Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 95-2482,95-2866 and 95-3031,s. 95-2482 |
| Citation | 87 F.3d 983 |
| Parties | 71 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1362, 44 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1382, 5 A.D. Cases 1531, 8 NDLR P 168 Thomas C. HOPPER, Appellant, v. HALLMARK CARDS, INC., Appellee. Thomas C. HOPPER, Appellee, v. HALLMARK CARDS, INC., Appellant. Thomas C. HOPPER, Appellant, v. HALLMARK CARDS, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael J. Gallagher, Kansas City, Missouri (argued), for Thomas C. Hopper.
David C. Trowbridge, Kansas City, Missouri, argued (John R. Phillips and Julianne Popper, on the brief), for Hallmark Cards, Inc.
Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
Following his discharge from employment, Thomas Hopper brought suit against Hallmark Cards, Inc. (Hallmark) for age and handicap discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Before trial, the district court 1 granted Hallmark's motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. At trial, it granted Hallmark's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claims. Hopper appeals alleging the district court erred when it: (1) applied an incorrect standard to Hallmark's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claims and refused to submit the discrimination claims to the jury; (2) found diverticulitis is not a medical handicap under Missouri law; (3) entered summary judgment on the emotional distress claim; (4) excluded "high potential" manager evidence and various other testimony; (5) denied discovery regarding other employees who allegedly also used drugs but were not discharged; and (6) awarded attorneys' fees against plaintiff's counsel on the emotional distress claim. Hallmark appeals the denial of its request for attorneys' fees on the discrimination claims. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In September 1967, Hopper began working for Hallmark as a production analyst in the Manufacturing Control Department. Over the next twenty-four years of service for Hallmark, Hopper held various positions, including several managerial positions in the Manufacturing Control Department. At the time of his discharge in March 1992, Hopper was employed in the Manufacturing Division of the Manufacturing, Scheduling and Control Department. He was forty-six years old at the time of his discharge.
In April 1988, roughly four years before his discharge, Hopper was first diagnosed with diverticulitis by his physician, Dr. Keith Jantz. Diverticulitis is the acute form of diverticulosis. Although usually asymptomatic, diverticulosis manifests itself as small pockets on the lining of the colon, which can become painful if infected. In this aggravated state, the condition is referred to as diverticulitis. Dr. Jantz successfully treated the 1988 flare up with antibiotics. Dr. Jantz's notes do not reflect any further visits from Hopper for this condition until late 1991. In December 1991, Hopper's colon ruptured as a result of complications from diverticulitis. The rupture required Hopper to undergo surgery at which a colostomy was constructed. 2 The colostomy was later surgically reversed following a successful healing process.
Several years prior to his discharge, Hopper experienced marital difficulties. After his wife left him in the summer of 1990, Hopper began drinking alcohol heavily. The drinking resulted in three driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) offenses: August 1991; October 1991; and April 1992. Along with the October 1991 DUI conviction, Hopper was convicted of attempted possession of cocaine and served time in jail. Hopper also testified to using cocaine on other occasions before and after that conviction. The April 1992 DUI resulted in the revocation of Hopper's probation on the earlier offense and another sentence of jail time. It is not clear who at Hallmark knew of Hopper's substance abuse and legal problems. Hopper testified, however, that his supervisors had become aware of his drug and alcohol use by the time of his exit interview, approximately one week after his discharge.
Deanna Bisel was Hopper's immediate supervisor at the time of his discharge. Bisel testified that she had seen a marked decrease in the quality of Hopper's work since mid-1990, around the time of his separation from his wife. 3 Bisel documented these concerns and twice recommended Hopper's discharge to her superiors, stating his recent poor job performance and unacceptable work attendance as reasons for the recommendations. Hallmark offered these same reasons for its eventual discharge of Hopper.
