Horton v. Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, Inc.

Citation334 So.2d 885
PartiesChristine HORTON et al. v. NORTHEAST ALABAMA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al. SC 1571.
Decision Date02 July 1976
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Wilson, Propst & Isom and Gordon F. Bailey, Jr., Anniston, for appellants.

James M. Campbell, Anniston, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal by Christine Horton and Lawrence Wayne Horton is from judgment in favor of appellees entered after grant of motion for summary judgment. Appellees are Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Medical Center), Anniston Memorial Hospital and City of Anniston, Alabama.

Case

The Hortons filed suit against the Medical Center, Anniston Memorial Hospital and the City of Anniston, for damages resulting from injuries allegedly incurred by Christine Horton while a patient at the Medical Center in Anniston, Alabama. Plaintiff, Christine Horton, sues in count one on the complaint for breach of implied contract to properly nurse and care for her, and in count two of the complaint for negligent or wanton misconduct in the same regard. She alleges in count one that:

'1. On or about the 21st day of October 1974, Plaintiff, Christine Horton and Defendants entered into an agreement by which Defendants promised to nurse and provide medical treatment and medical care for the Plaintiff, Christine Horton.

'2. Defendants breached the agreement by failure to properly nurse and care for the Plaintiff, Christine Horton, following her surgical operation and as a proximate result of the Defndants' breach of said agreement, the Plaintiff, Christine Horton, required additional or corrective surgery, incurred considerable medical and drug expenses, suffered great pain and mental anguish and became permanently injured.'

In count two she alleges the following:

'1. On or about the 22nd day of October, 1974, in the City of Anniston, Calhoun County, Alabama, the Defendants' (sic) negligently or wantonly caused or allowed the Plaintiff, Christine Horton, to be pushed, shoved and generally treated in a rough manner, and said treatment caused Plaintiff to be injured so that corrective surgery had to be performed on the Plaintiff, Christine Horton.

'2. As a proximate consequence of the Defendants' said negligence or wantonness, the Plaintiff, Christine Horton, was caused to suffer the following injuries and damages: Plaintiff, Christine Horton's right ovarian vein was split or severed; Plaintiff, Christine Horton, suffered internal bleeding; Plaintiff had to be subjected to a second operation; Plaintiff, Christine Horton, suffered great physical pain and mental anguish; Plaintiff has suffered permanent injuries.'

Plaintiff, Lawrence Wayne Horton, alleges:

'COUNT THREE

'1. On or about the 21st day of October, 1974, the wife of Plaintiff, Lawrence Wayne Horton, one Christine Horton, and the Defendants entered into an agreement by which the Defendants promised to nurse and provide medical treatment and medical care for Christine Horton.

'2. Defendants breached the agreement by failing to properly nurse and care for the Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton, following her surgical operation and as a proximate result of the Defendants' breach of said agreement, the Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton, required additional or corrective surgery, incurred considerable medical and drug expenses, suffered great pain and mental anguish and became permanently injured.

'COUNT FOUR

'1. On or about the 22nd day of October, 1974, in the City of Anniston, Calhoun County, Alabama, the Defendants negligently or wantonly caused or allowed the wife of Plaintiff, Lawrence Wayne Horton, one Christine Horton, to be pushed, shoved and generally treated in a rough manner so as to cause her to be injured, which injury required that corrective surgery be performed on the Plaintiff's wife.

'2. As a proximate consequence of the Defendants' said negligence or wantonness, the Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton, was caused to suffer the following injuries and damages: Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton's right ovarian vein was split or severed; Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton's right ovarian vein was split or severed; Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton, suffered internal bleeding; Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton, suffered great physical pain and mental anguish; Plaintiff's wife, Christine Horton, suffered permanent injuries.'

The Medical Center and the City of Anniston filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court, Following a pretrial hearing on the motions, ordered defendants to file affidavits and other evidence in support of the motions and proceeded to treat them as motions for summary judgment. Then, defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the pleadings, affidavit of Austin Letson, and Anniston City Ordinance No. 74--0--13. After consideration of the affidavit and other evidence presented, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, citing Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 293 Ala. 160, 300 So.2d 823, as authority.

We reverse and remand.

Issue

Did the trial court err in granting defendant's motions for summary judgment on the authority of Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County?

Facts

Plaintiff, Christine Horton, was admitted to Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, formerly Anniston Memorial Hospital, in the City of Anniston, Alabama, on 21 October 1974. On 22 October 1974, a hysterectomy was performed on her.

