Horton & Company v. Beall

• Decision Date: 07 December 1914
• Docket Number: 30
• Citation: Horton & Company v. Beall, 171 S.W. 894, 116 Ark. 273 (Ark. 1914)
• Parties: HORTON & COMPANY v. BEALL
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

171 S.W. 894

116 Ark. 273

HORTON & COMPANY v. BEALL

No. 30

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 7, 1914

Appeal from Hempstead Circuit Court; Jacob M. Carter, Judge affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Steve Carrigan, Jr., and Etter & Monroe, for appellants.

1. If appellants' efforts in bringing about negotiations between appellee, acting for himself, and Colter & Company acting for their client, was the cause originating in a series of events which, without break in their continuity resulted in the sale or exchange of the land, appellants, in contemplation of law, are the procuring cause of the sale, and are entitled to their commission. 76 Ark. 375; 84 Ark. 462, 467; 53 Ark. 49; 89 Ark. 203; 71 Conn. 590; 44 L.R.A. 321, and note; 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 198; 165 S.W. 503; Id. 1119; 14 S.W. 256; 157 S.W. 427; 60 S.W. 269; 61 N.W. 503; 154 S.W. 806; Id. 894; 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 164.

2. The court was not warranted in directing a verdict for the appellees. In determining like correctness of that action, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellants, against whom the verdict was directed. 89 Ark. 372; Id. 589; 63 Ark. 94; 36 Ark. 451; 35 Ark. 146; 62 Ark. 63; 84 Ark. 57; 95 Ark. 561; 103 Ark. 231.

O. A. Graves, for appellee.

The facts in evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, make it clear that appellants are not entitled to a commission. A real estate broker who has no exclusive authority to sell, lakes his chances with other agents who have like authority. The owner owes the commission to that agent only who is actually the procuring cause of the sale. 166 S.W. 537.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

This is an action instituted by appellants against appellees to recover commissions alleged to be due on the sale of a plantation in Hempstead County, Arkansas, owned by appellees. Appellants are real estate brokers at Hope and appellees entered into a contract, giving them exclusive right during a period of six months, to sell the plantation for a commission. That period expired without any progress being made toward a sale, and thereafter appellees continued the au-authority of appellants to sell or exchange the property and agreed to pay them a commission, but the agreement did not contemplate an exclusive privilege on the part of appellants. On the contrary, appellees reserved the right to list the lands for sale or exchange with other dealers, and did place them with other dealers.

An exchange of the lands for other real estate was finally made with one Aiken, and the trade was brought about and consummated through Colter & Co., a firm of real estate brokers at Muskogee, Oklahoma, with whom appellee had listed the lands. Some months prior to that time, appellants had corresponded with Colter & Co., with reference to an exchange of the lands for real estate in Muskogee owned by a man named Robinson, and Colter & Co. endeavored to bring about the exchange but failed. It was after the failure to effect that exchange (appellees having, after examining the Robinson property, declined to enter into the trade), that Colter & Co. brought appellees and Aiken together for the trade which was consummated. Appellees agreed to pay a commission to Colter & Co. and executed their note for the stipulated amount. When appellants asserted a claim to the commission, the note was held up until it could be determined whether or not they were entitled to the commission. Upon this state of facts, adduced in evidence at the trial, the circuit court peremptorily in-strutted the jury to render a verdict in favor of appellees, which was done, and judgment rendered accordingly.

The question for review is whether the testimony, in any phase of it most favorable to appellants, warranted a submission of the issues to the jury. Our conclusion, after considering the testimony, is that there was no evidence tending to justify a recovery by appellants, and that the court was correct in giving a peremptory instruction. The contract between appellants and appellee was that the latter should pay appellants a commission for bringing about or negotiating a sale or exchange of the lands, and it is undisputed that the exchange was not brought about through the efforts of appellants. In other words, they did not procure the exchange and are not entitled...