Hope v. Madison

Decision Date03 April 1939
Docket Number35164.
Citation192 La. 593,188 So. 711
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesHOPE v. MADISON.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1939.

Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Webster J. F. McInnis, Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Eleanor M. Hope against Charles C. Madison to annul and set aside sale of oil, gas, and mineral rights. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Blanchard, Goldstein, Walker & O'Quin, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Campbell & Campbell, of Minden, and Herold, Cousin & Herold of Shreveport, for appellee.

ODOM Justice.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Eleanor M. Hope, is the owner of 740 acres of land in Webster Parish. On June 22, 1936, by private act acknowledged before a notary, she sold to the defendant Charles C. Madison, an undivided 1/3 interest in all of the oil, gas, and mineral rights, royalty, rents, and privileges in and to said lands, ‘ in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and other valuable considerations, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged’ .

The purpose of this suit is to annul and set aside that sale. From a judgment rejecting her demands and dismissing her suit, she prosecutes this appeal.

As a cause of action, she alleged in her original petition that the consideration for the sale of the minerals was that Madison, who is an attorney-at-law, obligated himself to file suit at his own expense and to prosecute the same to successful completion, to obtain a cancellation of two oil and gas leases which she had made covering the land which she owned; that suit was filed for that purpose, ‘ although petitioner has been informed that the said Charles C. Madison did not prepare said suit, although appearing as one of the attorneys of record.’

She further alleged that, although she made repeated demands upon Madison to do so, he ‘ failed and refused to proceed further with said suit and to prosecute the same diligently to a successful termination in accordance with his obligation and in fact failed and refused to render any assistance in said suit whatsoever’, and therefore ‘ there was no consideration for the mineral sale referred to in paragraph 2, above.’

She alleged that Madison had received in excess of $14,000.00 for leases on a portion of said mineral interest, which was then deposited in a bank in Shreveport, La., under an escrow agreement, which amount, she alleged, belonged to her. Madison being a non-resident, she prayed that said amount be attached and that she be decreed the owner thereof, and prayed for judgment ‘ cancelling and annulling that certain mineral deed’ which she made to Madison.

In this petition plaintiff makes it perfectly clear that her cause of action for setting aside the mineral sale was that the sale was made without consideration.

The curator ad hoc appointed to represent Madison, the absentee defendant, filed a plea of estoppel, the basis of which was that in the instrument sought to be annulled plaintiff acknowledged and declared the receipt of the consideration therefor; and further, that on December 30, 1936, plaintiff joined the said Madison and Clifford E. Hays in a contract and agreement made in favor of J. G. Sellwood, in which agreement it was stipulated, and therefore admitted by plaintiff, that the minerals in and under said lands were owned in the following proportions: 32/48 owned by Mrs. Hope; 13/48 owned by Charles C. Madison, and 3/48 owned by Clifford E. Hays; and that on March 20, 1937, she joined said Madison and said Hays in the execution of a contract and agreement with a certain oil company, in which agreement she recognized that said Madison and said Hays owned interests in the minerals; that on the same day she joined said Madison and said Hays in the execution of an oil and gas lease to an oil company, in which it was stipulated that the minerals in and under said lands were owned by herself, Madison, and Hays, in the proportions above stipulated.

It is further alleged as a basis for the plea of estoppel that on February 13, 1937, the plaintiff joined the said Madison and the said Hays and one J. G. Sellwood in a suit styled Eleanor M. Hope et als. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation, in which suit plaintiff judicially acknowledged and asserted that she and other parties plaintiff were the owners of the oil and gas rights; and that on May 19, 1937, the plaintiff joined Madison, Hays, Hunt Oil Co., Sellwood, and J. B. Atkins in a suit against the Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., wherein plaintiff judicially declared and asserted that she, together with the other plaintiffs therein, were the owners of the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under 500 acres of the land.

All the above transactions, it is alleged, took place long after plaintiff made the sale to the defendant.