The Medical Center, where Christine Horton was admitted and where the alleged mistreatment occurred, functioned prior to 7 May 1974, under the name of Anniston Memorial Hospital. That entity was organized, and operated, under the provisions of Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 189, and Chapter 15 of the Code of the City of Anniston of 1961. Under that Code Section it was a municipal hospital.

However, on 7 May 1974, the Council of the City of Anniston, Alabama, adopted an ordinance which created and established the Regional Medical Center Board; the Board to be a body corporate and politic as permitted by Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 190(1). The Regional Medical Center Board was doing business as Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center at the time the alleged causes of action arose.

Decision and Opinion

It is axiomatic that summary judgment is to be granted to the moving party only where it is clear from the evidence presented that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. On such motion the court cannot try issues of fact. Rather, it may only ascertain whether there are issues for a jury to determine. If, under any conceivable set of circumstances the plaintiff may recover, the trial court must deny the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56, ARCP; Donald v. City National Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So.2d 92.

In this case the action brought by the plaintiffs was in tort, in counts two (2) and four (4), and in contract, in counts one (1) and three (3). The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the authority of Hembree v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 293 Ala. 160, 300 So.2d 823. In Hembree the action sounded in tort only. The defense of governmental immunity was a bar to recovery since no express or implied contract existed.

The question presented here is whether, under the pleadings and evidence before the court, there was a cause of action upon which the plaintiffs might possibly recover. We answer in the affirmative.

The defense of governmental immunity to actions in tort against county hospital boards no longer exists. In Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 320 So.2d 631, full effect was given to the legislative intent expressed in Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 204(24). That intent was not to immunize county hospital boards. Those boards have the power '* * * to sue and be sued * * *.' The Hortons could maintain actions in tort under counts two (2) and four (4) of their complaint but for the fact that Lorence, decided on 10 July 1975, was given prospective effect only. Christine Horton incurred her injury on 22 October 1974. The tort actions are therefore barred by the defense of governmental immunity.

The appellants argue that such immunity as applied in Hembree is not applicable here. This is based upon the contention that by adoption of Ordinance Number 74--0--13, establishing the Medical Center Board, the Council of the City of Anniston created an entity apart and separate from all county governmental ties. They argue that by creating the Medical Center Board, in compliance with Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 190(1), the hospital was at the time of the alleged injury a public corporation so far divorced and removed from governmental origin that it lay unprotected by any shields of immunity. Such is not true. The evidence shows that the Medical Center Board was created under Section 190(1), but this provision in no way removes the protective cloak of governmental immunity provided by the cases before the decision in Lorence, supra. The City Council merely withdrew the City of Anniston from operation of the hospital and placed its operation in a public body under authority of Section 190(1). However, the powers, obligations and duties of such a public body are the same as those of county hospitals, as provided in Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 204(18)--(30), since those Code Sections are, by reference, adopted in Tit. 22, § 190(1).

Code of Ala., Tit. 22, § 190(1) is as follows:

' § 190(1). Incorporation of public bodies created pursuant to this chapter; powers of such corporations.--Any public body heretofore or hereafter created and established by ordinance or resolution pursuant to chapter 6 of Title 22, Code of Alabama (1940) may become a body corporate and politic under the name set forth in such ordinance or resolution by filing a certified copy of such ordinance or resolution with the secretary of state, to be recorded in his office. The members of such public body shall constitute the members of the corporation until they are...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Cranman v Maxwell
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 24, 1999
    ...and governmental responsibility in tort is clearly set out in a dissenting opinion I wrote in Horton v. Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, Inc., 334 So. 2d 885, 890 (Ala. 1976), as "My position on the issue of 'governmental immunity' in cases such as this one was first stated in Hut......
  • E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Const. Co. of Texas
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • May 9, 1977
    ...Berry v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 333 So.2d 796 (Ala.1976), reviewed in 7 Cum.L.Rev. 355 (1976); accord, Horton v. Northeast Ala. Regional Medical Center, Inc., 334 So.2d 885 (Ala.1976). Here, however, we have pretermitted whether there is a breach of a contractual duty owed to Ernst. We reach......
  • Chandler v. Hospital Authority of City of Huntsville
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 5, 1986
    ...immunity and governmental responsibility in tort is clearly set out in my dissenting opinion in Horton v. Northeast Ala. Regional Med. Ctr., Inc., 334 So.2d 885, 890 (Ala.1976), as "My position on the issue of 'governmental immunity' in cases such as this one was first stated in Hutchinson ......
  • Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Steele
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • June 22, 2007
    ... ... Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama ... June 22, 2007 ... Certiorari Denied ... called for emergency medical assistance. The father testified that he ... Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993) [overruled on other ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT