Hoover v. Tuttle
Decision Date | 25 November 1992 |
Citation | 611 So.2d 290 |
Parties | Harry P. HOOVER v. Craig TUTTLE, et al. 1910690. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Robert M. Shipman, Huntsville, for appellant.
D. Edward Starnes III and Kelly M. McDonald of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellees.
Harry P. Hoover sued Craig Tuttle; James Mullens; 1 Albert Wright; and American Legion Buford D. Byrom Post 176, Inc. ("the Post"); alleging, in pertinent part, that the defendants had defamed him and had invaded his privacy, and that the defendants had conspired to defame him and to invade his privacy. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants. Hoover appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The summary judgment was proper in this case if there was no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P. The burden was on the defendants to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If that showing was made, then the burden shifted to Hoover to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, so as to avoid the entry of a judgment against him. In determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to Hoover and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendants. Stafford v. Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co., 569 So.2d 720 (Ala.1990). Because this case was not pending on June 11, 1987, the applicable standard of review is the "substantial evidence" rule. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
The evidence in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to Hoover, shows that Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright were members of the Post's executive committee, which was responsible for, among other things, evaluating and voting on applications for the Post's vacant club manager position. Hoover applied for that position and submitted a resume. His application was rejected, however, during a committee meeting at which Wright's wife, a less qualified applicant, was hired. Hoover submitted the following affidavit of another member of the executive committee, Frank Harris, as evidence of what occurred during that meeting:
Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright denied making any defamatory comments concerning Hoover's military service record.
In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 435 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.1983), this Court noted:
The evidence in the present case, even when viewed most favorably toward Hoover, was insufficient to support Hoover's claim of an invasion of his privacy. Hoover submitted a job application and a resume to the Post's executive committee. The comments of Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright, if made at all, were made in a private meeting of the Post's executive committee. There was no evidence that the actions of Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright constituted an intrusion into Hoover's private concerns, either by physical intrusion or through some other form of investigation or examination. See Phillips, at 710-11. Likewise, there was no evidence that the comments allegedly made by Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright were made outside of the meeting of the executive committee; therefore, Hoover could not have been subjected to publicity that would violate ordinary decencies or that would create a false image of Hoover in the public's eye. Finally, there was no evidence that Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright appropriated some element of Hoover's personality for a commercial purpose. The evidence tends to show only that Tuttle, Mullens, and Wright made false statements to other members of the committee about Hoover's military service for the purpose of discrediting him and, thus, clearing the way for Wright's wife to be hired for the position of club manager. Therefore, if Hoover has actionable claims against these defendants, th...
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...scope of their duties, do not constitute a publication by either the corporation or the employees of the corporation." Hoover v. Tuttle , 611 So. 2d 290, 293 (Ala. 1992) ; see also Nelson , 534 So. 2d at 1093 (Ala. 1988). Gray's argument fails because, although her disclosures were communic......
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Mills v. Wex-Tex Industries, Inc., 96-D-1616-S.
...must show that the defamatory matter was published by proof that it was communicated to someone other than herself. Hoover v. Tuttle, 611 So.2d 290, 293 (Ala.1992). There is no evidence in the record that this document was ever communicated to a third party. Accordingly, because there is no......
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