Horton v. State

• Decision Date: 21 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 79S02–1510–CR–628.,79S02–1510–CR–628.
• Citation: 51 N.E.3d 1154
• Parties: Adam HORTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

51 N.E.3d 1154

Adam HORTON, Appellant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 79S02–1510–CR–628.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 21, 2016.

Steven Knecht, Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C., Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Chandra Hein, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 79A02–1410–CR–765

RUSH

, Chief Justice.

The Indiana Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial, which may be waived by one, and only one, person—the defendant. Unless the defendant personally communicates to the judge a desire to waive that right, he must receive a jury trial.

Here, Defendant Adam Horton merely remained silent while his attorney requested a bench trial on the second phase of a bifurcated trial, where the State sought to prove a D-felony domestic battery charge based on a prior conviction. Because Horton's silence falls well short of personal waiver, the trial court committed fundamental error in proceeding to a bench trial. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial on the D-felony domestic battery charge.

Even though the ineffective jury trial waiver is dispositive, we also address Horton's insufficient-evidence claim because it raises an important question about judicial notice of court records. The trial court convicted Horton of the felony-level domestic battery offense based on judicial notice of its own file in a prior case, in which Horton had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery. We conclude that when a trial court takes judicial notice of a “record of a court” under Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5)

, unambiguously identifying the publicly available records may be minimally sufficient. But the better approach, when practical, is to enter the particular documents into the record, so that both the litigants and appellate courts can know with certainty what evidence the court considered. The trial court's omission of those documents here impedes our review but does not constitute error.

Facts and Procedural History

On December 4, 2013, Defendant Adam Horton and his girlfriend, K.F., spent a tense day at Horton's father's rural home near West Point, Indiana. After several heated arguments with Horton, K.F. fled on foot and began walking down the rural road leading away from the house. Horton caught up to her, pushed her to the ground, and straddled her. When K.F. screamed for help, Horton covered her mouth with one hand, grabbed her throat with the other, and told her that she “deserve[d] to die.” K.F. eventually managed to free herself and stand up, despite being struck in the face. Suddenly, a car pulled up to the scene, and the driver took K.F. away to safety.

The State charged Horton with two D-felony counts of strangulation, one A-misdemeanor count of intimidation, and two counts of domestic battery (one as an A-misdemeanor and the other elevated to a D-felony based on a prior domestic battery conviction). Horton moved to bifurcate the D-felony domestic battery charge. The State ultimately dismissed the intimidation charge.

On September 25, 2014, the jury found Horton guilty of the misdemeanor domestic battery and not guilty of the strangulation charges. Then, with the jurors still seated in the box, the judge paused to ask Horton's counsel whether Horton would like to waive his jury trial right on Count IV, the D-felony domestic battery charge:

Court: Ok. Ladies and gentlemen we—there's also another count that we would need to proceed under but—counsel, do I understand you're waiving the jury trial on Count IV?

State: That's correct, Judge.

Court: And we still need to proceed on Count IV now? He was found guilty of the domestic battery.

Defense Counsel: Yes, Judge.

Court: Ok. How do you intend to proceed? As a bench trial?

Defense Counsel: Yes.

State: I'm sorry, Judge, I didn't ...

Defense Counsel: Yes, as a bench trial.

Court: Very good. Then I'm going to suggest we take about a five minute break so that I can thank the jury for their service here today.

Tr. 139–40.

Minutes later, a bench trial commenced on the second phase for the D-felony domestic battery charge. To prove Horton's prior domestic battery conviction, as required for the elevated offense, the State presented certified copies of several documents filed under cause number 79D05–0201–CM–195: an unsigned sentencing order indicating an A-misdemeanor domestic battery conviction; charging informations for battery and domestic battery; and a probable cause affidavit noting Horton's full name and birth date of March 6, 1980. The State also presented booking photos from Horton's arrest on the prior charges, as well as a police report from the 2014 battery noting Horton's full name and birth date of March 6, 1980. Finally, because the prior conviction allegedly took place in the same court as the current proceeding—Tippecanoe Superior Court 5—the State asked the court to take judicial notice of that other case file, without objection from Horton:

State: And that's the last—[inaudible]—of witness; the only other matter is evidence of the previous conviction was a matter that was handled in Superior Court 5; I ask the court to take judicial notice of that file which is presently available.

