Horton v. Perkins, 2080175.

Decision Date20 February 2009
Docket Number2080175.
Citation17 So.3d 235
PartiesGeorge HORTON and Louise Horton v. Venita K. PERKINS.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Derek Kendal Johnson, Florence, for appellants.

Harold G. Peck, Florence, for appellee.

MOORE, Judge.

George Horton and Louise Horton appeal from a judgment entered by the Lauderdale Circuit Court ("the trial court") on August 4, 2008, denying them any recovery for improvements they made to property owned by Venita K. Perkins. We affirm.

Procedural and Factual Background

On October 6, 2006, Perkins filed a complaint against the Hortons, seeking to eject them from land she had acquired by warranty deed on June 15, 2006, and to recover damages for waste or other injury to the land caused by the Hortons. On November 9, 2006, the Hortons filed an answer and a counterclaim. In their counterclaim, the Hortons sought damages from Perkins for fraud and unjust enrichment. The Hortons claimed that they had been induced to make improvements to Perkins's property for which they were entitled to compensation. On May 30, 2008, after a failed mediation, the Hortons amended their counterclaim in an attempt to add Charity Perkins as a party; however, the Hortons never served Charity Perkins, and the trial court ultimately dismissed the action against her. The case proceeded to an ore tenus hearing on June 24, 2008.

The evidence adduced at the hearing showed that, before August 1993, the Hortons had resided in a manufactured home located on a lot they had rented in a mobile-home park in Sheffield. Unhappy with the condition of the park and an impending rent increase, Louise, with the assistance of her sister, Charity Perkins, started looking for alternative places to live. According to the Hortons' testimony, after Charity and Louise found no suitable property, Charity offered to give the Hortons a deed to a one-acre portion of a four-acre plot of land she had recently inherited from her and Louise's uncle so the Hortons could locate their manufactured home on that property. Charity testified that she had never promised to deed the Hortons the land but merely had agreed that they could move their manufactured home onto her property and occupy the land so long as they lived. Clara Thompson, a third sister, testified that she had heard Charity offer to allow the Hortons to park their manufactured home on her property rent-free for as long as they wanted but that she had never heard Charity offer to convey to the Hortons a gift of one acre of the land.

The Hortons moved their manufactured home onto the property in August 1993, parking it next to a mobile home owned by Charity in which her then teenaged daughter, Venita, was living. Charity did not execute a deed to the Hortons in 1993, however. The Hortons testified that Charity had told them she could not deed them the property until the uncle's will had been probated. The will was probated by April 1994, but Charity still did not execute a deed to the Hortons. Louise testified that over the next several years she often discussed the matter with Charity but that Charity kept making excuses as to why she could not execute the deed. It is undisputed that the Hortons never paid any rent for their use of the property.

Although they never received a deed to the plot of land on which their manufactured home was located, the Hortons spent considerable sums improving that home and the property. Among other things, the Hortons added a den and a deck to the structure, installed a septic tank, ran electrical, water, and sewage lines to the manufactured home, added vinyl soffit and siding, and bricked the exterior walls of the home. In addition, the Hortons paid for improvements to Charity's house located immediately next door to their home. The Hortons also paid to replace a dirt and gravel driveway with a concrete driveway that Charity shared. Charity testified that she had never anticipated that the Hortons would make those improvements, that she had advised them not to make those improvements, and that she had allowed those improvements to be made simply to avoid any arguments with the Hortons.

In 2001 or 2002, Charity conveyed the four-acre tract of property to her brother Jeffrey Perkins.1 Jeffrey testified that during his ownership of the property no one had ever mentioned to him that the Hortons were entitled to a deed to one acre of the property. Jeffrey testified that it had been his understanding that Charity had told the Hortons they could live on the property as long as they lived. Jeffrey stated that he also had agreed that they could remain on the property.

