Hopkins v. Levandowski

• Decision Date: 20 June 1911
• Citation: Hopkins v. Levandowski, 250 Ill. 372, 95 N.E. 496 (Ill. 1911)
• Parties: HOPKINS v. LEVANDOWSKI.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

250 Ill. 372

95 N.E. 496

HOPKINS

v.LEVANDOWSKI.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1911.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Charles A. Williams, Judge.

Action by W. H. Hopkins against W. G. Levandowski. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Louis Greenberg, Clarence E. Mercer, and Thomas H. Mercer, for plaintiff in error.

McKenzie Cleland, for defendant in error.

CARTER, C. J.

An action of forcible detainer was brought by defendant in error in the municipal court of Chicago against the plaintiff in error December 3, 1910, and on the trial the court instructed the jury to find for defendant in error, and judgment was entered on the verdict. This writ of error was sued out to reverse that judgment, and the case is brought to this court on the ground that a constitutional question is involved as to the power of the municipal court to make rules.

[1] Plaintiff in error contends that the provisions of the municipal court act as to proceedings in forcible entry and detainer suits subsequent to the trial delegate legislative powers to the municipal court of Chicago and are therefore unconstitutional. Section 48 of the municipal court act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 37, § 311) provides that the practice in forcible entry and detainer suits, other than the mode of trial and the proceedings subsequent to trial, shall be the same, as near as may be, to that prescribed by law for similar cases in other courts of record, but that ‘the mode of trial and all proceedings subsequent to the trial shall be the same, as near as may be, as in other cases of the fourth class, mentioned in section 2 of this act.’ Cases of the fourth class in the municipal court are tried without written pleadings. Nothing is said in the municipal court act as to the issuing of a writ of restitution in forcible entry and detainer suits. Under the provisions of said municipal court act the municipal court may make rules for conducting and disposing of cases within the jurisdiction of that court for which methods of procedure have not been sufficiently prescribed by the said act. The municipal court, under these provisions, has made rules with reference to issuing writs of restitution in forcible entry and detainer suits. Section 34 of article 4 of the Constitution, under which the municipal court was created states that the practice in that court ‘shall be such as the General Assembly shall prescribe.’

Counsel for plaintiff in error argue that the Legislature cannot delegate to the municipal court the power to regulate the issuing of writs of restitution in forcible entry and detainer suits. In the recent case of People v. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953, this court held that it was not a violation of the provision of the Constitution vesting legislative power in the General Assembly to authorize boards created by the Legislature to formulate rules for the performance of their duties. In Coleman v. Newby, 7 Kan. 82, it is stated that the Legislature may enact general provisions, authorizing the courts who are to act thereunder to fill up the details. ‘They may mark out the outlines and leave those who are to act within these outlines to use their discretion in carrying out the minor regulations.’ In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 253, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, said: ‘The jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until the judgment shall be satisfied. * * * Were it even true that jurisdiction could be technically said to terminate with the judgment, an execution would be a writ necessary for the perfection of that which was previously done, and would consequently be necessary to the beneficial exercise of jurisdiction.’ Nothing is said in any of the authorities cited by counsel for plaintiff in error that in any way conflicts with the conclusions reached in the foregoing decisions. The sections of the municipal court act are not unconstitutional because they fail to state in specific terms the requirements as to the issuing of writs of restitution in forcible entry and detainer suits.

[2] Plaintiff in error occupied a storeroom in a building known as 4548 Cottage Grove avenue, Chicago, and the second-floor flat of a building in the rear of said store, under two leases executed in 1910 and both espiring April 30, 1913. The original lessor for the flat was the defendant in error, and for the store one Bovee, who afterwards, on April 12, 1910, assigned the lease to the defendant in error. The rental was payable in monthly installments of $35 on the...