HOOVER v. WAGGOMAN
Decision Date | 24 November 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 5095,5095 |
Citation | 199 P.2d 991,52 N.M. 371 |
Parties | HOOVER v. WAGGOMAN. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Iden & Johnson and James Paulantis, all of Alburquerque, for appellant.
W. A. Keleher and A. H. McLeod, both of Alburquerque, for appellee.
The question is whether certain restrictive covenants contained in a deed conveying city lots, restrict the use of the land so that the grantee is precluded from its use for parking automobiles.
This action was brought by plaintiff (appellee) to enjoin the defendant from paving and using lots 1 and 2 of Block 55 of the University Heights addition to the City of Alburquerque for storing automobiles.
The material facts found by the court and its conclusions of law are in substance as follows:
'That the provisions of the deed from the subdivider and owner, conveying Lots 1 and 2 in Block 55 of the University Heights Addition, as well as the provisions in all other deeds conveying property in said addition (except the small portion designated for business), read as follows:
"The said party of the second part in consideration of the premises and of the sum of One Dollar to her in hand paid by the party of the first part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, for herself and her heirs and assigns, herebycovenants and agrees with the said party of the first part, its successors and assigns,that the said party of the second part, her heirs or assigns, shall not erect upon said premises or permit or suffer to be erected or placed upon said premises any tent house and no building other than dwelling houses and such barns, garages or outhouses as may be necessary in connection with the use of said premises for dwelling purposes nor more than one dwelling house to be erected on any one lot. Nor shall any building of less than restricted value on the rear of the lot be used for dwelling purposes longer than four months from the date of construction, and all adobe buildings must be cement finished on the exterior within six months after construction, and no dwelling house and accompanying barns, garages, outhouses or porches thereon be placed nearer than 25 feet to the front line of the lot, and no dwelling house and accompanying barns and outbuildings shall be of less value than $4,100, nor shall any of such lots be subdivided or buildings fronted on side streets, nor shall any open or dry toilets be permitted on said premises, nor shall any solid board fences be constructed on the lots, nor shall any building erected on said lots be used as a store or sanitarium (sanitarium being defined as any place harboring three or more people afflicted with tuberculosis) or for any other purpose than as private dwelling places. It is understood and agreed that said covenants on the part of the grantees herein shall attach to and run with the land hereby conveyed, and the party of the first part or any owner of a lot in said Addition shall have the right to enforce compliance with said covenants by injunction or other legal proceedings, and in case the said party of the second part, her heirs or assigns shall persist in the violation of said covenants after notice to desist, the title hereby granted shall revert to and revest in the said party of the first part or its successors or assigns, shall be entitled to the immediate possession of said premises.'
'That the plaintiff is the owner of Lot 22 of Block 50 of the University Heights Addition to the City of Alburquerque, New Mexico, and that such lot is used by the plaintiff as a residence for himself and family.
'That the defendant has recently built a business block or unit on all or part of Block 56 of the University Heights Addition to the City of Alburquerque, New Mexico, and that such business unit contains a total of twenty-nine separate store units which are rented or are offered for rent for the conducting of different kinds of business.
'That the defendant is the owner of Lots 1 and 2 of Block 55 of the University Heights Addition to the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and that defendant intended to use such lots for parkingpurposes for the tenants and their employees who will have store space in the business unit above referred to.
'That the defendant had graded said Lots 1 and 2 of Block 55 and intended to place an asphalt top of two inches on such property, and when paved defendant intended to have such lots used for parking in connection with the business unit above referred to.
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The trial court concluded that the building restrictions contained in the chain of title to Lots 1 and 2 of Block 55 of the University Heights Addition prohibits the use of such lots for any purpose other than private dwelling places, and particularly for the use of such property for parking automobiles.
The trial court entered a decree accordingly, perpetually enjoining the defendant from using, or attempting to use, the lots in question 'as a parking lot, either for the customers that might trade at the business unit on Block 56 of said addition, or as a parking lot for the tenants in such business unit, or as a parking lot for the tenants' employees, or for any other purpose than as a place for private dwellingplaces and the defendant is perpetually enjoined from paving such property for use as a parking lot.'
It is asserted that the restrictions imposed upon the lots in question relate only to buildings that may be erected thereon, but do not restrict the use of the land itself.
The part of the restrictive covenant here involved is in effect that 'no building other than dwelling houses, and such barns, garages or outhouses as may be necessary in connection with the use of said premises for dwelling purposes, nor more than one dwelling house to be erected on any one lot * * * nor shall any buildings erected on said lots * * * be used for any other purpose than as private dwelling places.'
It will be observed that no specific restriction is included in the covenant that applies to the land alone. As we understand the contention of defendant, it is that under the rule of strict construction which applies in such cases, the owner may use the land itself, before or after the construction of a dwelling house thereon, for any purpose, business or other purpose, for which it might have been used if such covenants were absent; provided the use shall not require the erection of buildings thereon. In other words, that there are no restrictions that preclude the use of the land for any 'open air' business.
This contention is supported by numerous authorities, of which the defendant cites the following: Granger v. Boulls, 21 Wash.2d 597, 152 P.2d 325, 155 A.L.R. 523; Jenney v. Hynes, 282 Mass. 182, 184 N.E. 444; Id., 285 Mass. 332, 189 N.E. 102; Shaddock v. Walters, Sup., 55 N.Y.S.2d 635; Cooke v. Kinkead, 179 Okl. 147, 64 P.2d 682; Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181, 155 A. 316. The deed involved in the Granger case had substantially the same restrictions as in the case here considered. It was held that such restrictions applied only to buildings, and did not prevent the owner of the land from using it for grazing or keeping cattel, pigs, chickens, and rabbits thereon. The Washington court said [21 Wash.2d 597, 152 P.2d 326];
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