Hopkins, Matter of

• Citation: 566 A.2d 1011
• Parties: In the Matter of The Honorable William J. HOPKINS, Jr., a Judicial Officer.
• Decision Date: 16 November 1989
• Court: Delaware Court of the Judiciary

Page 1011

566 A.2d 1011

In the Matter of The Honorable William J. HOPKINS, Jr., a Judicial Officer.

Delaware Court on the Judiciary.

Submitted Sept. 27, 1989.

Decided Nov. 16, 1989.

James E. Liguori, Hudson, Jones, Jaywork, Williams & Liguori, Dover, for respondent.

Charles P. Brandt, Brandt and Dalton, P.A., Wilmington, assigned as presenter.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH, and HOLLAND, JJ., ALLEN, Chancellor, and STIFTEL, President Judge.

CHRISTIE, Chief Justice:

A written complaint against Judge William J. Hopkins, Jr. was filed on February 16, 1989, by the Acting Administrator of the Justice of the Peace Courts alleging that Judge Hopkins was guilty of wilful misconduct in connection with a violation by him of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 A(3). ¹ The Court on the Judiciary, acting pursuant to the provisions of art. IV, § 37 of the Delaware Constitution ² and Court on the Judiciary Rule 3(b)(1), directed a Preliminary Investigatory Committee (the "Committee") to investigate the complaint. In its report, the Committee found that there was probable cause to believe that Judge Hopkins was subject to censure, suspension, removal, or retirement and recommended a severe reprimand of Judge Hopkins by this Court. The Court on the Judiciary then appointed Judge Henry duPont Ridgely as the Board of Examining Officer (the "Board") to hold a hearing on the charges and to render a report. Ct.Jud.R. 5-8. In the Board's final report, it concluded that Judge Hopkins' actions were the result of errors in judgment. The Board, acting on the theory that wilful misconduct required a showing of bad faith, concluded that wilful misconduct had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. As a result, it recommended that no further disciplinary action be taken against Judge Hopkins.

The Court on the Judiciary, acting sua sponte pursuant to Ct.Jud.R. 9(b), ordered further proceedings before the entire Court and appointed Charles P. Brandt, Esquire, to present the case to the Court, under a rule to show cause why the recommendation of the Board of Examining Officer should be rejected. Ct.Jud.R. 9(c)(1). Oral arguments by counsel for the respondent and the presenter were heard. The Court, having reviewed the entire record, now holds that: a) bad faith is not a necessary element of wilful misconduct, b) Judge William J. Hopkins, Jr. was guilty of wilful misconduct as that term is used in the Delaware Constitution, and c) Judge Hopkins is to be censured and suspended from his duties as Justice of the Peace for a period of one month.

I.

This case stems from an incident which occurred on January 27, 1989. On that date, William R. Davis was stopped by the Seaford police and charged with driving an unsafe vehicle and driving while his license was revoked. The Seaford police brought Davis to Justice of the Peace Court No. 4 where he was arraigned before Judge Hopkins. Davis pled not guilty to both charges. He was ordered to post a secured bond of $2,000 or a ten percent cash bond on the charge of driving while his license was revoked and to sign his own recognizance for the unsafe vehicle charge. While at Court No. 4, Davis was informed that an outstanding warrant from Harrington (which was within the jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace Court No. 6) had been discovered in a routine computer check. Davis insisted to Judge Hopkins that the charge in Court No. 6 had been dismissed and that he did not owe the $37.25 fine which would have resulted from a conviction on that charge. At that point, Judge Hopkins allowed Davis to go out to the hall to use the phone in order to try to raise the money for his $2,000 bond. It had become apparent that he had only two twenty dollar bills with him in his jacket pocket.

Davis later informed the court clerk that he was unable to raise the bond money by phone calls, and he also indicated that he refused to pay the fine said to be due at Court No. 6. Judge Hopkins then ordered Davis and the arresting officer back into the courtroom. Judge Hopkins asked that Davis pay the $37.25 due to Court No. 6. When he refused, Judge Hopkins ordered the police officer to take the money from him. At that point, the officer used some force to extract $40.00 in cash from Davis' pocket. Accounts of exactly how much force was used differ, but another justice of the peace stated that he entered the courtroom when he heard loud noises and observed the officer holding Davis by the neck with one of his arms pressed against the table. After placing Davis in handcuffs, the officer delivered the money to the court clerk. The clerk in turn deducted $37.25 from the $40 and returned the change and a receipt to Davis. Davis was then transported to jail in default of the $2,000 bond set on the pending charge in Court No. 4.

