Horne v. Russell County Com'n
| Decision Date | 15 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 3:03CV592-A.,Civ.A. 3:03CV592-A. |
| Citation | 379 F.Supp.2d 1305 |
| Parties | Leann HORNE, Plaintiff, v. RUSSELL COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Charles Michael Quinn, Kevin Wade Jent, Wiggins Childs Quinn & Pantanzis, PC, Birmingham, AL, Lisa E. Boone, Jackson & Boone, PC, Raymond Lewis Jackson, Jr., Raymond L. Jackson Jr. Attorney & Counsellor at Law, PC, Auburn, AL, for Plaintiff.
Ashley Hawkins Freeman, Gary L. Willford, Jr., Kendrick E. Webb, Robbie Alexander Hyde, Webb & Eley, P.C., Ronald G. Davenport, Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC, Montgomery, AL, William J. Benton, Jr., Benton & Benton, Phenix City, AL, Gary Clayborn Sherrer, Rhodes Sherrer & Terry PC, Dothan, AL, Stanley Allen Martin, Opelika, AL, for Defendants.
This cause is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 124) filed by Defendants Russell County Commission and Russell County, Alabama ("the County Defendants"), a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tillman Pugh individually and in his official capacity ("Pugh") (Doc. # 132), a Motion to Strike (Doc. # 159) and Renewed Motion to Strike (Doc. # 176) filed by all Defendants jointly, and a Motion for Leave to File a Corrected and Amended Reply Brief filed by Pugh (Doc. # 171).
This court previously granted in part and denied in part Motions to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint. The Plaintiff, Leann Horne, subsequently filed a Third Amended Complaint. In her Third Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff brings claims for violation of her due process rights against the County Defendants and her equal protection and due process rights against Pugh pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986 (Count II), defamation (Count III), assault (Count IV), tort of outrage (Count V), invasion of privacy (Count VI), breach of contract (Count VII), and Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims (Count VIII).
For the reasons to be discussed, the Motions for Summary Judgment are due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant:
Plaintiff Leann Horne ("Horne") is employed by the Russell County Commission and/or Russell County, Alabama as the County Administrator. Horne alleges that she has endured constant gender based remarks and other demeaning comments from former Commissioner Pugh and Commissioner Mervin Dudley ("Dudley"). She has presented evidence of comments directed to her and comments reported to her by others. She also has presented evidence that Pugh engaged in threatening conduct. Horne further contends that the Russell County Commission violated its own policies and procedures and filled an employee position in Horne's office without Horne's knowledge or consent. Horne eventually filed an EEOC charge and complaint in this court alleging violations of the constitution and various civil rights statutes.
At a July 16, 2003 meeting, the Russell County Commission voted 4 to 3 to place Horne on administrative leave with pay for a renewable 90 day period. The vote occurred after the County Attorney recommended that Horne be placed on leave because her lawsuit was entering the discovery phase. The Defendants have presented evidence that the County Commissioners had received reports that Horne was destroying and/or removing evidence relevant to the case.
Horne sought review of her placement on leave from the Russell County Personnel Review Board, but was informed that she was not entitled to review. Horne was taken off paid administrative leave and allowed to return to work in November 2003. She is currently employed as the Russell County Administrator.
The court will first turn to the federal claims brought, and the bases for summary judgment asserted by the County Defendants and Pugh as to those claims, and then will turn to the state law claims and the bases for summary judgment asserted as to those claims.
Because violations of different constitutional and statutory provisions have been asserted as to the County Defendants and Pugh, the court will separately address the federal claims asserted.
The County Defendants move for summary judgment on the § 1983 due process claim on several bases including that Horne has not demonstrated that state law relief is inadequate and that Horne has failed to present facts to support a "stigma plus" theory. The court will begin with the latter contention.
In order to prevail on a "stigma plus" due process claim, a plaintiff must establish the following: (1) a false statement, (2) of a stigmatizing nature, (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge, (4) was made public, (5) by a governmental employer, (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing. Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.2001).
The County Defendants have argued that Horne cannot show that she was discharged or that a false statement was published in connection with her placement on administrative leave. Finally, the County Defendants state that because Horne is a public figure, she cannot show stigma because she must prove actual malice. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The County Defendants state that the only statement made by placing Horne on administrative leave was that she was placed on administrative leave. The County Defendants further argue that Horne cannot prove the "plus" because she was not terminated, and has not suffered a negative impact on her future job prospects and has actually been sought out for a position.
In response to the argument that Horne cannot establish the "plus" because she was not terminated, Horne relies on a line of cases decided in the context of claims for discrimination on the basis of characteristics protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. In those cases, as Horne points out, employment actions taken which are short of discharge, but nonetheless are sufficient to be considered adverse employment actions can be the basis for a Title VII claim. See, e.g., Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001). That does not appear, however, to be the standard to apply in due process cases.
The United States Supreme Court has examined a "stigma plus" claim brought under the Fifth Amendment against a federal official in which there was a publication of information which, without dispute, injured the plaintiff's future employment prospects. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). In Siegert, the employee resigned to avoid termination. The Supreme Court stated that because the alleged defamation was not uttered incident to his termination, even though the statements made would undoubtedly damage his reputation and impair his employment prospects, there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 234, 111 S.Ct. 1789.
The Eleventh Circuit has recently addressed a stigma plus due process claim in a case in which employees were transferred to another position. The court stated that "[e]ven assuming Plaintiffs could establish the requisites for defamation, Plaintiffs' retention of employment negates a claim that they were denied their liberty interests." Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir.2003); see also Cannon, 250...
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