There was no ruling on the plea of estoppel, which was filed on January 7, 1938. With full reservation of his rights under the plea, defendant filed answer on January 21, which, in effect, is a general denial, and the case was set down to be tried on March 21.

On February 9, plaintiff filed, without objection on the part of defendant, a supplemental petition, in which it is stated that, at the time the original petition was filed, ‘ her attorneys were not fully acquainted with all of the facts concerning her cause of action, so that it is necessary to amend’ .

Plaintiff alleged in this petition that her lands had been seized under a writ of attachment in a suit styled C. M. Gordon v. Mrs. Eleanor M. Hope, and that, as a result of a judgment rendered therein, her property had been sold to C. M. Gordon, the plaintiff therein; that said sale was void because of the plaintiff's failure to comply with some of the requirements of the law; that petitioner is a woman without business training or experience, and that during the years 1935 and 1936 and prior thereto the said Madison ‘ acted as your petitioner's confidential agent with regard to this property and other matters', and that she had entire confidence in the said Madison, ‘ believing him to be wholly devoted to her interest’ .

She further alleged that she granted certain oil, gas, and mineral leases affecting her property, and that said Madison advised her that suits should be brought to have the sheriff's sale made to the said C. M. Gordon declared null and to have said oil and gas leases cancelled; that said Madison represented to her that, although not a Louisiana lawyer, he was capable of bringing and prosecuting such suits, and told her that he would willingly handle these matters for her for his expenses and such additional amount as she might desire to pay him when his work was done, and that accordingly she authorized the said Madison to institute both suits, and that he agreed to do so on the terms and conditions named by her. She further alleged that she was ignorant and uninformed as to the value of her property or the minerals thereunder or the leases affecting the same, and relied wholly upon the representation and advice of the said Madison in such matters; that shortly prior to June 22, 1936, the date on which she made the sale to the said Madison, he advised her ‘ that a conveyance of an undivided one-third interest in and to the minerals in and under the property hereinabove described would be a reasonable and just compensation to be paid him for bringing the aforesaid suits and carrying them through to final judgment’ .

She further alleged that said Madison knew that such representations were false and knew further that it was possible for him, as petitioner's agent, to have employed competent Louisiana attorneys to represent her and handle said suits ‘ for an interest in the minerals mentioned smaller than 1/3’, and that as a matter of fact the said Madison had already entered into an agreement with Clifford E. Hays, an attorney of Webster Parish, to perform all of the aforesaid services ‘ for a relatively small interest in the aforesaid minerals'. She further alleged that in her desire to accord said Madison fair treatment and pay him what his services were worth, she transferred to him an undivided 1/3 interest in said minerals; that during all this time she thought said Madison was acting as her confidential agent and that she had assumed that he would perform such services for a fee as small as would have been charged her by a competent Louisiana attorney.

In Paragraph 9 of her supplemental petition she alleged that, after inducing her to execute the conveyance to him, ‘ the said Charles C. Madison performed no services whatsoever of your petitioner, as he had promised to do’ ; that the suit was prepared by Hays, the Louisiana attorney, who performed all the services in connection therewith, ‘ without any beneficial assistance whatsoever from Charles C. Madison, whose participation in the proceedings was confined to having his name signed to the pleadings as one of petitioner's counsel .

In Paragraph 12 of her petition plaintiff alleged that she had repeatedly demanded that said Madison prosecute to completion the suits which had been filed by Hays, but that said Madison, ‘ after having obtained the conveyance of the mineral interest from your petitioner, lost interest in your petitioner's affairs, declined to proceed with the prosecution of the aforesaid suit or to render any assistance to your petitioner, and to Clifford E. Hays in connection therewith and openly stated that he would render no further services in connection with it; and similarly, the said Charles C. Madison has done nothing in preparing for the trial of the reconventional demand of C. M. Gordon against your petitioner .

She further alleged that the services of the said Madison to her were in fact valueless; and that, at the time the said Madison...

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