Hopkins v. Balachandran
Decision Date | 24 September 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 34650.,34650. |
Citation | 76 A.3d 703,146 Conn.App. 44 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Gary HOPKINS v. Kalipatti S. BALACHANDRAN et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Dana M. Hrelic, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque, Hartford, and, on the brief, Karen L. Dowd, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael R. McPherson, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).
BEACH, ROBINSON and BORDEN, Js.
The plaintiff, Gary Hopkins, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for partial summary judgment and granting the cross motion for summary judgment of the defendants, Kalipatti S. Balachandran, a physician, and New England Family Medical and Walk In Center, LLC. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff waived his right to claim confidentiality in a medical document improperly disclosed by the defendants to his employer in violation of the privacy regulations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat.1936 (privacy rule), when he had disclosed previously a different version of the document to his employer.1 We conclude that the plaintiff waived his right to claim confidentiality in the subject medical record and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are necessary to our resolution of this issue. “The plaintiff ... was a correctional officer employed by the Connecticut Department of Correction. On April 24, 2008, he presented as a ‘walk-in’ patient to the defendants' medical clinic with complaints of ‘flu-like symptoms.’ After an examination by Dr. Kalipatti Balachandran, [the plaintiff] left the clinic. He left with a copy of his ‘superbill.’ A superbill is an itemized form listing various medical services with code numbers that physicians ordinarily submit to insurance companies or Medicare/Medicaid for reimbursement. The form lists dozens of conditions and procedures, and the doctor circles or checks the applicable items. The form completed at the doctor's office ... had certain items circled or checked, but it did not contain any language excusing [the plaintiff] from work until any stated future date, and it was not signed.
That date appeared to have been written over or manipulated. It looked like it had been changed from 4–24 to 4–28.
“Suspecting that the note was fraudulent due to the date manipulation, the plaintiff's employer referred the matter to the plaintiff's prison shift manager, Captain Christopher Corey, for investigation. Captain Corey called the doctor's office on May 5, 2008, particularly to determine whether the return to work date had been altered. He talked with the doctor's office assistant, Angel Caouette. He faxed to her a copy of the note supplied by the plaintiff. He asked if the return to work date was 4–24 or 4–28. She sounded perplexed, and said her office did not issue notes like that. She said she would investigate it. Captain Corey called back on May 9, 2008, and spoke with Dr. Balachandran. At that time, Dr. Balachandran told him that he did not issue the plaintiff a doctor's note, and that the handwriting on the superbill filed with the prison was not his handwriting. He also implied that certain medical information on the form had been changed. The matter was referred to the Department of Correction Security Division. That unit conducts additional investigations in such matters. Dr. Balachandran's office was later asked to send a copy of the original superbill to the plaintiff's employer for comparison. Dr. Balachandran sent a copy of the original superbill to the plaintiff's supervisor, Deputy Warden Donald Cyr, on May 21, 2008, with a cover letter. In the letter, Dr. Balachandran wrote that on comparing the document submitted by plaintiff to the Department of Correction with the original on file at his office,
“
The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against the defendants. The operative complaint contained a claim of negligence against each defendant for the improper disclosure of his health information. He alleged that as a direct result of the defendants' disclosure, he was terminated by his employer. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment.2On March 28, 2012, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment.
The court found, as evidenced by the privacy rule, that the defendants had a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining the confidentiality of the plaintiff's medical records and that they breached this duty when they disclosed and discussed the plaintiff's protected health information without his release or consent.3 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiff had waived his right to claim confidentiality in the superbill, in any form, because he had voluntarily disclosed it to his employer when he used it to support his absence from work. The court reasoned: (Citation omitted.) Accordingly, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he had waived any right to claim confidentiality in the superbill for two reasons. First, he argues that the court erred because the applicable exception to the preemption provision of the privacy rule does not apply and thus waiver cannot be pleaded in this case. The plaintiff maintains that because the requirements for a health care provider's disclosure of protected medical information, namely, a written authorization, and the exceptions for when authorization is not required under the privacy rule are more stringent than those allowed for the common-law defense of waiver, the privacy rule preempts the less stringent waiver doctrine. Second, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly found waiver because the superbill provided by him to his employer was different from the one provided by the defendants and because the defendants provided additional information beyond the superbill. He asserts that his employer was able to gain additional information about his protected health information as a result of the defendants' actions. We conclude that the privacy rule does not preempt the common-law defense of waiver, and also conclude that the court properly found waiver in this case.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 458, 998 A.2d 766 (2010).
The plaintiff first argues that the privacy rule preempts the equitable defense of...
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...to grant [a moving party's] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hopkins v. Balachandran, 146 Conn.App. 44, 51, 76 A.3d 703 (2013). “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.... ......
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Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Degennaro
...to grant [a moving party's] motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hopkins v. Balachandran, 146 Conn. App. 44, 51, 76 A.3d 703 (2013). "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. . ......