Hope v. Cartledge

• Decision Date: 03 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 6:14-cv-03571-RBH
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Maurice Shaundell Hope, Petitioner, v. Warden Cartledge, Respondent.

Maurice Shaundell Hope, Petitioner, v. Warden Cartledge, Respondent.

Civil Action No.: 6:14-cv-03571-RBH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

August 3, 2015

ORDER

Petitioner Maurice Shaundell Hope, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Petition, ECF No. 1. Respondent Warden Cartledge filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as a return and supporting memorandum. See ECF Nos. 15 & 16. Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent's motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 23. The matter is now before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of United States Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald.¹ See R & R, ECF No. 26. The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment and deny Petitioner's petition. R & R at 17. Petitioner filed timely objections to the R & R. See Pet.'s Objs., ECF No. 28.

For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's R & R and grants Respondent's motion, but also grants Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

Background

Petitioner proceeded to a trial in state court on charges of kidnapping, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violentcrime. Petition at 1; ECF Nos. 15-1, 15-2, & 15-3. The State's theory at trial was that Petitioner and two accomplices robbed a Bi-Lo grocery store at approximately 7:00 A.M. on New Year's Day: Petitioner and one accomplice entered the store wearing ski masks and demanded money from the store manager and bookkeeper at gunpoint, while the other accomplice remained outside as the getaway driver. ECF No. 15-1 at 39-45, 47-122. Petitioner presented an alibi defense, calling himself, his wife, and four other witnesses who testified he was at home during the time of the alleged robbery. ECF No. 15-1 at 45-47; ECF No. 15-2 at 3-117.

The jury found Petitioner guilty as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of thirty years' imprisonment. ECF No. 15-3 at 39-40, 45-46. After the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's direct appeal pursuant to Anders,² Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging, among other grounds, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an alibi jury instruction. ECF No. 15-3 at 49, 54, 103, 107; ECF No. 15-7 at 2-3. The state PCR court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Petitioner's application, finding (1) trial counsel "may have been ineffective for failing to ensure that an alibi instruction was given to the jury"; but (2) Petitioner did not show prejudice from the lack of an alibi charge. Id. at 107-110. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari, and his appellate counsel filed a Johnson³ petition raising the alibi instruction issue. ECF No. 15-10 at 3, 7-9. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari and remitted the case. ECF Nos. 15-13 & 15-14. Petitioner then filed his § 2254 habeas petition.

In his § 2254 petition, Petitioner raised a single ground for relief: that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the law of alibi. Petition at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 2-5.Respondent agreed Petitioner exhausted his state remedies for this ground as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), and that the ground was ripe for adjudication in federal court. ECF No. 15 at 16-17.

Standard of Review

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).

Discussion

I. Habeas Standard

Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs review of his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA,federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision," and "[e]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and Petitioner has the burden to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Under the AEDPA, a federal court must afford a state court's decision "deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case" is being considered on direct review. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. Federal review of a state court decision under the AEDPA standard does not require an opinion from the state court explaining its reasoning. See id. at 98 (observing "[t]here is no text in [§ 2254] requiring a statement of reasons" by the state court). If no explanation accompanies the state court's decision, a federal habeas petitioner must show there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Id. Pursuant to § 2254(d), a federal habeas court must (1) determine what arguments or theoriessupported or could have supported the state court's decision; and (2) ask whether it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding of a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 102.

In other words, to obtain habeas corpus from a federal court, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103. "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Id. at 102. Section 2254(d) codifies the view that habeas corpus is a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. at 102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Strickland Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be reviewed under the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A habeas petitioner must first show trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. Second, the petitioner must show prejudice, meaning "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 688, 694. In cases brought under § 2254, "it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, . . . § 2254(d)(1) requires a habeas petitioner to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner." James v. Harrison, 389 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has "made clear that the unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court togrant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [the] petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. The Magistrate Judge's R & R and Petitioner's Objections

The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment. R & R at 17. In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge considered Petitioner's claim that he is entitled to habeas relief because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an alibi jury instruction. Id. at 12-16. After reviewing the record in great detail, the Magistrate Judge...