Hopper v. Barr
| Decision Date | 31 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 5:18-cv-01223-MGL-KDW,C/A No. 5:18-cv-01147-MGL-KDW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Gerald Damone Hopper, Plaintiff, v. William P. Barr; Mark S. Inch; Ian Conners; J.A. Keller; Hector Joyner; Regina D. Bradley; Richard Perkins; R. Lepiane; D. Garcia; Jade Lloyd, Defendants. Gerald Damone Hopper, Plaintiff, v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, S.E. Regional Office, and FCI Estill, Defendants. |
Plaintiff Gerald Damone Hopper, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Gaston County, N.C. Detention Center, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Mark S. Inch, Ian Connors, and J.A. Keller's Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 50. This matter is also before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Regina D. Bradley, Ian Connors, D. Garcia, Mark S. Inch, Hector Joyner, J. A. Keller, R. Lepiane, Jade Lloyd, Richard Perkins, William P. Barr, FCI Estill, Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), and SE Regional Office (collectively "Defendants") on December 3, 2018. ECF No. 59.2 As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court entered Roseboro orders3 related to the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Summary Judgment on October 19, 2018 and December 19, 2018 respectively. ECF Nos. 52, 62. In the Roseboro Orders the court advised Plaintiff of the importance of such motions and of the need for him to file an adequate response. Id. Plaintiff responded to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on December 19, 2018. ECF No. 66. Defendants did not file a Reply.
This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. Because Defendants' motion to dismiss and summary judgment motions are dispositive, a Report and Recommendation is entered for the court's review.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 26, 2018. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated the Eighth Amendment by "implement[ing] a custom and policy that den[ies] inmates treatment for the Hepatitis C Virus" that he contends he contracted while incarcerated at FCI Estill in or around 2010. ECF No. 1 at 4, 6.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he first reported that he was experiencing "severe and excruciating stomach pains" while he was incarcerated at FCI Estill in 2010. ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. Plaintiff alleges that in 2014, while incarcerated at FCI Hazelton, he was informed that he had the Hepatitis C Virus ("HCV") and had had it since 2011. ECF No. 1-1 at 3.
Plaintiff alleges that since his HCV diagnosis, he frequently requested treatment at both FCI Hazelton and when he returned to FCI Estill. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied his requests for treatment. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-7. In a supplement to his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants "exposed, and infected Plaintiff with the HCV, thereby showing deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff's health." ECF No. 1-3 at 2.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 1-1 at 8.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 630 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenge is raised to the factual basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment. Id.; Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987). The district court should apply the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment, under which the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Trentacosta, 813 F.2d at 1559 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). "The moving party should prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Trentacosta, 813 F.2d at 1558).
When a court's personal jurisdiction is challenged, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that a ground for jurisdiction exists. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989). When the court resolves the motion on written submissions (as opposed to an evidentiary hearing), the plaintiff need only make a "prima facie showing of a sufficient jurisdictional basis." Id. However, the plaintiff's showing "must be based on specific facts set forth in the record . . . ." Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306, 310 (D.S.C. 1992). The court may consider the parties' pleadings, affidavits, and other supporting documents but must construe them "in the light most favorable to plaintiff, drawing all inferences and resolving all factual disputes in his favor, and assuming plaintiff's credibility." Sonoco Prods. Co. v. ACE INA Ins., 877 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404-05 (D.S.C. 2012) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (). However, a court considering the issue of personal jurisdiction "need not credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences." Sonoco, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In construing a motion to dismiss, the facts, though not the legal conclusions, alleged in a plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint should survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim only when a plaintiff has set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and beyond the level that is merely conceivable. Id. at 555. However, a court is not required "to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or a legal conclusion unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Dismissal is appropriate when a complaint contains a description of underlying facts that fails to state a viable claim. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, Id. at 248.
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other...
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