The clerk of Court No. 4 sent a mail-in disposition slip to Court No. 6 on January 31, 1989. Thereafter, a representative from the Harrington Police Department appeared at Court No. 6 with the original ticket and requested that the charge be dismissed. A clerk of Court No. 6 related that she was aware that Davis had repeatedly tried to straighten out this ticket in 1988, but a judge had not been available and the police had misplaced the original of the ticket. According to the clerk, the Harrington police intended to have the charge dismissed but had never done so. Consequently, the charge was still listed in the computer as outstanding. On February 3, 1989, Court No. 6 issued a check to Davis for $37.25, describing it as an overpayment.

II.

The reports of the Preliminary Investigatory Committee and the Board of Examining Officer have "the force and effect of a master's report in Chancery." Ct.Jud.R. 9(a). Therefore, this Court is obligated to conduct its own evaluation of the evidence adduced by the Committee and the Board and reach an independent conclusion as to the sanction imposed. In the Matter of Rowe, Del.Jud., 566 A.2d 1001 (1989). We agree with the Preliminary Investigatory Committee that there is evidence tending to show that Judge Hopkins violated art. IV, § 37 of the Delaware Constitution. We do not agree with the Board of Examining Officer that the conduct of Judge Hopkins fails to show wilful misconduct on his part by clear and convincing evidence.

The standard of proof required for this Court to take action is clear and convincing proof. Ct.Jud.R. 7(f). This standard mandates more than a preponderance of evidence, but less than that required by a reasonable doubt standard. Rowe, 566 A.2d at 1006. We hold that the evidence indicates that Judge Hopkins' actions constituted misconduct in office and amounted to wilful misconduct.

Judge Hopkins has not denied that he gave the instructions to the police officer on January 27, 1989 to collect the money. He ordered the arrestee to pay a fine which the judge thought Davis owed in another court. When Davis protested and refused to pay, Judge Hopkins used his authority to order a police officer to seize the arrestee and use the force necessary to remove money from his person. Judge Hopkins' conduct was not authorized by the written instructions applying in such cases, and it was in violation of Canon 3 A(3) of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct. We rule that under the circumstances, it constituted "wilful misconduct" within the meaning of art. IV, § 37 of the Delaware Constitution. There being no credible evidence to the contrary, the wilful misconduct is deemed to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The evidence to show that Judge Hopkins' actions were "wilful" within the meaning of the Delaware Constitution as it has been construed is clear. See Rowe, 566 A.2d at 1008. Judge Hopkins has not denied that he knew that there was a procedure established in the Justice of the Peace Courts for handling outstanding warrants from another Justice of the Peace Court. He testified that he explained this procedure to Davis and that Davis initially offered to post $40.00 as a bond for appearance in Court No. 6. He also testified that when Davis apparently changed his mind and refused to pay any money to the court clerk, he articulated another policy by which he could have the money forcibly taken from Davis. However, there is no such policy, nor can the existing procedure be understood to include any such policy.

Judge Hopkins has asserted two arguments to indicate that his actions were based merely on a mistaken view of his authority under these circumstances. His first argument is that the procedure for warrants did not apply to the information which was generated by the computer search on Davis. The computer merely showed that there was an unpaid ticket in another court. This was verified by a phone call made by the arresting officer to the Harrington Police Department and further verification by the court clerk. However, Judge Hopkins testified that he relied on this information as he would if it were a warrant. His reliance on the regular procedure for warrants tends to refute his later argument that the policy as to warrants did not apply where the court was acting on information contained in a computer printout.

The second argument is that Judge Hopkins honestly believed that he had the authority to have the money seized from Davis. He has conceded that his belief was a mistake, but argues that the mistake was made in good faith. He explained that during the early part of his 23-year tenure as a judge, he overheard a remark made by the then Chief Justice of Delaware to the effect that a judge could use force to collect a fine from a defendant who had the money on his person but who refused to pay it. Testimony showed that Judge Hopkins had passed this notion on to at least three other justices of the peace whom he had trained prior to the issuance of Policy Directive 83-080. However, at the time of the incident in question, the clear written policy on the handling of fines due to...