Although not privy to Bisel's confidential memos regarding his problems at work, Hopper received notice of Bisel's concerns regarding his performance and attendance no later than mid-1991, when he received an unsatisfactory midyear evaluation from her. In that evaluation, Bisel stated that Hopper's job performance and attendance were unacceptable. Hopper disagreed that the evaluation accurately reflected his work performance but did not take his concerns to anyone else at Hallmark. Nevertheless, Hopper did not dispute the accuracy of Hallmark's attendance records and conceded that his attendance had at times been unsatisfactory according to the guidelines set for the Manufacturing, Scheduling and Control Department. To counter this evidence, Hopper produced numerous performance reports in which he had received positive evaluations and evidence showing he had received a pay raise shortly before his mid-1991 evaluation.
At trial, there was conflicting testimony regarding whether a younger individual, Pam Oberdiek, replaced Hopper or whether she filled a newly created, independent position. Hopper alleged that with few minor alterations, Oberdiek had taken over his job responsibilities. Hallmark claimed that Hopper's previous position had been eliminated during a reorganization of the Manufacturing, Scheduling and Control Department. It further claimed that Hopper was not moved to the new position assumed by Oberdiek because of his poor performance and attendance ratings.
Prior to trial, Hallmark moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim but denied the motion with respect to the discrimination claims. The district court stated that material factual disputes existed as to whether Hopper had alleged a medical handicap under Missouri law and as to Hallmark's proffered reason for terminating Hopper's employment. After the presentation of Hopper's evidence, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law on the handicap discrimination claim. Following the close of all the evidence, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law on the age discrimination claims, apparently finding Hopper had not successfully rebutted Hallmark's proffered reasons for his discharge.
Hopper claimed Hallmark discharged him because of his age, in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.055, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Both statutes prohibit employers from basing adverse employment decisions on age. The district court granted Hallmark's motion for judgment as a matter of law on these claims pursuant to Rule 50(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 In reviewing the grant of judgment as a matter of law, we apply the same standard as did the district court, i.e., we resolve all factual issues in favor of the nonmoving party. Hamaker v. Ivy, 51 F.3d 108, 110 (8th Cir.1995). Accordingly, we must: (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Hopper; (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in favor of Hopper; (3) assume as proved all facts that Hopper's evidence tended to prove; and (4) give Hopper the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. See First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir.1993).
Although we must give Hopper the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we may not accord him "the benefit of unreasonable inferences." Marcoux v. Van Wyk, 572 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir.1978). A reasonable inference is one " 'which may be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation.' " Caudill v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 919 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting Hauser v. Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir.1979)). If the jury could reasonably reach a different conclusion based on the facts and the law, we must reverse the grant of judgment as a matter of law. Applying this standard, we find no error in the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to Hallmark on these claims.
To prove he was the subject of age discrimination, Hopper must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination within the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case of age discrimination requires a showing that Hopper: (1) is within the protected age group; (2) was performing his job at a level that met Hallmark's legitimate expectations; (3) was discharged; and (4) was replaced by a younger worker. 5 Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir.1994). See also, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Hopper established a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Once established, "the prima facie case raises a legal presumption of discrimination in the plaintiff's favor, requiring the defendant to produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions." Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 355, 130 L.Ed.2d 310 (1994). If...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Van Arkel v. Warren County
...of age discrimination. Mayer, 318 F.3d at 807 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, and Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir.1996)). Defendants argue that Van Arkel cannot prove the second and fourth prongs of this analysis. Even if the Court determ......
-
Bauer v. Metz Baking Co.
...than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.") (emphasis added); Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983, 988 n. 5 (8th Cir.1996) ("The phrasing of this fourth prong [stating the requirement to be that the plaintiff was replaced by a `younger'......
-
Burgess v. A.M. Multigraphics a Div. A.M. Intern.
...legitimate expectations; (3) he was terminated; and (4) he was replaced with a significantly younger person. See Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, 87 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir.1996), In cases of a reduction in force, the fourth factor — an attempted replacement of the discharged employee — is not pres......
-
Poynton v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County
...that met the employer's legitimate expectations, (3) was discharged, and (4) was replaced by a younger worker. Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir.1996). See also O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 Pla......