Hoover v. Voigtman

• Decision Date: 26 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 110-J,110-J
• Citation: 248 A.2d 136,103 N.J.Super. 535
• Parties: Page 535 103 N.J.Super. 535 248 A.2d 136 Margaret HOOVER, Plaintiff, v. Edward VOIGTMAN, Defendant. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Morris County, New Jersey
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 535

103 N.J.Super. 535

248 A.2d 136

Margaret HOOVER, Plaintiff, v. Edward VOIGTMAN, Defendant.

No. 110-J.

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Morris County, New Jersey.

November 26, 1968.

Harold T. McGovern, Newton, for plaintiff(McGovern & Roseman, Newton, attorneys).

Leonard Goodkin, Lake Hiawatha, for defendant (Irwin Kanengiser,Lake Hiawatha, attorney).

POLOW, J.J. & D.R.C.

Plaintiff seeks increased support for four children born of her ma rriage to defendant. Her application reises the question of whether this court has the power to require continued support for Edward, the eldest son, who is now 18 years of age and a college freshman. In add ition to oral argument, counsel were given the opportunity to file bri efs on this question. Testimony was taken concerning the background, education and financial status of both parents as well as Edward's scholastic ability.

The marriage was terminated by foreign divor ce in 1962. Both parties have since remarried. Plaintiff has had custody of the children since the divorce. Defendant's obligation to support them was fixed by order of this court, entered on April 22, 1966; it provided for payments of $60 a week and satisfaction of any unusual medi cal and dental exxpenses. On June 10, 1966 the order was modified to require defendant to pay for eye care and dental expenses of the child ren in addition to the $60 weekly support. Defendant is presently in arrears on support payments. The cause is disputed. Plaintiff charges defendant with a deliberate reduction in support payments because he knew Edward intended to enter college in September of this year, Defendant attributes the arrears to his financial inability to meet his obligations.

Edward was born on December 26, 1949. He was a 'straight A' student in high school. Because of his particular aptitude in the sciences, he received an Allied Chemical Corporation grant and apparently has an excellent chance that the grant will be renewed. He is enrolled at Renss elaer Polytechnic Institute in Philadelphia. Defendant concedes that the boy is scholastically gifted. He is, in fact, proud of his son's achiev ements. He testified that he would like his son to have a college ed ucation, but stated he was unable to afford it.

Defendant himself completed only three years of high school. Plain tiff is a high school graduate. Defendant is empolyed by Warner Chilco t Laboratories in Morris Plains and earns $10,500 a year. His present wife is also employed and between them they have a net monthly income of approximately $1,030. They have no children in their household at present, but apparently defendant's elderly father-in-law is partially dependent on his daughter.

Defendant argues against continuing support for his oldest son on three grounds financial inability; the availability of Rutgers University at a much lower cost that the yearly $3,200 charge for board and tuition at Rensselaer, and the absence of legal authority in this court to ord er such support. On the last score, we were mindful at the time of or al argument of the decision in Nebel v. Nebel, 99 N.J. Super. 256, 239 A.2d 266 (Ch.Div.1968). ¹ Defendants sees Nebel as inapplicable here since it was decided in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court. He argues that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is limited in and to its statutory authority and is without jurisdiction to ord er a contribution toward college expenses. Indeed, he goes further and suggests that this court lacks the power to order support for any 'child' as a person under that age, and upon R.R. 6:1-3(c) which defines 'adu lt' as a person 18 years of age or over.

Plaintiff disputes the disclaimer of financial inability. She also urges a different view of Nebel and the power of this court. She does not seek to impose the entire obligation of Edward's education upon defendant; rather, she maintains that $15 a week for each child is no longer appropriate. She urges tht circumstances have increased, the children's needs become greater as they grow older, and defendant's income has increase substantially. ² She concludes that the suppor t for each child should be increased accordingly and that defendant should be required to continue to provide weekly support for Edward despite the fact that he is over 18,has complet ed his high school education and is a college student.

The jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is defined and limited by statute. Concerning support N.J.S. 2A:4-18, N.J.S.A. confers:

'* * * jurisdiction concurrently with such other courts as may have jurisdiction over the matter, to hear and determine in a summary manner disputes and complaints:

X * * * * * *

* * *

b. IInvolving matters of support * * * as to which jurisdiction is vested in the superior court.'

The statutory language is clear. Concurrent jurisdiction means precisely that i.e., the authority to hear matters cognizable in the Superi or Court and to 'base an award for support on the same obligations as are recognized' by that tribunal. Wilson v. Wilson, 86 N.J.Super. 61, 64, 205 A.2d 902, 903 (App.Div.1964); Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 609,123 A.2d 3 (1956), affirming, 39 N.J.Super. 117, 120 A.2d 510 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1956). 'Accordingly resort may properly be had to precedents established as a result of proceedings in that court * * * to determine the extent of a father's duty to support his child imposed or imposable under the law of this State * * * .' Daly v. Daly, supra, 39 N.J.Super., at p. 122, 120 A.2d at p. 512. Those precedents, codified into a dire ct holding in Nebel, indicate that, under appropriate circumstances, the obligation to support may include all or part of college education al expenses. See also e.g. Jonitz v. Jonitz, 25 N.J.Super. 544, 96 A.2d 782 (App.Div.1953); Rufner v. Rufner, 131 N.J.Eq. 193, 24 A.2d 180 (E. & A. 1941). Thus, under the grant of concurrent jurisdiction this court has the power to order a father to contribute toward payment of § uch expenses.

Defendant's broader argument does not in essence contradict this conclusion but, instead, focuses upon the authority of this court to order support of any kind for children who have attained their 18th birthday. The resolution of this argument lies in the nature and in tent of the statutory grant of jurisdiction itself.

A substantial change has taken place in our concept of the § pecific stage of education which is regarded as a 'necessary,' to which a child is entitled at the expense of the parent. Certainly, the old rule limited the obligation to a 'common public school and high school eduction. ' Ziesel v. Ziesel, 93 N.J.Eq. 153, 115 A. 435, 18 A.L.R. 896 (E. & A. 1921). However, restrictive common law concepts of support, a reflection of then existing judicial and social policies, have given way to enlargement by statute and modern judicial decision. See Jonitz v. Jonitz, supra, 25 N.J.Super., at p. 553, 96 A.2d 782; Daly v. Daly, supra, 21 N.J. at p. 610, 123 A.2d 3; Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 72 A.2d 318 (1950). Consistent with such advances is the realization that age alone is not the determinative factor in evaluating an obligation to support. With specific reference to age 18, prece dents suggest an unemancipated infant does not necessarily reach maturi ty at that point but rather 'becomes a sui generis person and therefore no longer a child' at age 21. Johonson v. State, 18 N.J. 433, 114 A.2 d 1 (1955), certiorari denied 350 U.S. 942, 76 S.Ct. 318, 100 L.Ed. 822 (1956); Leith v. Horgan, 24 N.J.Super. 516, 517-518, 95 A.2d 15 (Ap p.Div.195...