Horner v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2017
• Docket Number: X10CV176034898S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Stephen Horner v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation

Stephen Horner v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation

No. X10CV176034898S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Waterbury, Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket

October 25, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE (#111)

LINDA K. LAGER, JUDGE.

Stephen Horner (Horner or plaintiff) brought this action against the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (diocese or defendant) alleging that between the years 1977 and 1982 he was sexually abused by a diocesan priest, Daniel McSheffery and that the defendant breached its fiduciary duty to him was negligent and reckless, and fraudulently concealed information about McSheffery that prevented him from filing suit against it. It is not disputed that suit was filed more than thirty years after Horner turned eighteen implicating the provisions of the applicable statute of limitations General Statutes § 52-577d. It is not disputed that the first amended complaint, which is the subject of this motion to strike, contains factual and conclusory allegations of fraudulent concealment anticipating a statute of limitations special defense that may be tolled pursuant to General Statutes § 52-595.^[1]

The first three grounds of the motion to strike are directed to the statute of limitations and the anticipatory allegations of fraudulent concealment. The fourth ground is directed to the first count and claims it insufficiently pleads a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and attempts to impose fiduciary obligations based on religious beliefs in violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.

At the oral argument of this motion on October 5, 2017, the court ruled that the first three grounds failed under the rule set forth in Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn.App. 235, 239 624 A.2d 389 (1993). " A claim that an action is barred by the lapse of the statute of limitations must be pleaded as a special defense, not raised by a motion to strike . . . A motion to strike might . . . deprive a plaintiff of an opportunity to plead matters in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense." (Citations omitted.) Although there are two limited exceptions to this principle, id., they do not apply here because the counts sound in tort and the plaintiff does not agree that all the facts pertinent to the fraudulent concealment tolling provision, General Statutes § 52-595, are alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff should not have to rely solely on the anticipatory allegations of fraudulent concealment in the complaint. See Grimes v. Darien, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford, Docket No. 126013917, (Jan. 17, 2013, Karazin, J.). In the absence of an agreement that every relevant fact is before the court, a motion to strike is a procedurally inadequate mechanism to assert the statute of limitations. Rather, a motion for summary judgment, filed at the appropriate time, is preferable. " Facts that are not alleged in a complaint may be added to the procedural mix and facts in avoidance of the statutory time limitation of action can be considered in a motion for summary judgment, whereas they cannot be considered in a motion to strike." Girard v. Weiss, 43 Conn.App. 397, 416, 682 A.2d 1078, 1087 (1996).

The defendant challenges the first count on the ground that it does not sufficiently plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the diocese and the plaintiff. The diocese is not a fiduciary per se, Iacurci v. Sax, 313 Conn. 786, 800, 99 A.3d 1145 (2014), but the broad and flexible approach to defining a fiduciary relationship under Connecticut law allows for a finding that a fiduciary relationship may exist between a diocese and one of its parishioners. Ahern v. Kappalumakkel, 97 Conn.App. 189, 194-95, 903 A.2d 266 (2006). A fiduciary relationship requires " a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other . . . The superior position of the fiduciary or dominant party affords [it] great opportunity for abuse of the confidence reposed in [it]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " The law will imply [fiduciary responsibilities] only where one party to a relationship is unable to fully protect its interests . . . and the unprotected party has placed its trust and confidence in the other." (Citation omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 41, 761 A.2d 1268 (2000). " The unique element that inheres a fiduciary duty to one party is an elevated risk that the other party could be taken advantage of--and usually unilaterally." (Emphasis in original.) Iacurci v. Sax, supra, 313 Conn. 801. While a diocese may not have a fiduciary relationship with all of its parishioners, it may have a fiduciary relationship with a particular parishioner. Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 429 (2nd Cir. 1999); Ahern v. Kappalumakkel, supra, 97 Conn.App. 197-98, discussing Martinelli .

In applying these principles to the sufficiency of the first count, the court must look for allegations that directly or inferentially could support a finding^[2] that, as a minor child unable to fully protect his own interests, Horner had a close relationship with the diocese and that the diocese sponsored, encouraged or influenced Horner's ties with McSheffery. The first count is replete with such allegations. Specifically, it alleges that the plaintiff was a minor entrusted to the care of the diocese and its priests by his mother, ¶ ¶ 14, 15, 16, 17; that he participated in church sponsored activities, ¶ ¶ 14, 21; that he attended CCD classes which the diocese encouraged its parishes to provide, ¶ 20, and was taught to trust and respect the Archbishop and the diocese, ¶ ¶ 22, 23; that he trusted the moral authority of the diocese and its priests, ¶ 19; and that the diocese knew its priests would have close contact with minors and that minors would trust its priests, ¶ 28. McSheffery served as a diocesan priest and was assigned to St. George Church in Guilford and served during the relevant time, ¶ 3, 7. The plaintiff and his mother were parishioners at that church, ¶ ¶ 12, 14, and the plaintiff served as an altar boy ¶ ¶ 29, 30. The first count also alleges that the plaintiff entered into a formal pastoral counseling relationship with McSheffery, ¶ 34, 35, and that his mother approved of the counseling and trusted that McSheffery was qualified to counsel the plaintiff and was endorsed by the diocese to provide counseling and guidance to Horner, ¶ 39. From 1977 to 1982, when the plaintiff was between the ages of nine and fourteen, McSheffery sexually abused, assaulted and exploited him approximately 250 times, ¶ ¶ 42-46, and he was unable to protect his interests in light of the influence that the...