Horman v. Clark, 860068-CA

Decision Date27 October 1987
Docket NumberNo. 860068-CA,860068-CA
Citation744 P.2d 1014
PartiesS.M. HORMAN as General Partner for Horman Construction Co., a Utah partnership and S.M. Horman, Jr., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. S. Spence CLARK, as General Partner for Valley Shopping Center Associates, a Utah partnership, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals
OPINION

Before ORME, GARFF and DAVIDSON, JJ.

GARFF, Judge:

Plaintiffs/appellants S.M. Horman (Horman) and S.M. Horman, Jr. (Horman, Jr.) brought suit against defendant/respondent S. Spence Clark to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract. The lower court ruled that the Hormans had no cause of action, dismissing the suit. We affirm.

Horman owned a vacant tract of land north of and contiguous to the Valley Shopping Center, owned by Clark, in Murray, Utah. Clark had purchased the shopping center from Horman in 1970. Horman and Clark entered into an agreement which provided, in part, that Horman or his assigns were to have parking privileges in any public parking stalls in the parking lot at the rear of the Valley Shopping Center.

Even though this agreement was properly signed and acknowledged by September 1975, neither party immediately recorded it. Clark never recorded it, and Horman found it in his files nearly two years later, determined that it had not been recorded, and recorded it on January 12, 1978.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 1977, Clark conveyed his interest in the Valley Shopping Center to W. Meeks Wirthlin and his wife. The warranty deed conveying the center to the Wirthlins indicated that the property was subject to "easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of way, encroachments and reservations appearing of record or enforceable in law or equity." Clark did not inform the Wirthlins of Horman's parking rights on the property. The Wirthlins' warranty deed was recorded on March 15, 1977, nearly one year before Horman recorded his parking agreement. Because Horman's agreement had not yet been recorded, no mention was made of it in the Wirthlins' title report, and they were unaware of the agreement's existence. Subsequently, the Wirthlins sold their interest in the Valley Shopping Center to Arnold Development, which then sold it to G.G. Finlayson and Janet F. Griffin, who owned it at the time of trial.

When Horman finally recorded his agreement, he made no inquiry into the ownership status of the Valley Shopping Center and did not know of the subsequent sales. In 1980, he conveyed the property contiguous to the Valley Shopping Center to his son, Horman Jr., who commenced developing it for business purposes.

In July 1980, Horman Jr. obtained a building permit from Murray City and began constructing a twenty-unit commercial building. Finlayson, the new owner of the Valley Shopping Center, somehow learned of Horman Jr.'s apparent parking rights on his property, and requested an adjustment in the shopping center purchase price from Arnold Development.

Subsequently, on November 3, 1980, Finlayson's attorney notified Horman that any parking easement was ineffective against the Wirthlins and any subsequent purchasers because of the late recording of the agreement between Horman and Clark. On December 30, 1980, Horman asserted that the parking "easement" was valid in a letter to Finlayson's attorney.

In the following months, Murray City issued a stop order against Horman Jr.'s construction because he did not have sufficient parking space for his building to comply with Murray City ordinances. The Hormans, limited to 57% occupancy of the new building by Murray City, attempted to negotiate with Finlayson for use of parking spaces in the shopping center parking lot. Because these negotiations were unsuccessful, the Hormans filed this lawsuit on March 16, 1981, seeking lost profits and other damages resulting from the reduced occupancy of the building.

The trial court found that Clark had no duty to record the agreement, 1 and, therefore, the Hormans had no cause of action. We agree.

The Hormans argue that Clark had an implied contractual duty to disclose the parking agreement to the subsequent purchasers, nothwithstanding Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1986). That statute provides:

Effect of failure to record. Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof,...

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11 cases
  • First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 2 Enero 1990
    ...until 1960 no court had adopted Keeton's theories).14 Keeton at 738-39.15 Id. at 739 (footnote omitted).16 See Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Utah Ct.App.1987); supra notes 7 and 13 and accompanying text.17 See generally supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.18 Dennison State Ban......
  • Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Taylor
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 6 Enero 2012
    ...any third parties, and to inform third parties of the existence of pre-existing encumbrances on the property.” See Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (citations omitted). Indeed, the adoption of the Bank's position would allow a person with no current interest in the pr......
  • Johnson v. Higley
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 7 Octubre 1999
    ...statute's purpose "`is to provide a method by which a transferee can protect himself from intervening claimants.'" Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted). This is intending purchasers and encumbrancers should be protected against the evils of secret grant......
  • Crowther v. Mower, 930446-CA
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 9 Junio 1994
    ...in good faith and for valuable consideration and who first duly records the deed. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3; see Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah App.1987) (grantor has no duty to record, while grantee has option to record or assume risk of subsequent grantee acquiring superior righ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • CHAPTER 3 TITLE EXAMINATION OF FEE LANDS
    • United States
    • FNREL - Special Institute Mineral Title Examination III (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. (Adopted 1898, last amended ________________.) Leading Cases: Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). Wyoming (Race-Notice Type) Wyo. Stat. Ann. 34......
  • CHAPTER 2 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE: A MULTI-STATE PERSPECTIVE
    • United States
    • FNREL - Special Institute Nuts & Bolts of Mineral Title Examination (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...and (b) The subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. (Adopted 1898, last amended _____.) Leading Cases: Horman v. Clark. 744 P.2d 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Federal Land Bank v. Pace. 87 Utah 156, 48 P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). West Virginia (Notice-Type Purchasers for Va......
  • CHAPTER 5 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE--A MULTI-STATE PERSPECTIVE
    • United States
    • FNREL - Special Institute Mineral Title Examination (FNREL) 2012 Ed.
    • Invalid date
    ...(b) The subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. (Adopted 1898, last amended ________.) Leading Cases: Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). West Virginia (Notice-Type Purchasers for Val......

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