Hooper v. Stokes

• Decision Date: 09 January 1933
• Citation: 107 Fla. 607,145 So. 855
• Parties: HOOPER v. STOKES[*]
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

145 So. 855

107 Fla. 607

HOOPER v. STOKES^[*]

Florida Supreme Court

January 9, 1933

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1933.

En Banc.

Suit by George T. Hooper against H. D. Stokes, as executor of the last will and testament of George C. Hooper, deceased, to revoke the probate of decedent's will. From a decree of the circuit court, which reversed the decree of the probate judge granting the prayer of the petition, petitioner appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; W. S Bullock, judge.

COUNSEL

R. L Anderson and D. Niel Ferguson, both of Ocala, for appellant.

W. E Smith, of Ocala, for appellee.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

George C. Hooper died testate December 12, 1928, leaving an only son, George T. Hooper, surviving his wife having divorced him May 11, 1926. The senior Hooper executed his will July 10, 1926, in which, after providing for the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, he divided the remainder of his property equally among two friends living in Baltimore and a half-sister living in Washington, D. C. He provided the following legacy in favor of George T. Hooper:

'To my son, George T. Hooper, I bequeath a transcript of the divorce proceedings of Maud G. Hooper against me. This transcript contains the false testimony that he gave against me. I trust that on occasional perusal of same will recompense him for any pecuniary loss that his act has caused him. Furthermore I direct that the Executor of my estate procure from each legatee, as named above, an affidavit that he or she will under no circumstances render any financial aid to the above mentioned George T. Hooper. The share or shares of any legatee who refuses to make such an affidavit shall revert to the Childrens Home Society of Florida, at Jacksonville.'

This suit was instituted December 7, 1929, by George T. Hooper to revoke the probate of the will of George C. Hooper on the ground that the testator was suffering from monomania or an insane delusion at the time the will was executed. The probate judge, after taking testimony and hearing argument of counsel, entered his decree granting the prayer of the petition to revoke the probate of the will, which decree was, on appeal, reversed by the circuit court. The instant appeal is from the decree of the circuit court.

The ultimate question brought here for our determination is whether or not the evidence shows that the testator was suffering from, and was dominated by, monomania or an insane delusion at the time be executed his will.

Monomania, sometimes designated paranoia, has reference to a craze or mania for a single object or class of objects. The subject of it may be perfectly sane as to all other objects. As with an insane delusion, monomania presupposes a species of mental disease. A mere belief in a state of facts, however imperfect or illogical, will not support an insane delusion. It must be the offspring of an unsound or deranged condition of the mind. Any belief which arises from reasoning from a known premise, however imperfect the process may be, or how illogical the conclusion reached, is not an insane delusion. If one of normal faculties can put himself in the place of the subject of an insane delusion and conceive how he could believe that which he is charged with believing, and still be in full possession of his faculties, an insane delusion is not established; neither will such a delusion be supported on undue prejudice, if based on any kind of reasoning.

An insane delusion has been defined as a spontaneous conception and acceptance as a fact, of that which has to real existence except in imagination. The conception must be persistently adhered to against all evidence and reason. It has also been defined as a conception originating spontaneously in the mind without evidence of any kind to support it, which can be accounted for on no reasonable hypothesis, having no foundation in reality, and springing from a diseased or morbid condition of the mind. Numerous other definitions might be cataloged, but the ultimate test applied by all is that the aberration must be such as indicates a diseased or deranged condition of the mind. Owen v. Crumbaugh, 228 Ill. 380, 81 N.E. 1044, 119 Am. St. Rep. 442, 10 Ann. Cas. 606; Smith v. Smith, 47 N. J. Eq. 566, 25 A. 11; Wait v. Westfall, 161 Ind. 648, 68 N.E. 271; Martin v. Thayer, 37 W.Va. 38, 16 S.E. 489; Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307; Mullins v. Cottrell, 41 Miss. 291; Potter v. Jones, 20 Or. 239, 25 P. 769, 12 L. R. A. 161; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69; 2 Words and Phrases, Second Series, 1092.

An insane delusion has frequently been held in this country as ample ground for voiding a will, though the testator's capacity may be otherwise unimpeached. Dibble v. Currier, 142 Ga. 855, 83 S.E. 949, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1, Text 8, 12; 1 Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators (16th Ed.) § 136; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 983, 985; Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N.E. 197, 40 L. R. A. 256, 63 Am. St. Rep. 211.

Whether or not the testator here was afflicted with an insane delusion must turn on the interpretation of the evidence adduced. This court is committed to the rule that the findings of fact by a probate court on conflicting evidence should ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal to the circuit court when there is ample evidence to sustain the findings; yet, where the probate judge misapprehended the legal effect of the evidence as an entirety, his findings should not be sustained merely because there is evidence that is contradicted on which the findings may be predicated. Hamilton v. Morgan, 93 Fla. 311, 112 So. 80.

The evidence shows that the testator was about fifty-five years of age at the time he executed his will. He was a man of common school education, had read considerably, had little toleration for the views of others that ran counter to his was early left an orphan, was a jeweler...