Hopper v. Lincoln
Citation | 12 Haw. 352 |
Parties | J. A. HOPPER, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF THE PACIFIC BRASS FOUNDRY, v. G. W. LINCOLN AND H. E. COOPER. |
Decision Date | 04 May 1900 |
Court | Supreme Court of Hawai'i |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREEXCEPTIONS FROM CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST CIRCUIT.
Syllabus by the Court
Under our mechanic's lien law, the owner of the property upon which a lien is claimed is a necessary party defendant in an action by a subcontractor to enforce the lien, and a special execution may issue upon a judgment for the enforcement of the lien against the property covered by it, even though judgment cannot be entered against the owner personally.
Kinney, Ballou & McClanahan for the plaintiff.
H. E. Cooper for himself, Magoon & Silliman with him.
This action by a subcontractor for $312.98 against defendant Lincoln personally, the principal contractor, and defendant Cooper, the owner, for the enforcement of a lien under the mechanic's lien law, was tried jury waived and, by consent, judgment was ordered for the plaintiff for $341.98, including interest and costs, against Lincoln personally and against Cooper for the enforcement of the lien, without prejudice to the right of the latter to contest the enforcement of the lien by execution.
The only question raised by the exceptions is whether an execution could properly issue upon a judgment for the enforcement of the lien against the property covered by it. It is contended that the statute is deficient in failing to provide proper machinery for the enforcement of a lien and that no valid execution can issue upon a judgment for the enforcement of a lien against the owner in favor of a subcontractor, although it might in cases where the owner himself has contracted for the materials or labor.
The statute (Civ. L. Sec. 1745) provides: ***”
The statute contemplates an enforcement of the lien by an action at law. If the action were by a principal contractor against the owner, there could be no difficulty, for “the ordinary allegations in assumpsit” could be made and a judgment be obtained against the owner personally on the contract. But when, as here, the action is by a subcontractor, the ordinary allegations in assumpsit can ordinarily be made against the principal contractor only and a personal judgment be obtained against him alone. And yet we see no reason why the owner may not be made a party and a judgment be entered against him for the enforcement of the lien. Certainly he is a necessary party where his interests are to be affected. While the proceeding is to a certain extent of the nature of a proceeding in rem, it is not so in all respects. It is not a proceeding leading to a judgment against the property which will bind all the world. Persons not parties are not bound. The owner is a necessary party defendant even though no judgment can be entered against him personally. The ordinary allegations in assumpsit could be made as between the subcontractor and principal contractor and other allegations to show the relation of the owner to the subject-matter. This is a course followed in other jurisdictions. In such cases the...
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