Horne v. United States
Decision Date | 26 February 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 17487.,17487. |
Citation | 264 F.2d 40 |
Parties | Wilbur HORNE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Chester E. Wallace, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
William C. Calhoun, U. S. Atty., Augusta, Ga., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BROWN and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a denial of a Section 2255 application. 28 U.S.C.A. The ground for relief, urged below and here, was that appellant had been convicted by a jury of 11, with neither waiver in writing as F.R.Cr.P. 23(b), 18 U.S.C.A., requires, nor by him personally. The conviction was for armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a) and (c) with consecutive sentences aggregating 25 years.
A hearing on the application was held and from testimony of the petitioner, his former trial counsel, the official court reporter, and the United States Attorney, it revealed these facts which are largely undisputed. Twelve jurors had been selected and were in the box, but the remainder of the panel had not yet been excused. The Court then inquired whether the parties desired two extra alternate jurors or whether they were willing to proceed with less than twelve if any juror should become incapacitated and excused by the Court. Both Government and defendant's counsel categorically agreed to this.1 The trial opened on October 1. On the morning of the second (and last) day one juror failed to return and was excused for disabling illness. At that time the matter was again considered by the Court and both counsel agreed that the trial should proceed.
The record does not contain direct evidence showing an express assent to these actions by petitioner personally. But the record is sufficient to warrant the Court drawing the inferences that petitioner knew of the agreement by counsel, made on both the first and second day of the trial, that the case could proceed with less than twelve jurors, and with full knowledge of the stipulation acquiesced in it as his own. These were summarized by the Court's formal findings that petitioner
The failure to record the agreement in the form of a written stipulation as Rule 23(b) requires2 is not here decisive. This is a collateral proceeding in which errors in procedure on the initial trial of the case are not open for review. Arthur v. United States, 5 Cir., 1956, 230 F.2d 666; Cawley v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 461; McCreary v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 249 F.2d 433. As an error in failing to comply with the rule, it was a matter which had to be, but deliberately was not, brought here in Horne's original appeal from the conviction. Horne v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 83, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 878, 78 S.Ct. 143, 2 L.Ed.2d 109.
On this collateral review, the absence of writing is relevant only insofar as there is any real question whether the oral stipulation was made in fact. But on this phase petitioner himself acknowledges categorically that the agreement was made as the record, note 1, supra, so clearly reflects. The controversy here is whether it was sufficiently his agreement so as to bind him. But this has to do not with a technical imperfection in the form of the stipulation, but whether, under the basic constitutional principles set forth in Patton v. United States, 1930, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854, the waiver was intelligently made with the consent of the defendant.3
The record also shows that when the one juror became incapacitated from service, the Court did not routinely act on the prior stipulation set forth in note 1, supra. Had that been done, it would have raised a further and perhaps substantial question whether a carte blanche advance waiver as to unknown contingencies could be valid under these circumstances.4 But here the Court again considered the matter and both counsel again agreed. Petitioner, though unaware of the exact colloquy between Court and counsel, knew that the matter was discussed and by agreement of Court and all counsel, the trial proceeded with but eleven jurors. As on the opening of the trial, he voiced no protest and made no objection.
Patton v. United States, supra, is indeed a profound case. As a profound case, it has deep meanings transcending mere procedural mechanics. Jury trial is the accepted mode of criminal trial in Federal Courts.5 But "* * the court has authority in the exercise of a sound discretion to accept the waiver, and, as a necessary corollary, to proceed to the trial and determination of the case with a reduced number or without a jury; * * *." Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. at page 299, 50 S.Ct. at page 258. Where there is a departure from it, the record must reflect that it was deliberately, not inadvertently, done. That means that the jury trial must have been knowingly waived. That includes consent of the defendant. 281 U.S. at pages 312-313, 50 S.Ct. at page 263.
The Court's action in warning against the discharge of that duty by a trial court "as a mere matter of rote" reflects a dual purpose. First, a serious obligation is imposed on the Court to satisfy the judicial mind and conscience that this is in the interests of justice and is what all of the parties desire. Second, the performance or nonperformance of this duty is not to be measured by the presence or absence of any particular, peculiar ritualistic form. Judging is more than that. Consequently, the absence of any such form does not necessarily establish non-performance of the judicial function.
The requirement of "consent of the defendant" as Patton states it, is not to be measured solely by the absence of a written assent signed by defendant or a categorical oral response. Here the matter was intelligently and deliberately discussed in open court. The Court had every right to conclude that the action openly taken on both occasions by petitioner's counsel, with no protest from petitioner was, as in the usual case, Kennedy v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 259 F.2d 883; Floyd v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 910; Gray v. O. B. Ellis, 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 159, the act of petitioner.
Moreover, the circumstances were such that the possible departure from a 12-man jury afforded a reasonable foundation for the exercise of the Court's considered discretion. At the time of the first inquiry, note 1, supra,...
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