Hopkins v. United States
Citation | 107 US App. DC 126,275 F.2d 155 |
Decision Date | 11 December 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 14939.,14939. |
Parties | Catherine HOPKINS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Mr. Nathan J. Paulson, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, WASHINGTON and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied January 19, 1960.
Appellant was convicted of attempting an abortion, which resulted in death, on or about March 3, 1956. She waived trial by jury and was tried by a judge.
She was indicted June 4, 1956, and pleaded not guilty June 8, 1956. But she was not tried until 29 months later, in November 1958. She spent two months of the intervening time in the District of Columbia General Hospital, and more than two years in the government mental hospital of St. Elizabeths.
At appellant's trial, Dr. Schultz, Chief Psychiatrist at the District of Columbia General Hospital, testified that she was admitted there June 26, 1956, and that her "discharge diagnosis * * * was schizophrenic reaction, schizo-effective type." On August 30, 1956, she was transferred to St. Elizabeths. Dr. Pettit, Clinical Director for Branch 1 at St. Elizabeths, testified that her condition was diagnosed there as "schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type", and that when she came under his observation in November, 1956, he concurred in this diagnosis.
In April, 1958, appellant was transferred to the "chronic division" of St. Elizabeths. Dr. Hoye of that division testified that "She was suffering from schizophrenia reaction, chronic undifferentiated type." After reviewing her case history, Dr. Hoye concluded that she had been "suffering from schizophrenic illness since 1952."
Thus three government psychiatrists, in two government hospitals where appellant was long under observation, beginning soon after the attempted abortion, testified that she was schizophrenic. No psychiatrist testified that she was not schizophrenic.
Appellant's mother testified that after an ear operation when appellant was 8 years old, She did not play with other children as her sister did. In 1951 the mother took appellant to D. C. General Hospital for mental observation.
Laymen who had no previous acquaintance with appellant, but talked with her at various times after the attempted abortion, testified that they observed no abnormal conduct and thought her sane. Two doctors who were not psychiatrists gave similar testimony in similar circumstances. It does not appear that either had occasion to, or did, undertake a mental examination of appellant. Accordingly both made it clear that they were not expressing professional opinions. Dr. Robert Smith, an intern in the gynecology ward at D. C. General Hospital, testified that the appellant The prosecutor asked Dr. Smith: "As a layman and not in your capacity as a physician did you notice anything abnormal by way of activity, or speech, or anything about Catherine Hopkins — in other words, as a layman, can you tell His Honor from what you saw and heard of her was she crazy or sane when you saw her over there?" Dr. Smith replied: "She — well, as far as I am concerned, she was sane." Dr. Rovner, Resident Physician in Obstetrics and Gynecology at D. C. General, talked with her while treating her for an incomplete abortion. The prosecutor said to him: "I want you, if you will, doctor, as a layman, tell His Honor whether or not, based on your observation of this defendant Hopkins, and hearing her talk and seeing her actions, tell His Honor, as a layman, whether or not in your opinion during her time in the hospital she was crazy or of sound mind." He replied:
As we said in Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 237, 252 F.2d 608, 618, "while a lay witness's observation of abnormal acts by an accused may be of great value as evidence, a statement that the witness never observed an abnormal act on the part of the accused is of value if, but only if, the witness had prolonged and intimate contact with the accused." This case resembles Satterwhite v. United States, 1959, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 267 F.2d 675. Cf. Douglas v. United States, 1956, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 239 F.2d 52.
That the attempted abortion was performed in an outrageous and brutal manner is not evidence that the appellant was sane.
An "accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 241, 214 F.2d 862, 875, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430. Carter v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S. App.D.C. 227, 234, 252 F.2d 608, 615. In the present case the government says it proved proposition (1). We disagree.1
Wright v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 39, 250 F.2d 4, 7. In the present case the evidence of insanity was plainly substantial. It understates the matter to say that in our opinion all the evidence did not permit the trier of the fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt2 that appellant had no mental disease or defect. We by no means suggest that lay testimony may not, in some circumstances, be reasonably thought so far to outweigh psychiatric testimony as to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. We deal only with the circumstances before us.
For purposes of comparison, we suggest a hypothesis. Suppose the question were, as it sometimes is in an abortion prosecution, whether the woman was pregnant; three gynecologists, each of whom examined her professionally for the purpose of determining whether she was pregnant, testified positively that she was not; two psychiatrists, each of whom talked with her but neither of whom examined her, testified, expressly "as laymen", that she looked pregnant to them; and several laymen testified to similar effect. It would hardly be contended that the prosecution could be thought to have proved pregnancy beyond a reasonable doubt.
Without regard to other questions, we reverse the conviction and remand the case with instructions that unless the government advises the District Court, without unreasonable delay, that it can meet its burden of proof at a new trial, the appellant is to be acquitted on the ground of insanity, committed to a mental hospital, and dealt with in accordance with D.C.Code (Supp. VII, 1959) § 24-301; namely, hospitalized until she is free from such abnormal mental condition as would render her dangerous to herself or the community in the reasonably foreseeable future. Overholser v. Leach, 1958, 103 U.S.App. D.C. 289, 257 F.2d 667, cert denied 1959, 359 U.S. 1013, 79 S.Ct. 1152, 3 L.Ed.2d 1038.
Reversed and remanded.
Appellant was convicted of an attempted abortion resulting in death, punishable, under the D.C.Code,1 as second degree murder. The attempted abortion was performed in an outrageous and brutal manner, the details of which are too repulsive for recital as a part of this opinion. Although the able counsel for appellant has raised the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to implicate her in this crime, the evidence as to appellant's guilt is overwhelming; and the fact is that counsel's main reliance is on the failure of the District Court to direct acquittal on the ground of insanity.
The case was heard by the court without a jury and, after the conclusion of the evidence, the judge set forth his findings recognizing the duty of the Government to prove the sanity of appellant beyond a reasonable doubt and holding that the Government had done just that. The principal evidence presented by the Government on the issue of insanity was the testimony of two medical doctors (not psychiatrists) associated with the District of Columbia General Hospital, who had examined appellant within three weeks following...
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