Horton v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.

• Docket Number: 21-0769
• Decision Date: 28 June 2024
• Citation: 692 S.W.3d 112
• Parties: Angela HORTON and Kevin Houser, Petitioners, v. The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

692 S.W.3d 112

Angela HORTON and Kevin Houser, Petitioners,

v.The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent

No. 21-0769

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued January 31, 2023

OPINION DELIVERED: June 28, 2024

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

Matthew J. Kita, Kolter McKenzie, Ben C. Martin, Thomas Wm. Arbon, Dallas, Laura J. Baughman, for Petitioners.

Harvey G. Brown Jr., Houston, Daryl L. Moore, Houston, Harris County, for Amicus CuriaeHarvey Brown and W. Daryl Moore.

Paul Oliver Wickes, Plano, for Respondent.

David M. Gunn, Russell S. Post, Houston, for Amicus CuriaeDavid M. Gunn and Russell S. Post.

Thomas C. Wright, Brian J. Cathey, Eva M. Guzman, Houston, Roger W. Hughes, Harlingen, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Defense Counsel and American Trucking Associations.

Justice Boyddelivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, and Justice Huddle joined, and which Justice Blacklock and Justice Young joined as to Parts I, II, and III.

Angela Horton and Kevin Houser(together, Horton) sued the Kansas City Southern Railway Company(KC Southern) for the wrongful death of their mother, alleging KC Southern negligently maintained a railroad crossing by raising the crossing grade over time to form a "humped crossing" and by failing to replace a missing yield sign.In response to a single broad-form negligence question, the jury found both parties negligently caused the accident.In response to a separate question, the jury found the parties equally responsible.The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding Horton fifty percent of the damages the jury found.The court of appeals held that the evidence supports a finding that the missing yield sign proximately caused the accident but that federal law preempts a negligence claim based on the humped crossing.666 S.W.3d 1, 9, 10(Tex. App.—Dallas2021).Because the appellate court could not determine which of the two allegations the jury relied on when it found KC Southern negligent, it reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.Id. at 12.

Both parties sought review, which we granted.On June 23, 2023, we affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on different grounds.We held that (1) federal law does not preempt the humped-crossing claim and (2) no evidence supports the jury’s finding that the absence of the yield sign proximately caused the accident.Like the court of appeals, but for the opposite reasons, we concluded that only one of the two allegations could support the jury’s negligence finding, and we could not be certain which of the two allegations the jury relied on.We thus agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court’s use of a broad-form question to submit the negligence claim constituted harmful error and that a new trial is required.But unlike the court of appeals, we remanded for a new trial on the humped-crossing allegation rather than on the missing-yield-sign allegation.

Both parties filed motions for rehearing.On December 15, 2023, we denied KC Southern’s motion and granted Horton’s, which (among other arguments) urged us to reconsider our holding that the submission of the broad-form question constituted harmful error.We invited and received additional briefing on that issue from the parties and from various amici curiae.¹Having reviewed that briefing and the authorities they address, we now agree with Horton.As in our original opinion, we hold that (1) federal law does not preempt the negligence claim based on the humped-crossing allegation and (2) no evidence supports a finding that the missing yield sign caused the accident.But we now conclude that the submission of the broad-form question did not constitute harmful error in this case.We therefore withdraw our June 30, 2023 opinion and judgment and issue this opinion.Because we do not find harmful error, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

I.Background

A KC Southern train collided with Ladonna Sue Rigsby’s pickup truck as she drove across a railroad track on a rural county road near her home.The track had been there for over a century, and KC Southern maintained it by lifting and adding materials under the rails and ties, incrementally raising the track over the course of many years.This created a "humped crossing," with the mid-point rising around thirty inches above the level road thirty feet away.No signal lights, bells, or barrier gates protected the crossing, but "cross-buck" signs—white, X-shaped signs reading "Railroad Crossing"—marked the tracks from both directions.The posts holding those signs also previously included yield signs, but— for reasons no one could explain—the yield signs were missing at the time of Rigsby’s accident.

According to a video of the accident recorded by a camera installed on the train, Rigsby slowed her vehicle to around seven miles per hour as she approached the track, and then to three or three-and-a-half miles per hour as she began to ascend the hump.Rigsby, who was deaf in her left ear, continued to cross the track as if she never saw or heard the train approaching from her left.She did not survive the collision.

Rigsby’s adult children, Horton and Houser, sued KC Southern, alleging negligence based on the humped crossing and missing yield sign.KC Southern filed a summary-judgment motion, asserting, among other things, that federal law preempts Horton’s claim.The trial court denied the motion, and KC Southern filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing fed- eral law preempts Horton’s claim at least to the extent it is based on the humped crossing.The trial court did not rule on that motion, and the case proceeded to trial.

The trial court submitted a single broad-form liability question to the jury, asking whether the negligence of Rigsby or KC Southern proximately caused the accident.KC Southern objected to the question, arguing the court should submit two separate negligence questions—one based on Horton’s humped-crossing allegation and the other on the missing-yield-sign allegation.The trial court overruled that objection.The jury found both Rigsby and KC Southern negligently caused the accident and assigned fifty percent of the responsibility to each.The trial court rendered a final judgment based on the verdict, awarding Horton $200,000 in damages.

KC Southern appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, with one justice dissenting.666 S.W.3d at 4, 25.The court concluded the evidence supports negligence liability under the yield-sign allegation but federal law preempts the claim to the extent it is based on the humped-crossing allegation.Id. at 14-15.Because the court could not "determine whether the jury rested its liability determination on [Horton’s] preempted humped crossing theory, which should not have been submitted, or the missing yield sign theory," it remanded the case for a new trial only on the yield-sign allegation.Id. at 18.Horton and KC Southern both filed petitions for review, which we granted.

II.Preemption

[1]We begin by addressing whether federal law preempts Horton’s negligence claim based on the humped crossing.²The United States Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.As a result, federal statutes may preempt state laws and render them ineffective.Alina Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398(2008).They may do this expressly, by declaring that intent on the face of the statute, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351(2012), or impliedly, by demonstrating an intent to "occup[y] the field" or creating an irreconcilable "conflict,"Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407(1992)(first quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752(1983); and then quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664(1982)).KC Southern asserts—and the court of appeals agreed—that provisions of the federal ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88,109 Stat. 803(1995)(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-16106), expressly and impliedly preempt Horton’s humped-crossing claim.We disagree.To explain, we describe the ICCT Act and its relevant provisions, the separate Federal Rail Safety Act and its relationship to the ICCT Act, and other court decisions addressing preemption under the ICCT Act before turning to our own preemption analysis.

A.The ICCT Act

Congress enacted the ICCT Act"to reform economic regulation of transporta- tion, and for other purposes."109 Stat.at 803.The Act amended numerous federal statutes, including Subtitle IV of Title 49 of the United States Code, which addresses and governs interstate transportation.Id. at 803–04.Part A of Subtitle IV specifically addresses rail transportation.49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–11908.KC Southern’s contention that the Act preempts Horton’s humped-crossing claim relies on this part, which we refer to as the Rail Provisions.

As part of its reform of "economic regulation of transportation," the ICCT Act abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission and created a new federal agency called the Surface Transportation Board, granting it "jurisdiction over transportation by rail carrier that is … only by railroad" or, in some circumstances, "by railroad and water."109 Stat.at 807;see49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(1).More specifically, Section 10501(b) grants the Surface Transportation Board"exclusive" jurisdiction over:

(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in [the Rail Provisions] with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other...