Horns v. Brown, 9700

• Decision Date: 04 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. 9700,9700
• Citation: Horns v. Brown, 140 So.2d 781 (La. App. 1962)
• Parties: J. S. HORNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard E. BROWN, Administrator of the Division of Employment Security of the Department of Labor, State of Louisiana, et al., and Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation, Defendants- Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana

Page 781

140 So.2d 781

J. S. HORNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.Richard E. BROWN, Administrator of the Division of Employment Security of the Department of LaborState of Louisiana, et al., and Olin-Mathieson Chemical CorporationDefendants- Appellees.

No. 9700.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

April 4, 1962.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1962.

Certiorari Granted June 15, 1962.

Melvin L. Bellar, Shreveport, for appellant.

Jerry H. Bankston, Marion Weimer, Baton Rouge, for appellees.

Wilkinson, Lewis, Madison & Woods, Shreveport, for appelleeOlin-Mathieson Chemical Corp.

Before HARDY, AYRES and BOLIN, JJ.

HARDY, Judge.

This action was instituted by plaintiff as a judicial appeal from the denial of his claims for unemployment compensation by the several administrative agencies of the Division of Employment Security of the Department of Labor, State of Louisiana.After hearing of the appeal by the First Judicial District Court in and for Caddo Parish, the action of the Board of Review of the administrative agency which had denied plaintiff's claim was affirmed, and from this judgment plaintiff has appealed.

Only one question is presented for determination of this appeal, namely, whether plaintiff is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under the provisions of the statute(LSA-R.S. 23:1471 et seq.) by reason of his own misconduct in connection with his employment (LSA-R.S. 23:1601(2)).

Although the testimony in the record is subject to some uncertainty and confusion, the material facts appear to be conclusively established.The claimant, Horns, had been employed by Olin-Mathieson Company for a period of some six years, more or less, during which the performance of his duties was completely satisfactory; claimant was the head of a family consisting of his wife and seven children and his base wage was $1.10 per hour for a work week of forty hours; on some occasions during the period of his employment he was laid off for varying periods and, as a consequence, his wages were reduced to an amount of some $30.00 to $35.00 per week; claimant's employer had in effect a company rule subjecting an employee to discharge in cases where writs of garnishment were issued against his earnings; beginning in August of 1960the claimant's wages were garnisheed in several instances, and, finally, since one or more of the writs were not released, his employment was terminated.

We have no quarrel with the employer's rule with respect to dismissal of employees in instances where garnishments were levied against their wages.This rule affects only the policy of an employer with reference to the terms and conditions of employment.So far as we are concerned, an employer may adopt and make effective any nature of rule, reasonable or unreasonable--for example, the dying of hair by female employees or the wearing of bow ties by male employees--which would subject the violators to discharge.Indeed, an employer may terminate the services of an employee with or without reason.We make this gratuitous observation in order to pinpoint the crux of the instant case which does not concern the right of the employer to discharge the employee but involves the entirely separate and distinct right of such employee to the statutory unemployment compensation benefits.

The appropriate statutory provision with respect to disqualification for benefits under the Act, LSA-R.S. 23:1601, reads as follows:

'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: * * *

'(2) If the administrator finds that he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his employment.'

In view of the above provision, we are required to determine in the instant case whether multiple writs of garnishment levied against the wages of an employee (without regard to a company rule) constitute misconduct connected with the employment.

Adverting to the definition of the term 'misconduct' within the meaning of the statute, this court has declared that it must be an act of 'wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, and a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees'; Sewell v. Sharp (La.App., 2d Cir., 1958), 102 So.2d 259;quoted with approval inAmerican Sugar Refining Company v. Taylor et al.(La.App.Orleans, 1959), 115 So.2d 898.

In Jackson v. Administrator of Division of Employment Security(La.App.2d Cir., 1961, writs denied), 128 So.2d 915, we held that an employee involved in personal financial difficulties who was discharged when a creditor began garnishment proceedings, was not guilty of misconduct connected with his employment, and, accordingly, allowed recovery.And, in Robinson v. Brown (La.App.2dCircuit, 1961), 129 So.2d 45, in which an employee, whose wages were garnisheed in violation of a company rule relating to employment, was discharged, we allowed recovery by the claimant, and, in so doing, attempted to distinguish the violation of a company rule which might justify discharge and the statutory provision with respect to disqualification on the ground of misconduct in connection with the employment.

In both of the above cited cases reference was made to the holding of our brethren of the Orleans Court in the American Sugar Refining...