Hopkins v. United States, 82 CV 1938(ERN).
| Decision Date | 29 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82 CV 1938(ERN).,82 CV 1938(ERN). |
| Citation | 567 F. Supp. 491 |
| Parties | William J. HOPKINS, as administrator of the Estate of Patrick William Hopkins, and William J. Hopkins and Margaretha Hopkins, individually, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Schoer & Sileo, Forest Hills, N.Y., for plaintiffs by Gary Schoer, Forest Hills, N.Y.
Raymond J. Dearie, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y., for defendant by Jo Davis, Asst. U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y.
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), for damages for the death of their son, Private Patrick William Hopkins, allegedly caused by defendant's negligence in diagnosing, treating and supervising him while he was serving in the Armed Forces. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that defendant's negligence caused their son to suffer great emotional distress and mental anguish which eventually culminated in his death by suicide. Plaintiffs further allege that by virtue of his wrongful death, they were deprived of their son's support and companionship. In response to the complaint, defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, the court is compelled to agree and, accordingly, judgment dismissing the complaint must be granted.
The facts presented by the parties in their memoranda and supporting documents are essentially undisputed. Both parties agree that on or about April 24, 1980, the Hopkins' son was diagnosed by the Army as suffering from a psychological disorder characterized as moderate to acute, paranoid schizophrenia. According to his Army medical records, he exhibited signs of extreme agitation and complained of hearing "voices" which he believed were "trying to make him crazy." Because of his apparent psychosis, the decedent was hospitalized at Fort Lewis, Washington, and pursuant to Army Regulation AR-635-40, his case was referred to a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) for further investigation.
The MEB, which consisted of a panel of Army physicians, reviewed the decedent's medical history, symptoms and treatment, and, after meeting with the decedent, issued a diagnostic report on June 17, 1980 concurring in the previous explanation of decedent's disorder. Based upon its evaluation of decedent's symptomatology, the MEB concluded in its report that while he was "mentally competent to handle his own affairs," his disorder rendered him medically unqualified for retention in active military status. Accordingly, the MEB recommended temporary separation from the Service. The MEB further advised that the decedent should continue medication for an indefinite period and that he seek "outpatient follow-up psychiatric care at the VA Hospital nearest his home."
Pursuant to regulation AR-635-40, decedent's case was then referred to a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) to determine if he was, in fact, unfit for active military duty, and to determine whether his disorder was attributable to his service in the Army. The PEB convened on June 24, 1980 and it too concluded that decedent was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which they attributed to his military service. In its written report issued on June 28, 1980, the PEB also agreed with the MEB that decedent was unfit for further military service and suggested that he be placed on temporary disability retirement leave (TDRL). Waiving his right to appeal to a formal PEB, decedent acquiesced in the PEB findings.
At this point, and in accordance with regulation AR-635-40, decedent's medical file was forwarded to the United States Army Disability Agency for review, and then to the Commanding General of the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) for final action. Prior to the conclusion of this review process, however, the decedent sought and was granted permanent change of station orders allowing him to return home on leave while he awaited final orders from MILPERCEN. On August 8, 1980, five days after decedent's death, MILPERCEN approved the recommendations of the PEB and issued orders relieving decedent of his active duty assignment as of August 15, 1980, and placing him on TDRL beginning August 16, 1980. After exhausting their administrative remedies, plaintiffs commenced this action.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that the Army acted negligently when it diagnosed the decedent as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic and when it released him from hospitalization in July of 1980 without providing further supervision or care. Taking their allegations as true for purposes of defendant's motion to dismiss, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Rodriguez v. Board of Education, 620 F.2d 362, 365 (2d Cir.1980), the crucial question is whether the Supreme Court's decision in Feres v. United States, supra, bars this action because the injuries complained of "arose out of or were in the course of an activity incident to the decedent's military service." Id. 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. To answer this question, an understanding of Feres and its progeny is necessary.
Stated briefly, the Feres doctrine provides the government with a broad, much criticized, but well settled exception to its liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Standing as one of the last vestiges of sovereign immunity, the doctrine prevents military personnel from suing the government for damages incurred in a service-related incident. The effect of the doctrine is not only to preclude suits brought by the serviceman, but also to prevent derivative actions commenced by the serviceman's family members. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 134 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y.1980); Harrison v. United States, 479 F.Supp. 529, 530-31 (D.Conn. 1979), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828, 101 S.Ct. 93, 66 L.Ed.2d 32 (1980). While the application of the Feres doctrine to actions brought to remedy injuries occurring during actual combat or military maneuvers presents little difficulty, e.g., Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F.Supp. 46, 47 (D.Conn.1971), the question of when an injury is or is not service-related becomes more complex as the military nature of the injury-causing activity becomes more tenuous. See generally, Comment, The Effect of the Feres Doctrine on Tort Actions Against the United States by Family Members of Servicemen, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 1241 (1982). In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court has sought to provide some guidance on this issue.
In the first of these cases, United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949), the Supreme Court allowed two servicemen to recover for injuries suffered when they were struck by a civilian-operated Army vehicle. In reaching this result, the Court focused on the relationship of the servicemen's military status at the time the negligent act took place to the actual cause of their injuries. Noting that both men were on furlough and off the military base when the accident took place, the Court concluded that "the injuries were not caused by their service except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired." Id. at 52, 69 S.Ct. at 920. Recognizing the potential "dire consequences" of its decision, however, the Court expressly reserved the question whether an action would lie under the FICA for injuries sustained incident to active military service. Id. at 51-52, 69 S.Ct. at 919-920.
A year after Brooks, the Court in Feres v. United States, supra, faced this "wholly different case." Before the Court were three separate actions. The first involved a wrongful death action brought by the wife of a soldier who had perished in an Army barracks fire. The other two actions involved claims of medical malpractice brought by and on behalf of two servicemen who allegedly had been injured by the negligence of Army medical personnel. Holding that all three claims were barred by sovereign immunity, the Court distinguished its decision in Brooks on the ground that Id. 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. The Court reasoned that where the injury "arises out of or is in the course of an activity incident to service," the distinctively federal character of the relationship between the government and members of its armed forces precluded application of the State law remedies available under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 142-43, 71 S.Ct. at 157-58. Since Congress had not seen fit to provide a federal tort remedy, the Court concluded that the serviceman's sole remedy for such service-related injuries was limited to a recovery of veteran benefits.
added a further gloss to the issue. In Brown, the Court allowed a discharged veteran to bring a medical malpractice action against the Veterans Administration for the alleged negligent treatment he received after his discharge from the military. In reaching this result, the Court reasoned that the major but unarticulated premise behind the Feres decision was the belief that suits based upon service-related injuries could adversely affect military discipline. The Court stated:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent...
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