Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd.
| Citation | 842 P.2d 928 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 920273-CA,920273-CA |
| Parties | Creighton C. HORTON II, Petitioner, v. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
Creighton C. Horton II, pro se.
Mark A. Madsen (argued), and Kevin A. Howard, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ.
Creighton C. Horton II, appeals the Utah State Retirement Board's order denying him membership in the contributory retirement system established by the Public Employees' Retirement Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-2-101 to -802 (Supp.1987). We affirm.
Horton began working for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office in 1978. At that time, he joined the Public Employee's Retirement System, under which individual members contributed a portion of their monthly pay to a retirement account.
In July 1983, Salt Lake County and the State of Utah began a modified version of the previous system, which was referred to as the "contributory system." Under the contributory system, the member and the employer jointly contributed to the employee's account, with the employer paying into the contributory system in lieu of pay increases. Under this system, the contributions immediately vested to the employees' benefit and could be withdrawn upon termination of employment.
In 1986, while Horton was still employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, the Utah Legislature enacted the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-3-101 to -802 (Supp.1987). This act created a new retirement system known as the "noncontributory system," under which members could no longer contribute to the system, but all contributions were paid by employers. Further, members could not withdraw employer contributions upon termination of employment; rather, all contributions would remain in the retirement fund to pay benefits for members with four or more years of credited service.
The new act required all State employers to adopt the noncontributory system, thus compelling all new State employees to enroll in that system. However, the act allowed all other political divisions to elect between the contributory and the noncontributory systems. Additionally, employees covered under the contributory system at the time of the new law's enactment were given a six month period in which they could elect to remain in the contributory system or could voluntarily enroll in the noncontributory system.
On December 1, 1986, Horton, while still employed by Salt Lake County, elected to remain in the contributory retirement system. In September 1987, after the election period had run, Horton accepted a position with the Utah State Attorney General's Office. Prior to leaving the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Horton sought the opinion of the Utah State Retirement Board's (the Board's) general counsel as to whether he could remain in the contributory system after leaving the County for State employment. He was advised that Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-203(1) (1992) would preclude him from remaining in the contributory system. 1 Nonetheless, Horton applied to the Board for continuing coverage under the contributory system after changing employment, claiming that he should be treated as a transferee "for purposes of maintaining [his] status under the contributory system." The executive director of the Board denied that application, and Horton subsequently notified the Board of his intent to appeal the executive director's decision to the Membership Council.
In October 1990, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, and in October 1991, Horton submitted his case to the Board. On March 12, 1992, the adjudicative hearing officer entered an opinion, recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, recommending a denial of Horton's petition to remain in the contributory system.
On April 9, 1992, the Board adopted and ratified the hearing officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, denying Horton's request to remain in the contributory retirement system. The Board determined that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-203(1) (1992), Horton was a new State employee, and as such, must "automatically become a member of the noncontributory system."
Horton appeals the Board's order, claiming: (1) that the Board erred in interpreting the statute and determining that he was a new State employee and thus required to enroll in the noncontributory retirement system; and (2) that the Board's application of the statute unconstitutionally impaired his right to contract, and deprived him of his due process rights and his right to equal protection under the law.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) provides:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
....
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law
....
Under UAPA, this court will give deference to an agency's statutory construction only when "there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language." Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). "[A]bsent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. In the case at bar, no explicit or implicit grant of discretion exists, therefore we review the Board's decision for correctness, giving no deference to the Board's interpretation of the statute in question.
With respect to Horton's constitutional claims, such are questions of law and "are to be reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision." Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted).
Horton argues that the Board erred in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 49-3- 203(1) (1992) as requiring him to enroll in the State's noncontributory retirement system. Specifically, Horton argues that the statutory language, when viewed in context with the entire statutory scheme and with Board Resolution # 86-15, is ambiguous and therefore should be resolved in his favor. The Board argues that the statute and resolution are unambiguous and clearly preclude Horton from remaining in the contributory retirement system. We agree.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-203(1) (1992) provides:
Any person entering full time employment with the state or its educational institutions after the effective date of this chapter [July 1, 1986] shall automatically become a member of the noncontributory retirement system.
The plain language of section 49-3-203(1) requires that Horton enroll in the noncontributory retirement system. Horton terminated his employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office in October 1987 and commenced full time employment with the Utah State Attorney General's Office shortly thereafter. As a new State employee, Horton could not remain in the contributory system, but was required, pursuant to section 49-3-203(1), to become a member of the noncontributory system. Further, there is no basis for Horton's claim that this section applied only to "new employees who had not already been members of the retirement system." Rather, this section applies to "any person entering full time employment with the state." Thus, the statute clearly applies to Horton.
Moreover, Resolution # 86-15, passed by the Board in May 1986, specifically directs that Horton could not be treated as a transferee. 2 That resolution provides in pertinent part:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Board will consider any change in employment of a member between units covered by the Utah State Retirement System during the election period to be a transfer as long as the time between employment does not exceed 120 days and a refund of vested retirement contributions has not been taken.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that any change of employment from one employing unit to another after the election period will not be considered a transfer, and there will be no election of retirement systems.
Pursuant to the plain language of Resolution # 86-15, Horton, who changed employment between covered units after the election period had run, could not be considered a transferee. Rather, he was a new employee and as such could not elect between retirement systems, but was required to enroll in the noncontributory system.
Horton argues that the Board's application of the law unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to contract, his right to due process of the law, and his right to equal protection under the law. We disagree.
Horton first argues that the Board's decision denying him continuing coverage under the contributory system and requiring him to enroll in the noncontributory system impairs his right to contract under Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, he argues that the Board's action impairs his vested right to remain in the contributory retirement system. Such argument is without merit.
Horton has not shown that he had any contract with the Board under which he could remain a member of the State contributory retirement system irrespective of his employer. When Horton voluntarily left the employ of Salt Lake County, where he had vested rights under the contributory system, to accept employment with the State, he forfeited all rights to membership in that system, and was required, pursuant to statute, to enroll in the noncontributory system.
Horton next argues that the Board's decision denying him...
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