Horace Mann League of U.S. of America, Inc. v. Board of Public Works

• Decision Date: 02 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 356,356
• Parties: The HORACE MANN LEAGUE OF the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., et al. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS of Maryland, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 645

242 Md. 645

220 A.2d 51

The HORACE MANN LEAGUE OF the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., et al. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS of Maryland, et al.

No. 356.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 2, 1966.

Leo Pfeffer, New York City, and Melvin J. Sykes, Baltimore (Walter R. Tabler, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen (Robert C. Murphy, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Edward L. Blanton, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for Board of Public Works of Maryland, part of appellees.

William L. Marbury, Baltimore (Lewis A. Noonberg, Baltimore, Arthur E. Sutherland, Cambridge, Mass. on the brief), for appellees St. Joseph College of Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Inc., College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Inc., and Hood College of Frederick, Md.

Francis X. Gallagher, George T. Tyler and J. Nicholas Shriver, Jr., Baltimore, on the brief for St. Joseph College of Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Inc.

Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D. C., and George W. Constable, Baltimore, on the brief for College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Inc. Parsons Newman, Frederick, on the brief for Hood College of Frederick, md.

Ridgely P. Melvin, Jr., Annapolis, for appellee Western Maryland College.

Franklin C. Salisbury, Washington, D. C., on the brief amicus curiae for Protestants and other Americans United for Separation of Church and State.

Before PRESCOTT, C.J., HAMMOND, HORNEY, MARBURY and OPPENHEIMER, JJ., and THOMAS J. KEATING, Jr. and RALPH W. POWERS, Special Judges.

PRESCOTT, Chief Judge.

After dismissal of their bill of complaint, which challenged the validity, as violating the Federal and Maryland Constitutions, of four separate statutes, providing outright, matching grants, totaling $2,500,000, for the construction of buildings, to four private colleges, the plaintiffs appealed. The four colleges and appropriate public officials were named as defendants; injunctive relief and a declaration to the effect that the grants were unlawful were prayed.

The questions involved have been briefed and argued with signal care, skill, and ability by counsel for the respective parties.

The appellees contend that appellants lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. The principal issue, of course, is whether any one (or more) of the statutes violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, or Articles XV, XXIII, or XXXVI of our Declaration of Rights. Appellants concede that some degree of relationship to church or religion may exist in an educational institution without rendering it 'sectarian'; they contend, however, that when such a relationship is 'substantial,' it renders the institution sectarian and grants of public funds may not constitutionally be made to it. Four of the appellees state that the colleges involved 'are admittedly related in varying degrees to particular religious denominations,' but urge that there is no constitutional proscription against a state granting 'public funds to a sectarian college, nor is there anything in either constitution which forbids grants for educational purposes to colleges

which bear a substantial relation to a church.' We think the orderly and efficacious sequence in which to consider these issues is first to determine the question of standing, for if the appellees prevail thereon, it will control the entire appeal; next to decide the test to be applied to the statutes in determining whether they are constitutionally permissible or impermissible under the First Amendment; then to apply that test to the facts in the record pertaining to the individual colleges; and finally to consider whether the grants violate the named sections of the Maryland Constitution.

THE STANDING OF THE PARTIES PLAINTIFF.

The Chancellor held that the Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc., lacked standing. We agree. It is a non-profit educational and charitable Maryland corporation organized, as claimed by it, for the purpose of fostering and strengthening the American public school system.

It argues that the Chancellor 'took an unduly restrictive view of the status in modern jurisprudence of organizations formed to protect the public interest * * *,' asks us to compare several Federal cases in which the N.A.A.C.P. participated as a party, and to consider several law-review articles relative thereto. We have considered the same, but find nothing therein which would warrant our departing from the former rulings of this Court. The Chancellor was correct in his ruling. Citizens Committee of Anne Arundel County, Inc. v. County Commissioners, 233 Md. 398, 197 A.2d 108; Bar Association v. District Title Co., 224 Md. 474, 168 A.2d 395.

