MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, David Horton, filed this action in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama, but defendants removed it, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1 Plaintiff asserts a claim for unreasonable and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Morgan County Sheriff Ana Franklin and Deputy Sheriff Brian Fulford, as well as supplemental state-law claims for negligence or wantonness against both of those defendants and the Morgan County Sheriff's Department.2 The case presently is before the court on motions filed by each of thedefendants,3 seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff was ordered to file a response to the motions,4 but he failed to do so.5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for, among other reasons, "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires that a pleading contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaicrecitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." [Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id., at 557.
To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not "show[n]" — "that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. RuleCiv. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied) (first and third alterations supplied, other alterations in original). Following consideration of the pleadings and briefs, the court concludes that the motions are due to be granted in part and denied in part.
The complaint contains two Counts. The first asserts claims against Deputy Bryan Fulford and Sheriff Ana Franklin in their individual and official capacities for a violation of plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable, excessive force.6 The second asserts supplemental state-law claims against both of those defendants, as well as the Morgan County Sheriff's Department, for negligence or wantonness.7 All claims are based upon the following allegations of fact which, for purposes of ruling upon defendants' motions, this court assumes tobe true:8
5. On or about April 15, 2014, Plaintiff was shopping in the Walmart store located on South Memorial Parkway in Huntsville, Alabama.
6. While shopping he was confronted by Defendant Fulford after Defendant Fulford recognized him as having an outstanding warrant.
7. Defendant Fulford was off-duty at the time he confronted Plaintiff and never made any attempt to properly identify himself to the Plaintiff.
8. Plaintiff was startled by the aggressive confrontation and fled from Defendant Fulford.
9. Defendant Fulford pulled his weapon, aimed and steadied himself, and then fired a shot at the Plaintiff while he was fleeing.
10. Defendant Fulford did this in the middle of a busy Walmart seemingly without any regard for the safety and wellbeing [sic] of not only the Plaintiff but also all of the other shoppers that were present at the time he fired his weapon. Some of the innocent bystanders were children.
11. Plaintiff was struck in the backside by the bullet from Defendant Fulford's weapon.
12. He was later transported to Huntsville Hospital for emergency treatment.
13. Any reasonable law enforcement officer knows or should know that the conduct complained of herein constitutes an unreasonable and excessive use of force in violation of an individual's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
14. The aforesaid rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct giving rise to the claims asserted herein by Plaintiffs [sic].
15. All acts complained of herein were performed under color of state law and pursuant to the policies, procedures and customs of Ana Franklin, as the Sheriff of Morgan County, Alabama.
16. Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants' actions and/or inactions as set out in the Complaint were negligent, wanton, willful, malicious, fraudulent, in bad faith, beyond their authority, and/or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.
17. Plaintiff further alleges that all actions and/or inactions of the Defendants were committed while in the performance of their duties in the line and scope of their employment.
18. As a direct and proximate result of the acts complained of herein above, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer from physical injury, anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress.
Doc. no. 1-1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 5-18.
A. Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims Claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state or county officials in their "official capacity" are tantamount to suits against the state governmental entitiesserved by such defendants and, absent waiver or consent, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.9 See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997) (observing that "a suit against a governmental officer 'in his official capacity' is the same as a suit 'against [the] entity of which [the] officer is an agent'") (alterations in original) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (in turn quoting Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)); see also, e.g., Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, 3 F.3d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Official capacity actions seeking damages are deemed to be against the entity of which the officer is the agent.").
Alabama sheriffs are deemed to be "arms of the State" when engaged in law enforcement activities and, consequently, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued in an official capacity under § 1983 for retrospective money damages. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793 ("Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Alabama, not their counties.").
It also is well established that Alabama deputy sheriffs are viewed as "an extension of the Sheriff" who employs them. Carr v. City of Florence, 916, F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 377 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Under Alabama law, a deputy sheriff is the general agent of and empowered to enter into business transactions for the sheriff."). As a consequence, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to deputies sued in their official capacities under § 1983 for retrospective money damages because of their "traditional function under Alabama law as the Sheriff's alter ego." Carr, 916 F.2d at 1527.
Accordingly, plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Morgan...
