Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc.

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Trout
• Citation: Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 141 P.3d 1099, 143 Idaho 230 (Idaho 2006)
• Decision Date: 08 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 31588.,31588.
• Parties: Virgil HORNER and Julie Horner, individually and on behalf of their natural daughter, Hanna Alena Horner, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SANI-TOP, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

141 P.3d 1099

143 Idaho 230

Virgil HORNER and Julie Horner, individually and on behalf of their natural daughter, Hanna Alena Horner, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SANI-TOP, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 31588.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 2006 Term.

August 8, 2006.

Rehearing Denied August 15, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bowen & Bailey, L.L.P., Boise, for appellant. Chris Kronberg argued.

Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., Boise, for respondents. W. Breck Seiniger Jr. argued.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION

THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 5, 2006, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN

TROUT, Justice.

This is a wrongful death case arising out of an accident that occurred in the Home Depot Store in Twin Falls, Idaho (Home Depot). Janessa Horner, who was two years old at the time, died after being struck by debris from a load of countertops which fell as a Home Depot employee removed them from a high shelf using a forklift. Defendant Sani-Top, Inc. (Sani-Top), the company that manufactured and packaged the countertops for shipment to Home Depot, appeals from a district court decision denying its post-trial motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After the accident, Janessa's parents Virgil Horner and Julie Horner-Cunningham (Virgil, Julie, or collectively the Horners) began negotiations with both Home Depot and Sani-Top. Initially, Home Depot voluntarily paid the Horners for Janessa's medical and funeral expenses incurred as a result of the accident. Ultimately, the Horners entered into a Settlement Agreement with Home Depot and fully released Home Depot from any further responsibility. Thereafter, the Horners, individually and on behalf of Janessa's sister, Hanna, filed a wrongful death action against Sani-Top, alleging Sani-Top had negligently designed and/or manufactured its packaging system for the countertops.

After a seven-day trial, the jury awarded over $4 million dollars to the Horner family, primarily relating to noneconomic damages. On the verdict form, the jury was instructed to apportion liability, if any, to Home Depot as well as Sani-Top. The jury assigned 87% of the fault to Home Depot and 13% of the fault to Sani-Top. Based upon the percentage of fault assigned by the jury, the district judge multiplied each plaintiff's total award by 13% and then entered separate judgments against Sani-Top for Virgil, Julie and Hanna Horner. As a result, Virgil and Julie were awarded $221,000 each (representing $26,000 in economic damages and $195,000 in noneconomic damages) and $130,000 for their daughter Hanna.

After entry of judgment, Sani-Top filed post-trials motions to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and for a JNOV under I.R.C.P. 50(b). Sani-Top raised issues concerning whether the judge properly calculated the judgment, whether the judgment should be offset by money Home Depot paid to settle the case and whether there was sufficient evidence to support some of the jury's damage awards and/or the overall verdict. In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion, the district judge analyzed each of the arguments Sani-Top raised and denied both the motion to alter or amend the judgment and the JNOV. Sani-Top now appeals from those rulings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The determination of the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of law over which this [C]ourt exercises free review." Woodburn v. Manco Prods., Inc., 137 Idaho 502, 504, 50 P.3d 997, 999 (2002). "Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001).

When considering an appeal from a district court's ruling on a motion to alter or amend the judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e), this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999). In reviewing an exercise of discretion, the appellate court must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).

The standard of review of a grant or denial of a motion for JNOV is the same as that of the trial court when ruling on the motion. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990). In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for JNOV the Court may not reweigh evidence, consider witness credibility, or compare its factual findings with that of the jury. Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 319, 63 P.3d 441, 445 (2003). This Court reviews the facts as if the moving party had admitted any adverse facts, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equipment, Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 580, 51 P.3d 392, 394 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

Sani-Top argues the district judge abused his discretion in denying its motion to alter or amend the judgment, alleging the following: (1) in calculating the judgment, the district judge incorrectly applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages set forth in Idaho Code § 6-1603; (2) Sani-Top is entitled to a credit against the judgment for the proceeds of the settlement with Home Depot and for the out-of-pocket payments Home Depot made for Janessa's medical and funeral expenses; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the award for economic damages; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the award to Virgil for emotional distress.

1. Statutory cap on noneconomic damages

At the time the cause of action arose, I.C. § 6-1603 read, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a judgment for noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the maximum amount of four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000) [and providing for adjustments based on industrial commission adjustments to the average annual wage]. . . .

(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of: (a) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant who incurred personal injury or who is asserting wrongful death; (b) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant, regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed. . . .

I.C. § 6-1603 (2000) (emphasis added).¹

In this case, the district judge correctly treated this as he would any other jury verdict, initially applying comparative fault to the total damage award for each plaintiff and then multiplying each damage award by the 13% of fault attributable to Sani-Top. Then, in preparing to enter judgment against Sani-Top, he considered I.C. § 6-1603, which provides that no judgment shall be entered for a claimant exceeding the statutory cap. Since not one of the plaintiff's damage awards for noneconomic damages exceeded the statutory cap, the judge appropriately entered judgment in compliance with I.C. § 6-1603.²

Sani-Top argues the language in the statute applying the limitation "regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed" means that any responsible person, even if not a party to the lawsuit, must be taken into consideration when apportioning the cap. The only way to do this, Sani-Top argues, is to first apply the statutory cap to the noneconomic damage award for each plaintiff and then apply comparative fault, requiring the defendant(s) who proceeded to trial to pay their share of the cap as allocated by the jury.

I.C. § 6-1603 specifically contemplates the amount of damages awarded in a lawsuit, as its only limitation is that a "judgment" for noneconomic damages cannot be entered for a plaintiff that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap. I.C. § 6-1603 provides no indication, as Sani-Top suggests, that the legislature was concerned with out-of-court settlements or that these should be taken into consideration when applying the cap. The language "regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed" found in I.C. § 6-1603(2) simply means that regardless of how many defendants are listed on the verdict form or how many actions the plaintiff brings to collect damages, ultimately, a judgment cannot be entered in favor of "a claimant" that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap. After properly apportioning liability as found by the jury at trial, a court must then determine whether the total noneconomic damage award for a particular plaintiff exceeds the cap. If so, the court should further reduce each defendant's responsibility on a proportional basis, based upon the jury's allocation of fault so the plaintiff's total judgment does not exceed the cap.

Here, the district judge properly entered judgment against Sani-Top in favor of these three claimants.

2. Offset of Judgment

Sani-Top argues that its judgment should be offset by the amount Home Depot paid in its Settlement Agreement. I.C. § 6-805 governs the effect of the release of one tortfeasor on the liability of other tortfeasors. Under the statute, the effect of a tortfeasor's release on other tortfeasors depends on whether there is joint and several liability. I.C. § 6-805(1) applies to "a release by an injured person of one (1) joint...