Horton v. Guillot

Decision Date23 August 2016
Docket Number1:14-CV-1050
PartiesWILLIS HORTON, and LUIS SAEZ, Plaintiffs, v. ERIC GUILLOT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

DECISION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment and to preclude testimony from Plaintiff's rebuttal experts in this defamation action. See dkt. # 62. The parties have briefed the issues and the Court has determined to resolve the matter without oral argument.

I. Background

This case concerns the aftermath of the Travers Stakes, contested on August 24, 2013 at Saratoga Race Course. Plaintiff Luis Saez rode a horse named Will Take Charge to victory, narrowly defeating Moreno. Defendant Eric Guillot trained Moreno. Defendant's brother watched a replay of the race. He concluded that Saez had used an illegal device to shock Will Take Charge into running faster. He reported that belief to his brother. Defendant then reported his suspicion to the New York State Gaming Commission, which conducted an investigation. Guillot also brought his allegations to the press. The investigation eventually cleared Saez and Will Take Charge's owner, Plaintiff Willis Horton, of any wrongdoing. Horton and Saez then sued Defendant for defamation, alleging that Guillot's allegations diminished the value of Will Take Charge and limited Saez's earnings as a jockey. At the end of discovery, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment and to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff's rebuttal experts under the Supreme Court's Daubert standard.

II. Legal Standard

Defendant seeks summary judgment. It is well settled that on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999), and may grant summary judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if the relevant evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to a dispositive issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant is able to establish a prima facie basis for summary judgment, the burden of production shifts to the party opposing summary judgment who must produce evidence establishing the existence of a factual dispute that a reasonable jury could resolve in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials" asserted in his pleadings, Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994), or on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998).

III. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment

The Court will first address Defendant's argument that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs' defamation claims. The Court takes this approach because the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the underlying claims does not rely on any expert opinion on damages, but rather on the facts supporting the defamation claim. If the Court were to grant summary judgment on the defamation claim, Defendant's arguments on the admissibility of expert testimony-which focuses on how damages could be proved-would be moot. In that sense, Defendant's expert-testimony motion-which is essentially a motion in limine-would have been more sensibly brought at the time of trial.1

a. The Law of Defamation

Plaintiffs allege defamation by the Defendant in his allegations concerning the Travers Stakes. In New York, defamation is "the making of a false statement which tends to 'expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendlyintercourse in society.'" Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744, 751, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 N.Y.2d 369,379 (1977)). A Plaintiff claiming defamation must prove: "(1) a false statement that is (2) published to a third party (3) without privilege or authorization, and that (4) causes harm, unless the statement is one of the types of publications actionable regardless of harm[.]" Stepanow v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 120 A.D.3d 28, 34, 987 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41-42 (1st Dept. 2014) (citing Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38, 704 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1st Dept. 2012)). "Generally, only statements of fact can be defamatory because statements of pure opinion cannot be proven untrue[.]" Thomas H. v. Paul B., 18 N.Y.3d 580, 584, 965 N.E.2d 437, 440 (2012). "A verbal utterance that inaccurately accuses a person of a serious crime can be slander per se." Id.

b. Allegedly Defamatory Statements

Plaintiffs point to a number of allegedly defamatory statements made to reporters and published in various periodicals.2 An Albany Times-Union story, published on August 31, 2013, reported that "Travers runner-up says winner cheated." See Exh. 0 to Affidavit of Shannon O'Connor, dkt. # 62-16. The paper reported that Defendant "alleges Saez was carrying an electrical device in his hand during the race, and then dropped it after Will Take Charge beat Moreno by a nose." Id. The paper quoted Guillot that "[t]he gamingcommission is working on it[.]" Id. He had "brought them the video. I showed it to 100 people, and there ain't been one person to deny it yet. You see a blurry, black device go from the right hand to the left, and then he drops it."3 Id. A September 7, 2013 article in the Daily Racing Form reported that "Will Take Charge's jockey accused by rival trainer of using electrical device in Travers[.]" See Exh. Q to O'Connor Affidavit, dkt. # 62-18. The story related that the New York State Gaming Commission was investigating the charge, which Saez had denied through his agent. Id. Guillot told that paper that "the New York stewards told him 'they would have to go through the proper procedures, which they're doing right now.'" Id. He claimed that "[t]o me, the horse was dead in the water four jumps from the wire when he hit him with the machine, he surged . . . pretty suspicious when they had a jock change coming off a second place in the Jim Dandy." Id. The story noted that "Guillot is known to be a charachter who says outlandish things," and that he had made a voodoo doll of a rival trainer. Id. The Daily News quoted Defendant as stating that "[o]ne thing I have with all the [stuff] I talk is integrity . . . integrity goes a long way with me." Id. Horse racing "needs it." Id. Guillot predicted that "[t]his will be a black eye to the industry. But I think if we all clean up the rats and flush them out, we'll have no more problems in the future. I feel sorry for the industry and the gamblers, the people that bet on [Moreno] at 30-1, for it to come to this." Id.

On September 15, 2013, the Daily News reported that "Trainer Eric Guillot alleges jockey Luis Saez used device on Will Take Charge, sticks to story." See Exh. R to O'Connor affidavit, dkt. # 62-19. Discussing the upcoming Pennsylvania Derby, Guillot predicted that"[t]hey won't use the machine on him in back-to-back races . . . We have nothing to worry about." Id. The story also repeated Guillot's accusations about the Travers and explaining the Gaming Commission's ongoing investigation. Id. "We're still waiting," Guillot explained. Id. Investigators were "taking their sweet old time, but that's good for us. Otherwise, they would have already made an opinion." Id. On the eve of the 2013 Breeder's Cup Classic, the Louisville Journal Courier reported that Defendant had "apologize[d] to" D. Wayne Lukas, Will Take Charge's trainer, "as much as he's capable of." See Exh. Q to O'Connor affidavit, dkt. # 62-20. After the Racing Commission found Guillot's charges about the Travers unfounded, Guillot stated that "Mr. Lukas, I'd like to formally apologize on national TV[.]" Id. "The emotions got the best of me and I had a bad video. I tried to apologize to the kid (Saez) this morning. His agent got into it with me and wouldn't let me. I thought the coincidences looked obvious. I thought until five minutes before they told me that it was still true." Id. Still, the paper noted, "being Guillot, he concluded 'I'd do it all over again.'" Id. When asked if that meant he was apologizing for his comments, Defendant stated "[y]eah . . . I just did. (But) I'd do it all over again.'" Id.

c. Analysis

Defendant offers several grounds for granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' defamation claims. The Court will address them in turn.

i. Statements Concerning Plaintiff Horton

Defendant first argues that he did not make any statements of and concerning Plaintiff Horton. None of the statements outlined above mention Horton by name. As such, Defendant contends, Plaintiffs cannot prove any defamation directed at Horton. Plaintiffs respond that Defendant's accusations of use of an illegal device included the word "they,"which clearly included Horton as the owner of the horse. Defendant also referred to the Plaintiffs as "rats," which indicated that he directed his allegations at more than one person. Moreover, in the racing industry, allegations about a horse are commonly understood as allegations against the owner as well. A question of fact therefore exists as to the subject of the allegedly defamatory speech, Plaintiffs insist, and such question must be resolved by a jury.

"A statement is not [defamatory] unless it is 'of and concerning' the plaintiff." Dalbec v. Gentleman's Companion,...

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