Horton v. Maffitt

• Decision Date: 01 January 1869
• Citation: Horton v. Maffitt, 14 Minn. 216 (Minn. 1869)
• Parties: HIRAM T. HORTON and Wife v. ROBERT MAFFITT and Wife.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

14 Minn. 216

HIRAM T. HORTON and Wife

v. ROBERT MAFFITT and Wife.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court, Olmsted county, refusing a new trial.

Jones & Butler, for appellants, cited:

Stearns & Start, for respondents.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

This is an action for partition. The court found that plaintiff Horton owns an undivided two twenty-fifths and defendant Maffitt an undivided twenty-three twenty-fifths of the premises; that defendant has paid all the taxes on them since they were owned by the parties, amounting to $108, and built a dwelling-house on them; and directs judgment that the land, without the building, be sold, and the proceeds, after paying costs of sale and the disbursements in the action, be divided between the parties in accordance with their respective interests, and that defendant have 60 days after the sale to remove his building.

We see no reason to reverse or modify the action of the court below on the ground that it directs a sale of the property, instead of setting it off to the defendant, upon paying plaintiff the value of his interest.

The plaintiff in his complaint claimed that he owned thirty-one seventy-fifths and defendant forty-four seventy-seventy-fifths of the premises, but on the trial abandoned all claim except to two twenty-fifths. The land originally belonged to Daniels, Hurd, and Taylor; and such conveyances were made that on the thirteenth of May, 1865, it belonged, twenty-three twenty-fifths to Hurd and two twenty-fifths to one Bissell. On the sixteenth of May, 1865, Hurd conveyed his interest to defendant, and on the twenty-sixth of February, 1866, Bissell conveyed his interest to plaintiff. On the trial defendant offered to prove certain matters alleged in his answer, substantially these:

That while they owned the premises, Daniels, Hurd, and Taylor executed a mortgage on them, which mortgage was foreclosed by action, and the premises sold under the decree May 13, 1865, to one Lowry, for $140, to whom a proper certificate of sale was executed and recorded; that on December 4, 1865, Lowry assigned this certificate to plaintiff; that on the eleventh of May, 1866, defendant (who appears to have been in possession) paid to plaintiff a back tax, and one year's interest on the $140, and on the eleventh of May, 1867, paid him another year's interest, and on the eighth of May, 1868, paid in to the sheriff of the county, for the purpose of redeeming the premises from the sale, $140 and one year's interest, and that the plaintiff received from the sheriff twenty-three twenty-fifths of the money so paid, leaving two twenty-fifths in his hands. This evidence was objected to by plaintiff, and excluded by the court.

Upon this ruling the error alleged arises. The question is, admitting all those matters to be facts, would they affect plaintiff's right to a partition as directed by the court?

We will consider the case as though those facts were proved. At the time plaintiff purchased the certificate of sale the title stood thus: Defendant held twenty-three twenty-fifths and Bissell two twenty-fifths of the legal title, subject to the estate of the purchaser at the mortgage sale. As the foreclosure was not complete, by reason of the time to redeem not having expired, — Daniels v. Smith, 4 Minn. 172, (Gil. 117;) Donnelly v. Simonton, 7 Minn. 167, (Gil. 110;) Laws 1862, p. 73, § 4, — the estate of the purchaser was that of a mortgagee before foreclosure — an equitable estate or interest. Either of the co-tenants might redeem the whole estate from the sale, and upon so doing, or upon taking an assignment of the certificate, would be held to do so for the benefit of the whole estate, and he would be entitled to reimbursement from his co-tenant of the amount properly chargeable to the share of such co-tenant. After acquiring the interest of the purchaser, plaintiff took a conveyance of Bissell's two twenty-fifths. Having acquired the purchaser's interest when the relation of a co-tenant did not exist between him and defendant, his right was fixed to hold and enforce it for his own benefit, and that right (unless by merger) was not impaired by his subsequently acquiring the title of Bissell to the two twenty-fifths.

Defendant argues that upon acquiring Bissell's title there was a merger to the extent of two twenty-fifths of the equitable in the legal estate; that the Bissell title was the equitable title to the two twenty-fifths, and that it was extinguished by the merger; and that he, defendant, acquired the purchaser's title by the redemption.

His redemption, redeeming as owner, annulled the sale so that no title could pass to him by means of it. Gen. St. p. 564, § 14; Daniels v. Smith, above cited; Warren v. Fish, 7 Minn. 432, (Gil. 347;) Rutherford v. Newman, 8 Minn. 47, (Gil. 28.) The purchaser's estate or interest was thereby defeated.

If there were a merger, it was the purchaser's estate to the extent of two twenty-fifths, which was merged and extinguished in the legal estate conveyed to plaintiff by Bissell, and by such merger the title of the parties would not be materially affected. After it, defendant could redeem by paying twenty-three twenty-fifths of the purchase money; and without it, so long as plaintiff was the holder both of the purchaser's interest and of the two twenty-fifths, and so...