Horner v. Shearin
| Decision Date | 09 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. JKB-12-2582 |
| Parties | MATTHEW JAMES HORNER, Petitioner, v. WARDEN BOBBY P. SHEARIN, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
On February 5, 2020, this Court granted Petitioner Matthew Horner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (2/5/20 Order, ECF No. 151.) In its analysis, the Court concluded Horner was entitled to the writ because during his trial, his constitutional rights under Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) had been violated. (Mem. Op. at 40, ECF No. 150.) The Court directed Respondents ("the State") to release Horner by April 5, 2020 unless the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a superseding stay of execution or the State elected to retry Horner and obtained from Maryland state courts a decision denying him bail and/or release pending retrial. (2/5/20 Order.)
Three weeks later, on February 26, 2020, the State filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment (Mot. Amend, ECF No. 154), a motion to stay the judgment pending appeal (Mot. Stay, ECF No. 153), and a motion to substitute the public officer respondent (Mot. Substitute, ECF No. 152). Two and a half weeks later, on March 15, 2020, the State also filed a motion to include Horner's sentencing transcript in the record for its stay motion. (Mot. Include Tr., ECF No. 159.)
Before the Court could rule on these motions, the State filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 2020.1 (Not. Appeal, ECF No. 162.) Because the deadline by which the State was required to comply with the Court's order was approaching and the Court was uncertain as to the scope of its jurisdiction in light of the notice of appeal, the Court extended the deadline by which the State was required to comply with the Court's order by an additional 60 days. (4/1/20 Order, ECF No. 166.) The State then moved to withdraw without prejudice its motion before the Fourth Circuit, which the Fourth Circuit granted. (4CA ECF Nos. 7, 8, U.S.C.A. Case No. 20-6426.) The Court now addresses the State's four pending motions.
The Court will deny the State's motion to alter or amend the judgment, grant the motion to include Horner's sentencing transcript, deny the motion to stay the judgment, and grant the motion to substitute the public officer respondent.
The State makes two requests in its motion to amend. First, it asks the Court to decide Horner's claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Court declined to do in its prior opinion. (Mot. Amend at 3-4.) Second, it asks the Court to strike the third and fourth numbered paragraphs in its order granting Horner a writ of habeas corpus; the State contends the instructions contained in these two paragraphs exceed the bounds of the Court's authority. (Id. at 4-5.) Horner opposes the motion. (Opp'n Mot. Amend, ECF No. 155.)
In its February 5, 2020 decision, the Court declined to consider Horner's Strickland claims on the merits and instead denied the claims without prejudice. (Mem. Op. at 39.) The Court'sreasoning was that it was not necessary to analyze the Strickland claims because the Court had already concluded that Horner was entitled to relief under both Patton and Brady. (Id.) The State contends this was clear error because the denial of the Strickland claims without prejudice raised "a substantial question [as to] whether the Court's February 5, 2020 order [was] a final judgment, and therefore appealable." (Mot. Amend at 3.) The State further argues that even if declining to address the Strickland claims on the merits was not a clear error of law, it did result in "a manifest injustice" that should be remedied by the Court now ruling on those claims. (Id. at 13.)
First, it was not clear error for the Court to decline to rule on Horner's Strickland claims: the Court's order granting the writ of habeas corpus was a final appealable order regardless of whether the Court addressed the Strickland claims on the merits. The parties heavily dispute whether the Fourth Circuit's decision in GO Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2007) authorized the approach the Court took here or whether the Fourth Circuit has been silent on this issue. (See Opp'n Mot. Amend at 4-6; Reply Mot. Amend at 3-6, ECF No. 158.) But even if the Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, as the State contends, other circuits overwhelmingly have sanctioned the approach the Court took here. As Horner points out, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that "[a]n order granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is ordinarily considered a final judgment, even if the district court does not address all of the petitioner's claims." Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 645 (7th Cir. 1996); accord Burks v. Kelley, 881 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2018); Swanson v. DeSantis, 606 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2010); Foxworth v. Maloney, 515 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2008); Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408, 1410-12 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Washington v. Champion, 52 F.3d 339, at *1 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished); Young v. Herring, 777 F.2d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 1985); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 525 (11th Cir. 1985). The State concedes this line of authorityexists but contends there is a "circuit split" and cites two cases that it alleges stand for the opposite proposition: Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1981) and Stewart v. Bishop, 403 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1968). (Mot. Stay at 10.) Neither of these cases is on point, however, as the reason the orders in these cases were not final was because the district courts did not actually take the final step of granting habeas relief, which the Court did do here. Consistent with the clear authority on point, the Court concludes it was not clear error to decline to rule on Horner's Strickland claims after concluding Horner was entitled to the writ on two other grounds.
As for whether the Court's decision not to address the Strickland claims resulted in a "manifest injustice," even if was not a clear error of law, the Court again agrees with Horner. The State is correct that some courts have said it is best practices for a district court to address every claim in a habeas petition to avoid the potential for piecemeal litigation. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 938 (11th Cir. 1992). But the Court believes piecemeal litigation is unlikely here. The Court has already concluded that Horner is entitled to relief for two independent reasons. Given the facts in this case, the Court believes reversal on either ground is unlikely, but reversal on both grounds even more so. And even in the unlikely event the Court is reversed on both grounds, it sees no basis for concluding the State would be subject to a "manifest injustice" if it had to participate in further litigation related to the Strickland claims.
In sum, it was not "clear error" or a "manifest injustice" for the Court not to rule on Horner's Strickland claims. It declines to amend its judgment by ruling on those claims now.
In the Court's February 5, 2020 order, the Court took several actions, including: granting Horner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus (paragraph two), vacating Horner's conviction and sentence (paragraph three), and stating that within 60 days, "the State shall afford Matthew JamesHorner the opportunity, after he has been fully and properly advised by counsel, to make an election as to whether to have a jury trial or a court trial for the charges against him" (paragraph four). (2/5/20 Order.)
The State contends that the Court's instructions in paragraphs three and four were too prescriptive and violated principles of federalism. (Mot. Amend at 14-18.) The State asserts this amounted to a clear error of law and asks the Court to strike paragraphs three and four from the order. (Id. at 18.)
The Court will not strike these paragraphs. The State's general description of the law is correct: in the habeas context, principles of federalism are implicated, and the extent to which a federal district court can prescribe actions that should be taken by a state court is limited. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 431 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) () For example, federal courts can exceed their authority if they attempt to commute a sentence, see Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir. 1992), or order a state court to reinstate an appeal, see Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 1988).
But the Court did not exceed its bounds here. The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly upheld orders from district courts that, as is the case here, vacate a conviction after granting a habeas petition. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 426 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1972) (). It has similarly upheld orders from district courts that, as is the case here, vacate a sentence after granting a habeas petition. See, e.g., Bennett v. Stirling, 170 F. Supp. 3d 851, 855 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 842 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2016). Absentany authority that the Court exceeded its power in vacating Horner's conviction and sentence, the Court will not strike paragraph three from the order.
The Court will not strike paragraph four from the order either.2 This paragraph merely provides that the state court must correct the constitutional deficiency the Court identified: that is, the State, if it elects to retry Horner, must give him the opportunity to make an...
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