Hopkins v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 10 December 1918 |
Citation | 121 N.E. 465,225 N.Y. 76 |
Parties | HOPKINS v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INS. CO. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
Action by May Davies Hopkins against the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (174 App. Div. 23,160 N. Y. Supp. 247) reversing judgment of Trial Term (158 N. Y. Supp. 79) which dismissed complaint on merits, defendant appeals. Reversed, and judgment of Trial Court affirmed.Charles E. Hughes, of New York City, for appellant.
Warren C. Van Slyke, of New York City, for respondent.
On April 29, 1915, the defendant issued an accident policy to Mr. Hopkins in favor of his wife for $40,000 payable in case his death was caused by the burning or wrecking of a vessel on which he was a passenger. Physically attached to this policy was a rider by which the insured agreed that the policy should not cover any loss caused directly or indirectly by any act of any of the belligerent nations engaged in the present European War. This rider was prepared by an executive officer of the defendant, and the agent who negotiated the policy was authorized to deliver it to Mr. Hopkins if and when he signed the rider. Mr. Hopkins did sign, and the delivery of the policy was made. By its terms the policy included the rider, and the rider itself stated that it formed part of the policy. The form of the policy itself had been properly filed with the superintendent of the insurance department of the state of New York but the rider had never been filed with him. Mr. Hopkins was drowned when the Lusitania was torpedoed.
[1] This was the contract which the parties made between themselves. It is to be enforced as they made it and understood it unless, because of some statutory provisions, the courts are required to give it a construction or effect which the parties never intended.
[2] We are told that this must be done because of section 107 of the Insurance Law ( ). This section is entitled ‘Standard Provisions for Accident and Health Policies.’ It largely consists of standard provisions with regard to the details of the insurance contract which must be contained in every policy together with certain optional standard provisions both of which are principally for the protection of the rights of the insured. It is not said, nor was it the intention to say, that the policy should contain only these standard provisions. Unlike the standard form of fire policy prescribed by section 121 of the same law, they are not exclusive. There is no statement as in the case of fire policies that no agreement not contained in the standard provisions shall be made. Like the standard provisions in life policies (section 101), they are to be contained in every contract of insurance, but they form simply a part, not the whole, of such contract. Two rules, however, are laid down. No policy and no rider to a policy shall contradict, vary, or alter these standard provisions; and no policy shall be issued until a copy of its form shall have been filed with the superintendent of the insurance department for the purpose of enabling him to determine if it complies with the law.
The rider in question does not contradict or vary any of these standard provisions. But, as we have seen, it was never filed with the superintendent. It is said that in consequence the rider may be ignored, and the remainder of the policy, which was duly filed, may be enforced.
[3] The appellant argues that under the statute riders attached to the policies need not be filed. It says that what the statute requires to be filed is a copy of the form of the policy; that running through the statute a distinction is clearly made between the policy itself and indorsements and papers attached to it. We do not think, however, that in requiring the form of the policy to be filed any such distinction was in the mind of the Legislature. The rider itself is a part of the policy. The policy itself says so. So does the rider. It affects the risks and the rates which are based upon the extent of the risks assumed. The purpose of the statute is to see to it that the policy itself, of which the rider forms a part, and all its provisions, are such as to meet the approval of the superintendent. If it were not so, the greater part of the policy might be contained in riders and the object of the statute would be defeated. Nor it the distinction between the form of the policy and the attached papers consistently maintained. Repeatedly in the Insurance Law the Legislature refers to ‘the policy’ as meaning the entire contract between the parties. Sections 59, [225 N.Y. 81]62, 89. In the very section before us there is the same lack of discrimination. Section 107, subd. d, prohibits the issuing of a policy which contains a provision relative to cancellation at the instance of the insurer except in a fixed form. The word ‘policy’ here must include riders. Subdivision ‘e’ prohibits the issuing of policies purporting to make any portion of the charter of the insurer a part of the policy by mere reference. Here again the prohibition must refer to a rider as well as to the policy itself. Finally, in this very section the Legislature provides that ‘this policy includes the indorsements and attached papers.’ Subdivision c, 1. This would seem to define what it intended by ‘a copy of the form’ of the policy.
[4] Nor is the argument with regard to necessity convincing. The need of issuing riders to meet sudden emergencies is answered by the authority given to the superintendent to consent immediately to the form proposed if it is wise to do so.
What then is the result of the failure to file the rider? The statute provides two classes of remedies. If the violation is willful, a fine is imposed, and, if the company is a foreign one, its license may be revoked. Next, the policy is valid, but it is to be ‘construed as provided in this section, and when any provision in such a policy is in conflict with any provision of this section, the rights, duties and obligations of the insurer, the policy holder and the beneficiary shall be governed by the provisions of this section.’ Section 107, subd. i. Here again we understand the word ‘policy’ to mean the entire contract, whether it is contained in the policy itself, strictly speaking, or in agreements attached thereto.
The violation of the section referred to may occur in various ways: (1) By issuing a...
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