Hopper v. Sinclair Refining Co.
| Decision Date | 25 November 1933 |
| Docket Number | 15,023 |
| Parties | HOPPER v. SINCLAIR REFINING COMPANY |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rehearing denied March 17, 1934.
From Industrial Board of Indiana.
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Bargie Hopper employee, against Sinclair Refining Company, employer. From an order ending the period of disability, the employee appealed.
Affirmed.
William J. McAleer, Francis J. Dorsey, James J. Clark, and William L Travis, for appellant.
Herman L. McCray, Edward J. Boleman, Burrell Wright, and Jacob S. White, for appellee.
On May 27, 1932, appellant received a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by appellee. On June 24, 1932, they entered into an agreement for compensation during total disability not exceeding 500 weeks. The agreement was approved by the Industrial Board. Appellee paid appellant the agreed compensation until June 24, 1932, when it ceased to make further payments. On March 1, 1933, appellee filed with the Industrial Board an application for review of the award on account of a change of conditions. A hearing was had by a single member of the board, who granted said application for review, and terminated the payments as of June 24, 1932, the date the payments ceased. A review was had by the full board, and the full board also found for appellee that appellant's disability had ended June 24, 1932, and ordered that said payments should end as of said date. Thereafter appellant perfected this appeal, assigning as error that the award is contrary to law.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not appellee was required to continue making compensation payments until ten days before he filed his application for review of the award.
Appellant introduced rule 33 of the Industrial Board in evidence. This rule reads as follows:
Appellant contends that said rule required, as a condition precedent to the filing of appellee's application for review, that appellee pay compensation payments under the agreement up to within ten days of the date of filing such application.
The rule, if so construed, would not recognize the disability of appellant as the sole basis for compensation, as does the Workmen's Compensation Law. In many instances the rule would provide more compensation than the law provides, and therefore the rule would be in conflict with the law.
The rule, if so construed, would not recognize the termination of the period of disability as fixed by law, as the time when the one year limitation for filing of applications for review begins to run as does the law of this state. See Miles v. Ind. Service Corp. (1933), 97 Ind.App. 400, 185 N.E. 460; Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman (1933), post 560, 187 N.E. 692. The rule if so construed in cases similar to Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, supra, would produce the opposite result, and hence would be contrary to law.
The requirement of said rule, as construed by appellant, that compensation payments must be continued up to within ten days of the time of filing an application for review, is based solely upon the employer's failure to...
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