Horney v. Westfield Gage Co.

• Decision Date: 17 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 99-30175-KPN.,CIV.A. 99-30175-KPN.
• Citation: 227 F.Supp.2d 209
• Parties: Anita J. HORNEY, Plaintiff v. WESTFIELD GAGE COMPANY and Edward Woodis, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

227 F.Supp.2d 209

Anita J. HORNEY, Plaintiff v. WESTFIELD GAGE COMPANY and Edward Woodis, Defendants

No. CIV.A. 99-30175-KPN.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

October 17, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Donna M. Cuipylo, W. Roxbury, for Anita J. Horney, Plaintiff.

Thomas E. Shirley, Karen D. Lane, Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, MA, Timothy J. Ryan, Theodore F. Glockner, Crevier & Ryan, LLP, Springfield, MA, Mark E. Draper, Annino, Draper & Moore, P.C., Springfield, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS (Docket No. 260)

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Anita Horney ("Plaintiff") — having prevailed before a jury on various employment discrimination claims against Westfield Gage Company ("Westfield Gage") and Edward Woodis ("Woodis") (together "Defendants") — now moves for an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $269,020.50 and costs of $25,973.63. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion on various grounds and suggest that she be awarded only $78,967.18 and $14,851.07 respectively. For the reasons which follow, the court will award Plaintiff $136,585.00 in fees and $25,419.13 in costs.

I. BACKGROUND

The background of the underlying matter has been extensively detailed in prior court decisions. See Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 211 F.Supp.2d 291, 296-301 (D.Mass.2002); Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F.Supp.2d 29, 31-32 (D.Mass.2000). Therefore, the court describes only those facts salient to the present motion.

Plaintiff worked for Westfield Gage, a machine shop, from April of 1994 through April of 1998. At all times, she was supervised by Woodis. Shortly after leaving Westfield Gage's employ, Plaintiff filed a pro se charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), in which she claimed to have been a victim of on-the-job sexual harassment and gender discrimination. Soon thereafter, Attorney Donna Cuipylo ("Cuipylo") filed an appearance on Plaintiff's behalf. In due course, Plaintiff obtained permission to withdraw her MCAD charge in order to pursue a complaint in federal court.

On August 10, 1999, Plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed the present action and targeted three defendants: Westfield Gage, its general manager Edward Patterson, and Woodis. As originally framed, the action alleged that, during Plaintiff's employment at Westfield Gage, each defendant subjected her to sexual harassment and thereby violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B ("chapter 151B"), and retaliated against her for opposing the harassment in violation of both Title VII and chapter 151B. Plaintiff also alleged that Westfield Gage, by and through its agents, violated federal and state equal pay acts and discriminated against her because of her gender in violation of Title VII. Finally, Plaintiff's complaint asserted that each of the three defendants intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress upon her.

In May of 2000, the court dismissed Woodis and Patterson, as individuals, from Plaintiff's Title VII claims. See Horney, 95 F.Supp.2d at 32-36. (See also Docket No. 27.) Subsequently, in September of 2001, the court granted Westfield Gage summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, dismissed Patterson entirely as a defendant and granted Woodis summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's "constructive discharge" claim. (See Docket No. 150.)¹

Trial on Plaintiff's remaining claims began on October 22, 2001. On October 29, 2001, at the close of Plaintiff's case, each defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). The court generally denied these motions, although it did dismiss a "constructive discharge" claim aimed at Westfield Gage and a "retaliation" claim targeting Woodis. (See Docket Nos. 189, 190.) The court also generally denied Defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, although it dismissed Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages. (See Docket Nos. 197 and 198.) Then, just prior to closing arguments, the court dismissed Plaintiff's state-based equal pay claim.

The jury began its deliberations on Friday, November 2, 2001. At that time six categories of claims remained: a Federal Equal Pay Act ("FEPA") claim targeting Westfield Gage; a claim against Westfield Gage for gender discrimination under Title VII; claims against Westfield Gage for sexual harassment under Title VII and chapter 151B; a retaliation claim also targeting Westfield Gage; a chapter 151B sexual harassment claim against Woodis; and a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim aimed at Woodis as well.

