Hoopes v. Beale

• Decision Date: 07 May 1879
• Citation: 90 Pa. 82
• Parties: Hoopes <I>versus</I> Beale.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 82

90 Pa. 82

Hoopes versus Beale.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 28, 1879.

May 7, 1879.

March 28th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Chester county: Of January Term 1877, No. 96.

Charles H. Pennypacker, Wayne Mac Veagh and Joseph J. Lewis, for plaintiffs in error.—The witnesses were the obligors in a bond, the assignee of which is dead, and his administrators are the equitable and real plaintiffs. They were clearly incompetent under the Act of 1869. The suit is indeed in the name of Hoopes, but for the use of the administrators of Baily, who was, in his lifetime, assignor and sole owner of the bond. The administrators might, indeed, have sued in their own names. But the form of the action can make no difference, as to the evidence, which may be admissible for either party. There can be no advantage gained or lost by suing in the name of the assignor, for the use of the assignee, or in the name of the assignee, as the legal plaintiff. Parol evidence was not admissible to contradict the terms of the bond.

John J. Pinkerton, R. E. Monaghan and P. Frazer Smith, for defendants in error.—The evidence was admissible: Lippincott v. Whitman, 2 Norris 244; Greenawalt v. Kohne, 4 Id. 369. The witnesses were competent under the Act of 1869; Pattison v. Armstrong, 24 P. F. Smith 476. Executors and administrators are not the plaintiffs here. Hoopes is the plaintiff technically; he stands so on the record; he is so spoken of in the declaration as the party with whom the contract was made. The plaintiff could not have declared in any other way than that the contract was made with him; there is no averment of any interest whatever in the use parties.

Mr. Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court, May 7th 1879.

That parol evidence may be admitted to contradict, vary or even avoid a written instrument, where it is proved that, but for the oral stipulations, it would not have been executed, is a doctrine now so well settled that its discussion would be a mere waste of time. It is understood that this rule does not apply to negotiable paper, when in the hands of innocent holders for value, but other than this, we know of no exception.

Admitting the competency of the evidence, and there is no doubt but that Wells, Mullin and Doan, the trustees of the lodge, signed the bond in suit, with the express understanding that they were not to be personally liable, and it is manifest, that under no other condition would they have executed it.

This brings the transaction directly within the ruling of Irwin v. Shoemaker, 8 W. & S. 75, wherein it was held, that where a mortgage and bonds were given to secure the purchase-money of land sold, it was competent, in an action on one of the bonds, for the vendee to prove that it was part of the contract that the vendor was to look alone to the property sold for payment of the said purchase-money. It is indeed true, as was said by Mr. Justice...