The appellees challenge the standing of the individual appellants on two grounds: (a) 'the miniscule dimensions of the plaintiffs' financial stake in the challenged programs * * *'; and (b) that if Maryland were required to educate the Maryland students who now attend the appellee colleges, the cost would be much greater to the State than the grants under consideration.

(a)

Most of the appellees, rightly we think, concede that the recently decided case of Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, fatally undermines their argument here. Having so recently considered and enunciated our conclusions on the question, it

would be a useless gesture to elaborate further thereon. We hold that Murray is controlling on this point, and the individual appellants do not lack standing for the reasons there assigned.

(b)

There are a number of answers to this contention. We shall name but two. All of the parties agree that the issues here presented are of great public interest and concern. When this is the case, the necessary interest or injury to sustain standing to institute a taxpayer's suit is 'broadly comprehensive' and may be 'slight.' In Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n v. Board of License Comm'rs, 171 Md. 426, 189 A. 209, 109 A.L.R. 1253, this Court stated its opinion on the merits, even though the plaintiffs lacked technical standing. For other cases wherein there were similar holdings or the principle recognized see Citizens Committee of Anne Arundel County, Inc. v. County Comm'rs, etc., supra; Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 71 A.2d 474; Dutton v. Tawes, 225 Md. 484, 171 A.2d 688. We agree with the parties that the issues are of general and urgent public interest, and they are of sufficient importance and magnitude to invoke the above principle, if the factual situation rendered it necessary to do so.

However, we do not find it necessary to base our conclusion that the individual appellants have standing on the above theory, alone. In Berghorn v. Reorganized School District No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573, taxpayers' standing to sue to prevent expenditures of state funds for religious schools was attacked on the ground that the challenged expenditure would cost plaintiff less than the taxes they would be required to pay if the students at such religious schools were educated in the public schools. In sustaining plaintiffs' standing and granting relief, the court stated:

'In determining a taxpayers' pecuniary injury resulting from the unlawful expenditure of public funds, we may not weigh lawful expenditures against unlawful expenditures, because no legal injury results from the lawful expenditures of public funds.'

We agree with the Missouri Court. Also compare this Court's holding in McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 98 A.2d 561, wherein the same principle was applied, although no religious issue was Further on the question of standing, appellees argues that if the suit had been instituted in a Federal court, appellants would have lacked standing to attack the grants as being impermissible under the United States Constitution; hence the Maryland courts should not permit them to challenge state statutes as being violative of the Federal Constitution in the state courts. Again, the Murray case, supra, supplies the quick answer, wherein Judge Oppenheimer, for the Court, said:

there involved, and School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844.

'When the validity of a state statute is attacked in a state court, it is the duty of that court to determine all the constitutional issues involved, federal as well as state. If the statute is held valid under the state law, but invalid under the federal Constitution, the state court must give the complainants the relief they pray. * * *. If they have standing under the law of Maryland to bring the suit, it is irrelevant that the result might have been different had the action been instituted in a federal court.' 241 Md. p. 392, 216 A.2d p. 902.

We hold that the Chancellor was correct in ruling that the individual appellants had standing.

THE TEST TO BE APPLIED

It should be noted at the outset that nothing in this opinion is intended as a criticism of, or a boost to, any religion, sect, or schism, or lack of religion. Our task is to decide a constitutional issue. We proceed to do just that, and that alone.

For our present purposes, it will be unnecessary to include an extended historical background of the First Amendment ¹ (which, of course, is likewise pertinent, in large measure, to After Christianity became the established Church of Rome and the Church gradually increased in wealth and power, there constantly developed disputes in the various provinces between the Roman bishops and the civil authorities as to their respective authority. In time, the Church became so rich and influential that certain of the Popes felt free to assert their authority as being superior to that of the reigning Sovereigns. This, naturally, developed angry and deep-rooted conflicts and controversies between the Papacy and some of the nations, and also between nations, themselves, depending upon whether or not they agreed with the Papacy.

                Article XXXVI of our [220 A.2d

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