The jury returned a verdict late in the day on Monday, November 5, 2001. With regard to Plaintiffs FEPA claim, the jury found that Plaintiff had established her prima facie case, determined that Westfield Gage had not proven its affirmative defense and assessed damages in the amount of $8,140. As for Plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, the jury found that Westfield Gage had intentionally discriminated against her and awarded her $750,000 in damages for "economic harm," but assessed no damages for "emotional harm." With respect to the sexual harassment claims against Westfield Gage, the jury found that Plaintiff had established her prima facie case, determined that Westfield Gage had not proven the first element of its affirmative defense and assessed damages for Plaintiff's emotional harm in the amount of $250,000. The jury also found that Woodis had sexually harassed Plaintiff and determined that he should pay $25,000 in damages for her emotional harm. Finally, the jury decided that Westfield Gage was not liable for retaliation and that Woodis was not liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. On November 27, 2001, the court, after calculating interest, entered judgment against Westfield Gage in the amount of $1,077,057.12 and against Woodis in the amount of $31,888.26.

Following the entry of judgment and in response to a number of post-trial motions, the court, in a memorandum and order dated June 20, 2002, allowed Plaintiff's motion to enforce a $25,000 post-trial settlement reached between her and Woodis, denied Woodis' motion to order Westfield Gage to pay that settlement and denied Woodis' other post-trial motion as moot. The court also denied Westfield Gage's post-trial motions in all but one respect; it determined that Westfield Gage would be granted a new trial on Plaintiff's gender discrimination claim unless Plaintiff agreed to remit to $187,500 the $750,000 jury award.

On July 5, 2002, Plaintiff agreed to the remittitur. Accordingly, on July 10, 2002, the court amended the total judgment against Westfield Gage to $533,663.52 (including interest). As to Woodis, the court, having allowed Plaintiff's motion to enforce the $25,000 settlement, dismissed with prejudice all remaining claims against him. Plaintiff then filed the instant motion for attorney's fees and costs.

In support of her motion, Plaintiff presents Cuipylo's time records from August 25, 1998, through July 10, 2002. Plaintiff multiplies the hours Cuipylo claims to have worked in that four-year period (1,281.05) by what Cuipylo asserts is her "current" hourly rate ($175), thereby producing a suggested "lodestar" figure of $224,183.75.² To this amount, Plaintiff applies a twenty percent "enhancement" ($44,836.75) for having achieved "exceptional success" over the course of what she describes as a "lengthy and risky" case. In total, Plaintiff seeks fees of $269,020.50 and $25,973.63 for such costs as investigation, service of process, experts and depositions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court's analysis of a fee request is not done in a vacuum. "In applying for judicial approval of a fee award, it is the plaintiff's burden to furnish the evidence required, not the court's burden to seek it out." Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 527 n. 11 (1st Cir. 1991). Likewise, a defendant's objection needs a certain level of particularity and specificity. See Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 420 n. 35 (1st Cir.1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 956, 113 S.Ct. 1378, 122 L.Ed.2d 754 (1993); Brewster v. Dukakis, 786 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir.1986).

To determine a proper fee award, a court must necessarily "engage in a thoughtful analysis of the number of hours expended and the hourly rates charged to ensure both are reasonable." Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F.Supp.2d 91, 100 (D.Mass.1998). See also King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1977). In doing so, the court is obliged "to see whether counsel substantially exceeded the bounds of reasonable effort." United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Typically, a court computes the lodestar "by ascertaining the time counsel actually spent on the case `and then subtract[ing] from that figure hours which were duplicative, unproductive, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir.1984)). Then, the court applies hourly rates to the various tasks, considering the prevailing community rates for comparable attorneys. Id. To say that a court must fashion a lodestar, however, "is not to say that the court is in thrall to an attorney's time records." Coutin, 124 F.3d at 337. A court, in its discretion, "can segregate time spent on certain unsuccessful claims, eliminate excessive or unproductive hours, and assign more realistic rates to time spent" and, ultimately, "may fashion a lodestar which differs substantially from the fee requested by the prevailing party." Id. (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSS...