Hoots v. Pennsylvania, CIV A 71-538.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV A 71-538.,CIV A 71-538.
• Citation: 118 F.Supp.2d 577
• Parties: Dorothy HOOTS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Commonwealth of PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

118 F.Supp.2d 577

Dorothy HOOTS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Commonwealth of PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV A 71-538.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

July 25, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark Fatla, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

OPINION

COHILL, Senior District Judge.

This case comes before us on motions filed by defendants Woodland Hills School District ("WHSD" or "the District") and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration of unitary status and the end of judicial supervision of the District's schools. Plaintiffs, representing a class of children and parents in the District, oppose these motions. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant defendants' motions in part and deny them in part, and thus commensurately curtail our oversight of the District's schools.

Background

The underlying facts of this case have been well documented numerous times throughout the past twenty-nine years. To provide a context for our consideration of the question of unitary status, however, we will briefly summarize the relevant developments in this litigation.

During the 1960s, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted legislation to consolidate smaller school districts in the Commonwealth's public school system. The Commonwealth ultimately approved the creation of the General Braddock Area School District, which combined the school districts of the Boroughs of Braddock, North Braddock, and Rankin in eastern Allegheny County. These were all financially troubled districts, and they also contained the largest concentration of minority students in this portion of the county. The Commonwealth also approved the creation or preservation of several neighboring school districts which were overwhelmingly white and economically affluent, including the school districts of Turtle Creek, Swissvale Area, Churchill Area, and Edgewood. This case was originally filed in 1971, when plaintiffs, representing a class of parents and children in the General Braddock Area School District, challenged the newly created district as racially discriminatory.

The late Judge Gerald Weber conducted a trial on plaintiffs' claims, and determined that the creation of the General Braddock Area School District was an act of de jure discrimination, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Hoots II), 359 F.Supp. 807, 823 (W.D.Pa.); aff'd, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.1974); cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884, 95 S.Ct. 150, 42 L.Ed.2d 124 (1974).

This finding of liability against the then defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, state Board of Education, and Allegheny County Board of School Directors, marked the beginning of the next phase of the case. Judge Weber directed the defendants to prepare a comprehensive school desegregation plan to remedy the Constitutional violations. There followed a series of proposed remedies, each of which the Court determined to be inadequate.¹ In the spring of 1981, the plaintiff class presented a merger plan, proposing a consolidation of the General Braddock Area School District with several neighboring districts serving predominantly white populations. Following a hearing on this proposal, the Court adopted the plaintiffs' plan and ordered the immediate merger of the General Braddock Area School District with the districts of Edgewood, Churchill, Swissvale, and Turtle Creek. Hoots VIII, 545 F.Supp. 1 (W.D.Pa.1981). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed both the merger and the underlying finding of de jure discrimination. Hoots IX, 672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 55, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982).

What was then known as the "New District" and later became the Woodland Hills School District, began operation with the 1981—82 school year. The second decade of this litigation saw the gradual development and implementation of remedial student assignment and transportation plans, designed to desegregate all of the District's schools. Judge Weber ordered an interim arrangement to desegregate the secondary schools during that first year, and directed the School Board to submit a plan for full desegregation of all the New District's schools. Ultimately, the School Board proved unable to do so.²

Following hearings on plans submitted by both parties, the Court adopted a comprehensive student assignment plan covering grades 1—12 for the 1982—83 school year. Hoots XIII, 539 F.Supp. 335 (W.D.Pa 1982), aff'd, Hoots XIV, 703 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.1983). At the elementary level, the assignment of students was based upon "paired" or "clustered" schools, configured as K—3 and 4—6; this arrangement successfully integrated the student populations, maintained two elementary facilities in the minority community, and required that both black and white students share the burden of transportation.

