Hopson v. Gray

• Decision Date: 20 October 2021
• Docket Number: 5:21-cv-704
• Parties: PEYTON HOPSON, PETITIONER, v. WARDEN DAVID W. GRAY, RESPONDENT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

PEYTON HOPSON, PETITIONER,
v.
WARDEN DAVID W. GRAY, RESPONDENT.

No. 5:21-cv-704

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

October 20, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HONORABLE SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“petition”) filed by pro se petitioner Peyton Hopson (“Hopson” or “petitioner”), and an addendum to the petition. (Doc. Nos. 2, 11.) Hopson originally filed the petition, along with motions for “expedited consideration” (Doc. No. 3) and “release of medical records” (Doc. No. 4), in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Thereafter, the action was transferred to the Northern District of Ohio. (Doc. Nos. 1, 7.) After the case was transferred, Hopson filed a motion for this Court to recuse and transfer this action back to the Southern District, and an amendment to the motion for recusal. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10.)

For the reasons that follow, the motion to recuse is denied, the petition is dismissed, and the pending motions for expedited consideration and release of medical records are denied.

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I. BACKGROUND

Hopson is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional Institution in St. Clairsville, Ohio. He is serving a sentence imposed upon him in 2014 by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 2 ¶¶ 1-5.) Hopson originally filed the petition in the Southern District of Ohio. On March 31, 2021, the Southern District transferred the action to the Northern District of Ohio on the grounds that the petition challenges Hopson's conviction in Stark County, Ohio and, therefore, his petition should be transferred to the district court where the state court that convicted and sentenced him is located. (Doc. No. 1.) Hopson, however, does not challenge the lawfulness of his underlying Stark County convictions and sentence. Instead, he claims that his state imprisonment in Belmont Correctional Institution violates his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment on the basis that he suffers from chronic Hepatitis C (“HCV”) and has been “categorically denied [the] curative treatment” that he has requested “based solely on a blanket policy promulgated and implemented by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections (“ODRC”).”^[1] (Doc. No. 2 at 8-9.^[2]) Hopson does not allege that he has pursued formal grievances within the prison system, or that he has raised his

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claim in the Ohio courts. Instead, he claims that the backlog of cases faced by Ohio's judicial branch resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has rendered state remedies ineffective and inadequate to protect his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and he should not be required to exhaust his state court remedies. (Id. at 5.)

Then on May 26, 2021, Hopson filed a civil rights action against the Court in the Southern District of Ohio (No. 2:21-cv-2784 (“SDOH Case”).) The complaint in the SDOH Case alleges that, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the undersigned has deprived Hopson of adequate medical care by not ordering the warden to respond to the transferred petition. (See SDOH Case Doc. No. 5.) In the SDOH Case, Hopson seeks $100, 000.00 in damages against the undersigned. On June 8, 2021, Hopson filed a motion in the instant action for this Court to recuse (and amendment to the motion to recuse) and transfer this action back to the Southern District of Ohio. (See Doc. Nos. 9, 10.) The basis for Hopson's motion for recusal is that because he is seeking $100, 000.00 in damages in the SDOH Case against the undersigned, the outcome of the instant action “could have a direct bearing on the award granted in the [SDOH Case]. Therefore, Judge Lioi has a personal financial interest in the outcome of the above captioned case.” (Doc. No. 9 at 1.)

On June 30, 2021, Magistrate Judge Kimberly Jolson issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) in the SDOH Case recommending that the case against the undersigned be dismissed on two grounds-failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and judicial immunity. (See SDOH Case Doc. No. 4 at 4-5.) On July 23, 2021, Hopson filed an objection to the R&R. In order to allow the Southern District of Ohio time to issue a final judgment in the SDOH Case, the

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Court entered an order indicating that it would defer a ruling on Hopson's petition and motion to recuse until such time as such judgment was issued. (See Order [non-document] dated August 4, 2021.) But given that Hopson has filed a motion in the SDOH Case asking that court (1) “to stay adjudication” of that action, (2) serve the complaint in the SDOH Case upon the undersigned, and (3) order the undersigned to rule on Hopson's motion for recusal in the instant action (SDOH Case Doc. No. 8), and given that the Southern District of Ohio has not to date issued a final judgment in the SDOH Case (perhaps due to Hopson's request), the Court can no longer defer acting upon Hopson's pending motions and petition.

II. MOTION TO RECUSE

The Court will first address Hopson's motion that the Court disqualify itself and transfer the case back to the Southern District of Ohio. In his motion to recuse, Hopson argues that because he seeks $100, 000.00 in damages against the undersigned in the SDOH Case, the Court has a financial interest in the outcome of the instant action and should recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Doc. No. 9 at 1-2.)

“[A] judge is presumed to be impartial.” PNC Equip. Fin. v. Mariani, 758 Fed.Appx. 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 Fed.Appx. 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007) (further citation omitted)). The burden of justifying disqualification falls upon the party seeking recusal. Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The burden is on the moving party to justify disqualification.”) (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), a judge should disqualify himself or herself in the following circumstances: “He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child

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residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding[.]” The statute defines “financial interest” as follows:

“financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.

28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4).

Hopson's claim for damages against the Court in the SDOH case does not fall within the statute's definition of financial interest. Nor does Hopson otherwise explain how the Court's decision in this action would impact the outcome of the SDOH Case. Hopson has not carried his burden to justify the disqualification of the Court pursuant to § 455(b)(4), and his motion on that basis is denied.

In the motion, Hopson also recites the language of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides that: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (Doc. No. 9 at 1.) It appears

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that Hopson is suggesting the Court cannot be impartial in the instant action because its financial interest is implicated in the SDOH Case. For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned does not have a financial interest in the instant action as defined by the statute upon which to question the Court's impartiality. To the extent that Hopson is arguing that the Court cannot be impartial in the instant action simply because he has sued the Court in another jurisdiction, that argument is unavailing.

Section 455(a) requires recusal not only when there is actual partiality, but also when there is an “appearance” of partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2203, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). But to “‘say that § 455(a) requires concern for appearances is not to say that it requires concern for mirages. The standard is an objective one[.]'” United States v. Odeh, No. 13-cr-20772, 2014 WL 3767808, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2014) (quoting United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). As the Sixth Circuit has explained, § 455(a) “‘imposes an objective standard[.]'” PNC Equip. Fin., 758 F. Appx at 390-91 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gagacki, 834 F.3d at 616 (citing United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 837 (6th Cir. 2013))). Under that standard, “[t]he statute requires a judge to recuse ‘if a reasonable, objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have questioned the judge's impartiality.'” Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ., 783 F.3d 1077, 1079 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d 1495, 1501 (6th Cir. 1990)). A judge need not recuse under § 455(a) “‘based on the...