In June 2006, Jeffrey sold the four-acre tract to Venita. At the time of the sale, Venita knew that the Hortons lived on the property. Charity informed Venita that she wanted to make sure the Hortons had a place to live their whole lives. Venita testified that she then met with the Hortons and told them that they could stay on the property as long as they wanted but that she wanted the manufactured home moved off the property upon their deaths. Venita testified that the Hortons had originally agreed to that arrangement. Louise testified that Venita had then presented a "lifetime lease" to the Hortons that contained terms to which the Hortons could not consent and that they had therefore refused to sign the agreement. Venita then sued to have the Hortons ejected from the property. The Hortons moved out of the manufactured home and off the property in October 2007.

The Hortons called Melissa Calloway, a real-estate appraiser, as an expert witness at the trial. Calloway testified that, based on a sales-comparison analysis she had performed, in her opinion the manufactured home had a fair market value of $69,000; however, she could not identify any purchaser who would pay that price for the home. Venita testified that the presence of the manufactured home actually decreases the value of the property and that the property would be worth more if the home was removed. Venita explained that the home is situated too close to the other homes on the property and that it causes traffic problems on the property at times. Venita testified that when she bought the property she had wanted the manufactured home removed but that she had agreed to let the Hortons stay there at her mother's request. Jeffrey testified that because of poor workmanship, a sagging and leaking roof, and structural problems, the manufactured home would cost more to maintain than could be recovered in rent. Jeffrey opined that the manufactured home did not enhance the value of the property and that he would tear it down if he owned the property. Jeffrey also stated that he believed the property was worth more without the manufactured home and that the reasonable rental value of the property on which the manufactured home rested was $100 to $150 per month.

On August 4, 2008, the trial court entered the following judgment:

"The Court held a hearing at which the parties were present with their attorneys. After a trial and upon consideration of the evidence, ... the Court finds that the plaintiffs/counter-defendants are entitled to judgment with respect to the counterclaim of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs.2 Pursuant to the decision in Griffin v. Griffin, 206 Ala. 489, 90 So. 907 [ (1921) ], the defendants/counter-plaintiffs should be allowed the value of the improvements they made to the property; however, that decision states that the fair value for rental of the land should be deducted from the same. The Court finds that the fair rental value of the land offsets any value of the improvements. The plaintiff's original claim against the defendants is MOOT as they have voluntarily removed themselves from the property in dispute. This concludes the case."

On September 2, 2008, the Hortons filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. See Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. In that motion, the Hortons claimed that the trial court had erred in denying them any equitable relief and that they should receive damages or an equitable lien against the property in the amount of $46,350. The trial court denied the Rule 59 motion on September 5, 2008. The Hortons filed a notice of appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court on September 15, 2008; that court subsequently transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12-2-7.

Discussion

In Griffin v. Griffin, 206 Ala. 489, 90 So. 907 (1921), J.M.E. Griffin took possession of a parcel of land as a parol gift from his father, Jerry Griffin. 206 Ala. at 489-90, 90 So. at 907. Thereafter, based on his understanding that he owned the property, J.M.E. erected a house and made other major and minor improvements for which he paid. Id. After the death of J.M.E., his widow and child became embroiled in a controversy with Jerry over the ownership of the property, resulting in a lawsuit. Id. The trial court ultimately determined that Jerry held title to the land, but it fixed a lien on the property for the present value of the improvements less the reasonable rental value of the property during the time that it was occupied. Id. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that, although a court of equity could not order specific performance of the parol gift, it was authorized to award the donee, or his representatives, compensation for the improvements less the reasonable rental value of the property as a condition precedent to the recovery of the property. 206 Ala. at 490, 90 So. at 908.

Although recognizing significant factual differences between this case and Griffin, the Hortons do not quarrel with the trial court's application of the holding in Griffin to this case. They apparently agree that they are not entitled to specific performance of the alleged parol gift made by Charity. They also apparently agree that the measure of any equitable relief to which they would be entitled is measured by the...

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