In 1987, the parties successfully negotiated a district-wide reorganization involving building utilization, grade structure, and student assignments. This configuration remains in effect at the present time, although changes from a junior high to a middle school structure are contemplated.³

The pairing of schools continues, and the burden of transportation remains shared by all students. Students in the former General Braddock Area School District travel to schools in the predominately white communities for grades K through 3; then all students at those schools attend grades 4-6 in facilities located in the minority community. Students throughout the District are transported to the junior and senior high schools.

By 1987, then, the attendance plan placed all children in desegregated facilities and imposed the burden of transportation on both black and white students. However, the discriminatory effects of the constitutional violation remained evident in such areas as student activities, guidance and discipline, educational programs, including special education, and staff assignments. Thus the defendants, with much prodding by the Court, began the process of implementing programs to remedy the vestiges of discrimination. Many of these racial disparities and remedies were first articulated in a Consent Decree, which was negotiated by the parties and presented to the Court on July 12, 1988.⁴

Judge Weber passed away in August, 1989, before any agreement could be reached on a remedial plan. This case was then assigned to the undersigned. The Court appointed a Hearing Officer, Mark T. Fatla, Esquire, to conduct a hearing on the parties' conflicting implementation plans. After six weeks of hearings, he issued a Report and Recommendation Regarding Desegregation Remedies on August 20, 1990 ("1990 R & R"). The Court then heard argument and adopted the Report and Recommendation, with three exceptions, including activities, in an unpublished Opinion and Order dated January 16, 1991 ("1991 Opinion & Order").

Recognizing that the vestiges of discrimination were embedded deep in all aspects of school life, we ordered that remedies for the constitutional violation proceed along several fronts at once. To assure that all students in the District received an equal education, we ordered a comprehensive redesign of curriculum and testing, so that the curriculum would be appropriate for heterogeneous, multicultural, detracked classrooms⁵ and that the effectiveness of this redesigned curriculum would be carefully monitored through proper assessments. We recognized, however, that merely providing an equal educational opportunity from 1991 forward would not address the existing gap between the races in academic performance. (1991 Opinion at 4.) Children who were already behind as a result of a segregated school system needed additional help, and, to that end, we ordered the District to implement appropriate compensatory and remedial programs beginning at the elementary level.

We also acknowledged the difficulties inherent in expecting teachers who were familiar only with tracked, homogeneous classrooms, to teach in the District's multicultural, detracked setting. Therefore, as part of the remedy we ordered the District to provide appropriate in-service training and workshops for its teachers and other staff.

To address the clear racial disparities in discipline, we ordered the District to reorganize the guidance department and to hire a number of new guidance counselors.

Our 1991 Opinion and Order included a variety of other miscellaneous remedial relief, including the hiring of certain specified personnel, although we declined to order the District to provide after-school transportation for activities. We also ordered that the cost of all court-ordered remedial programs be funded 90% by the defendant Commonwealth, as the party charged with the constitutional violation, and 10% by the District. (1991 Opinion & Order at ¶ 17; 1990 R & R at 96.)

The Court of Appeals reversed this Court's ruling on activities, and affirmed on all other issues. Hoots XVI, Nos. 91-3316, 91-3317, 91-3319, 91-3436, 1992 WL 289174 (3d Cir. filed Sept. 21, 1992). The 1990 R & R and the 1991 Opinion and Order remain the basis of the court-ordered remedies in place today.

Implementing the appropriate remedies and measuring their effectiveness remained a point of friction between the parties. In 1995, we again appointed Mr. Fatla to act as a Special Master in this matter. In that position he has conducted a series of hearings, including a lengthy hearing in 1997 on discipline and guidance, issued several Reports and Recommendations, and held regularly scheduled status conferences to attempt to resolve ongoing remedy and budget issues. Mr. Fatla has served the Court and the parties well in this capacity.

The defendants each filed motions for a declaration that the District has achieved unitary status in October of 1999. In addition, the District filed a unitary status transition plan. A hearing on these motions commenced on April 3, 2000, and we heard closing arguments on May 16. Defendants...