Court: Ok so then again, do you want me to take judicial notice of the court's own records; they're the 0201–CM–195 case?

State: Yes.

Court: Ok.

State: With that, State rests.

Court: Any objection to the Court doing that?

Defense Counsel: No, Your Honor.

....

Court: Ok. So now we have someone who's been convicted of misdemeanor today. We have—we need to set a sentencing hearing. We may very well have—I haven't read through these; I haven't compared these documents and exhibits yet and not going to presume that it shows what the State says; I need to go through it carefully. But it would seem to me that we need to set a date for sentencing regardless of what the conviction will be for.

Tr. 150–51.

At the sentencing hearing four weeks later, the trial court found Horton guilty of the D-felony domestic battery, but—again without objection from Horton—it never entered the judicially noticed case file's contents into the record. The judge simply stated,

We're here for a sentencing hearing but the first thing that we need to do is rule on Count IV which was submitted to the Court for consideration and the defendant waived the jury trial on that count. The court, having reviewed the evidence submitted by the—on that count now finds the defendant guilty of the crime of domestic battery, as a class D felony.

Tr. Sent. Hr'g 1. The court then imposed two-and-a-half years' incarceration, with one year executed, one year in community corrections, and six months suspended to probation.

On appeal, Horton argued that he did not validly waive his Indiana and federal constitutional jury trial rights and that because the sentencing order from the prior conviction was unsigned, insufficient evidence supported the felony domestic battery conviction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on both issues. It first held that Horton “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” waived his jury trial right because he had just been through a jury trial on the A-misdemeanor domestic battery count. Horton v. State, No. 79A02–1410–CR–765, 38 N.E.3d 739, slip op. at 9 (Ind.Ct.App. July 28, 2015)

. It further held that sufficient evidence supported the D-felony domestic battery conviction because although the sentencing order was not signed, the judge also took judicial notice of its case file from the prior conviction, with no objection from Horton. Id. at 5–7. We granted Horton's petition to transfer to consider these issues.

Standards of Review

Horton first alleges that his jury trial waiver was deficient under the Sixth Amendment; Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution

; and Indiana Code section 35–37–1–2. Each issue raises a question of law we review de novo. See

Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind.2015), reh'g denied (reviewing alleged constitutional violation de novo); Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind.2010) (reviewing matter of statutory interpretation de novo).

Horton also alleges the evidence is insufficient to support his D-felony domestic battery conviction because the sentencing order for his prior conviction was unsigned and the trial court never entered the judicially noticed case file into the record. This claim involves two distinct standards of review. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without reweighing the evidence or reassessing witness credibility. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573 (Ind.2014)

. And we review a trial court's decision to take judicial notice of a matter, like other evidentiary decisions, for abuse of discretion. Storey v. Leonas, 904 N.E.2d 229, 236 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (reviewing judicial notice of another jurisdiction's law for abuse of discretion), trans. denied;

McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 536 (Ind.2001) (reviewing exclusion or admission of evidence for “whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled upon the evidence”).

Discussion and Decision

I. Defendant Did Not Personally Communicate Waiver of His Indiana Constitutional Jury Trial Right.

Horton contends that the trial court denied him his right to a jury trial on the D-felony domestic battery charge because he did not personally communicate waiver to the judge, as required by this Court's longstanding precedent, reiterated most recently in Kellems v. State, 849 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind.2006)

. The State concedes that Horton did not personally waive the right, but argues that this Court should make an exception where, as here, the defendant has just experienced a jury trial and is thus more likely “aware” of the right his attorney attempts to waive on his behalf.

The jury trial right is a bedrock of our criminal...