Hopps v. People of State
| Decision Date | 30 April 1863 |
| Citation | 1863 WL 3121,83 Am.Dec. 231,31 Ill. 385 |
| Parties | WILLIAM HOPPSv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. GEORGE MANIERRE, Judge, presiding.
William Hopps was indicted in the court below for the murder of his wife. Being put upon his trial, the fact of the killing was clearly established, and was not controverted by the accused; but it was insisted in his behalf, that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act charged, and in reference to that question voluminous proofs were made both by the defense and the prosecution.
The trial below resulted in the conviction of the prisoner of the crime as charged in the indictment, and a new trial being refused, he brought the case to this court upon a writ of error.
The questions decided here, arise upon various rulings of the court below in admitting evidence on the part of the prosecution, and rejecting evidence offered by the defense; the grounds of alleged error in those rulings sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
Other questions arise upon the instructions of the court below, which are embraced in two propositions, first, What character and degree of insanity will excuse the commission of an alleged crime; and second, Must the fact of insanity, when set up as a defense, be established by preponderating evidence. It is not necessary to the proper understanding of the rules laid down upon these questions to set forth here the voluminous instructions of the Circuit Court.
Messrs. MCCOMAS & DEXTER, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. W. K. MCALLISTER, for the defendants in error.
The plaintiff in error was convicted in the Cook Circuit Court, on an indictment for the murder of his wife. He brings the record here, complaining of several errors alleged to have been committed to his prejudice, the most important of which, we propose to notice.
He complains, first, that the Circuit Court would not permit him to give evidence of his uniform good character as a man and a citizen.
It was, at one time, a disputed question, whether such evidence could be given in a case where, as in this, the homicide is not denied. Some of the books say, such evidence, if offered, ought to be restricted to the trait of character in issue, or, in other words, should bear some analogy to the nature of the charge. 3 Gr. Ev., sec. 25.
To the same effect is 2 Russ. on Crimes, 784, but yet, he says, the good character of an accused party is an ingredient which should always be submitted to the consideration of the jury, along with the other facts of the case. Ib. 785.
In a case where the defense is insanity, we cannot have a doubt, that evidence of uniform good character as a man and a citizen, is proper for the jury to consider; whether a person whose character has been uniformly good, has, in a sane moment, committed the crime charged. It is undoubtedly true, a sane man, whose previous character has been unexceptionable, may commit an atrocious homicide, no doubt may exist of the fact, yet, under his plea of insanity, should he not be entitled to all the benefit which may be derived from the fact of uniform good character, as tending, slightly, it may be, to the conclusion that he could not have been sane at the time the deed was done. Generally, a person of good character does not, of a sudden, fall from a high position, to the commission of outrageous crimes; should he do so, would it be an unnatural or forced inference, that he may have been affected with insanity at the time? But be this as it may, it seems to be now settled, that such evidence in capital cases, is admissible. In the case of the Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 317, which was a capital case, PARSONS, Ch. J., said, a prisoner ought to be permitted to give in evidence his general character in all cases. SEWELL and PARKER, justices, said, they were not prepared to admit that testimony of general character should be admitted in behalf of the defendant, in all criminal prosecutions; but, they were clearly of opinion, that it might be admitted in capital cases in favor of life. The same rule was stated in the case of the Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cushing, 325. The court there say, it is the privilege of the accused, to put his character in issue or not.
In 2 Bennet and Heard's Leading Cases, 159, and notes, the cases are collected and commented on, in which this rule is recognized.
In the case of The People v. Vane, 12 Wendell, 78, the court held, that evidence of the good character of the defendant on the trial of an indictment, is always admissible, though it cannot avail when the evidence against him is positive and unimpeached; but when the evidence is circumstantial, or comes from a suspected or impeached witness, proof of good character is important.
We think, at least in view of the defense relied on, the evidence of the prisoner's uniform correct bearing, as a man and a citizen, should have been made known to the jury. A good character is a most precious possession, and it ought to be permitted, in favor of life at least, to go to the jury.
The plaintiff in error also complains, that the prosecution was permitted to prove that about thirty years before the commission of the crime charged, he had been engaged in a violation of the revenue laws of the country, by a career of smuggling goods and property, to and from Canada. The prisoner insists it was not competent to prove this offense against him; that all the facts proper to be proved, should be strictly relevant to the particular charge, and have no reference to any of his conduct, not connected with the charge.
This is undoubtedly true as a general principle, but we think such proof was warranted in this view. The defense being insanity, the coolness and unconcern of the prisoner at the time he did the fatal act, was made a prominent feature in the case, and inferences were sought to be drawn from it, favorable to the plea.
Is it possible, ask his counsel, that a man who could show so much coolness, self-possession and apathy, at the moment and after the fatal deed, could be otherwise than insane? To this the people reply, the prisoner had spent years of his early life in a perilous calling, demanding, at all times, great coolness and hardihood, and therein, had educated his nerves to withstand any shock; in such a school he learned the deportment exhibited by him on the fatal occasion. To account for this coolness and unconcern, the testimony of Beardsley and Phelps was properly received, it being in the nature of rebutting evidence on the point made.
But these are small points, compared to those we must consider.
The prisoner complains, that the court did not lay down to the jury, correctly, the law of his case. That he was prejudiced by the charge of the court, not coming up, as he alleges it should have done, to the true principles involved in it, by which guilt was established in a case where guilt could not exist, and for which his life must be forfeited, if this court has no corrective power.
The homicide stands confessed. It has never been denied by the prisoner; on the contrary, he declared on its commission, that it had been long contemplated and was right; that his wife was unchaste. After his arrest, he justified the deed, and has, throughout, exhibited total indifference and unconcern.
His counsel say for him, he was not of sound mind when the deed was done, and the court, trying the cause, gave to the jury, at great length, its views of the nature of the defense, and prescribed the rule which should govern them in the decision of the case.
We do not propose to examine, in detail, the several instructions given by the court for the prosecution, or those refused when asked by the defense. We are not fully convinced what the rule, or tests, should be in such cases. The results of scientific investigation on this intricate subject, are so imperfect as to render it very difficult to establish any general rule, by which judicial proceedings of a criminal nature should be governed, when the defense of insanity is interposed. Writers on the subject treat of several different kinds of insanity, and of different degrees of the several kinds, and among them, there is considerable diversity of opinion on the same point. They furnish, as yet, no true and safe guide for courts and juries, but it is hoped as science advances, a rule will be eliminated, which, whilst it shall throw around these poor unfortunates a sufficient shield, shall, at the same time, place no great interest of community in jeopardy.
It is now generally conceded, that insanity is a disease of the brain, of that mass of matter through and by which that mysterious power, the mind, acts. There, the mind is supposed to be enthroned, acting through separate and distinct organs. These organs may become diseased, one or more or all, and in the degree, or to the extent of such disease, is insanity measured. A disease of all the organs, causes total insanity, while of one or more, partial insanity only. There is, it seems, a general intellectual mania, and a partial intellectual mania, and a moral mania, which is also divided into general and partial. It is claimed for the prisoner, that the species of insanity with which he is afflicted, is of the partial intellectual order, denominated monomania; that is to say, a mania on one subject, and that subject, the infidelity of his wife, in which his belief, without the least ground to base it upon, was so fixed as to become a deep-seated delusion amounting to mania. In the simplest form of this species of mania, the understanding appears to be tolerably sound on all subjects but those connected with the hallucination. Ray's Med. Jur. 164.
Premising these, it is truly said, it has been found difficult to establish any general rule under which all these varieties of...
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