Horvath v. City of Barberton Bldg. Dep't

Docket Number5:22-cv-1387
Decision Date24 July 2023
PartiesWILLIAM HORVATH, PLAINTIFF, v. CITY OF BARBERTON BUILDING DEPARTMENT, et al., DEFENDANTS.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HONORABLE SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE

This matter is currently before the Court on the question, raised sua sponte, as to whether abstention should apply in view of a pending action brought by William Horvath (plaintiff or “Horvath”) in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. See Horvath v Barberton Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals, No CV-2020-09-2481 (Ohio Com. Pl., filed Sept. 8, 2020) (“the state court action”). At this Court's request (see Doc. No. 26 (Order)), each side timely filed a brief after having been granted a short extension of time to do so. (See Doc. No. 29 (Plaintiff's Brief); Doc. No. 28 (Defendants' Brief).) The matter is now ripe for determination.

For the reasons and in the manner set forth herein, the Court will abstain pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). See also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (noting that Younger abstention is among the threshold issues that must be decided before turning to the merits of an action).

I. Background

On August 5, 2022, Horvath filed this single-count complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Barberton Building Department, Barberton Law Director Lisa O. Miller, Barberton Property Maintenance Inspector David Sykes (Sykes), and three John Does (who have never been identified or served).[1] On February 15, 2023, with leave and in response to the defendants' original motion for judgment on the pleadings, Horvath filed an amended complaint, which is now the operative complaint; it substituted defendant City of Barberton (“the City”) for defendant City of Barberton Building Department. (Doc. No. 19.) Defendants filed their answer and counterclaim on February 15, 2023 (Doc. No. 20), along with a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 21), which has been denied without prejudice to renewal should that become appropriate (see Doc. No. 30 (Order)).

The case arises out of facts relating to an April 2020, tornado that damaged Horvath's residence in Barberton, Ohio (“the Subject Premises”). Plaintiff alleges[2] that, shortly after the tornado occurred, he “began working with his property insurer to make various claims for damages[.] (Doc. No. 19 ¶ 10.) By August 7, 2020, Horvath had allegedly (1) begun the process of removing “rubbish and garbage” from the Subject Premises in response to a letter from the City; (2) received a June 18, 2020, report from the EES Group, a structural engineer, “indicating that the Subject Premises could be repaired[;][3] (3) contacted Sykes in July 2020, along with Dean Acklin (“Acklin”), an insurance adjuster, to review plaintiff's “plans to repair and refurbish the Subject Premises[;] (4) received a July 14, 2020, insurance estimate from Acklin; and (5) received an August 7, 2020, delivery of “dumpsters . . . to the Subject Premises for the purpose of beginning work to repair and restore the premises.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-15.)

On August 7, 2020, the same date the dumpsters were allegedly delivered, Horvath received a Violation Notice, signed by Sykes, from the City of Barberton Building Department. It “alleg[ed] a plethora of unspecified code violations and demand[ed] that such be cured within 30 days or the Subject Premises would be demolished.” (Id. ¶ 16.)[4] Horvath alleges he had a conversation with Sykes “in an attempt to get a building permit” but Sykes “indicated that a building permit would not be issued and the Subject Premises would be demolished in 30 days.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

On August 14, 2020, Horvath allegedly “received a check from his insurer for the purpose of repairing and restoring the Subject Premises.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff immediately contacted Acklin regarding the Violation Notice; Acklin reached out to Sykes for clarification, but Sykes allegedly “simply sent Mr. Acklin a copy of the violation notice[.] (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Acklin “informed all concerned that it would take somewhere between 10 and 14 months to make the necessary repairs.” (Id. ¶ 20.)

Horvath alleges that, on an unspecified date, [h]aving been unable to obtain a proper permit or permits to make the necessary repairs to the Subject Premises himself, [he] retained the services of Attorney Robert McNamara [‘McNamara'] and Serian Builders and Designers, Inc. [‘Serian'] for the purpose of obtaining the proper permits.” (Id. ¶ 21.) On December 1, 2021, McNamara and a Serian representative allegedly presented the senior clerk at Barberton's Building Department “with a properly completed Application for Repair Permit for roofing repairs to the Subject Premises[,] . . . [containing] design specifications for roof repair . . ., including materials to be employed and work to be performed and an architectural drawing entitled Main Level Roof Framing Plan and an AA-Roof Section.” (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) The clerk “advised that the Application and attendant drawings met the requirements and that a proper permit would have been issued except that the address was ‘flagged' on her computer and could not be issued a permit without direct approval from Miller.” (Id. ¶ 24.) About a month later, having heard nothing back from the clerk, “McNamara and several others contacted Miller telephonically in order to inquire about getting the permit issued [but] Miller responded that such a permit was never going to be issued under any circumstances and that the premises would be demolished.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

On September 8, 2020, Horvath filed the state court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, “challenging the enforceability and/or validity of the Violation Notice and/or the refusal of the City to accept his untimely appeal of the Violation Notice.” (Doc. No. 20, Counterclaim ¶ 6).)

A copy of the complaint in the state court action is available on the state court's website.[5]In his declaratory judgment claim, Horvath alleged, inter alia, that he suffered a “deprivation of his property without due process of law or fair compensation under both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.” (Complaint, Horvath v. Barberton Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals, No. CV-2020-09-2481 ¶ 8 (Ohio Com. Pl. Sept. 8, 2020) (emphasis added).[6]) The state court initially granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) but, on January 21, 2021, having conducted a hearing, the state court denied Horvath's motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies would likely apply and that Horvath had failed to establish either of the two possible exceptions to exhaustion. Horvath v. Barberton Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals, No. CV-2020-09-2481, 2021 WL 8892033, at *2 (Ohio Com. Pl., Jan. 21, 2021).

Horvath appealed this ruling, but a unanimous panel of the Ninth Judicial District Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction and declined to address any constitutional arguments relating to Horvath's declaratory judgment claim as “beyond the scope of this appeal.” Horvath v. Barberton Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals, No. 29921, 2022 WL 1164714, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App., Apr. 20, 2022), appeal not allowed by 192 N.E.3d 511 (Ohio 2022) (Table No. 2022-0456).

The state court action remains pending according to the online docket, with at least three as yet unresolved motions: (1) defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed on November 14, 2022; (2) Horvath's motion to remove personal property, filed on December 27, 2020; and, (3) Horvath's motion to enter his real estate in order to protect property and obtain evaluations, filed on December 30, 2022.

Horvath alleges in his complaint in this Court that (1) he has been deprived of [a property interest in the Subject Premises] without adequate procedural protections[,] (Doc. No. 19 ¶ 30); (2) as “compared with others similarly situated,” he was “selectively treated . . . based upon impermissible considerations . . . including intentions to inhibit or punish the exercise of [his] constitutional rights and with a malicious and bad faith intent to injure [plaintiff,] (id. ¶ 31); (3) these actions of the defendants “shock[] the conscious [sic][,] (id. ¶ 32); and (4) he was deprived of “clearly established rights” including equal protection, procedural due process, substantive due process, and the right not to be deprived of his property without just compensation (id. ¶ 33).

II. Discussion

“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule[,] because of “the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). “Nonetheless exceptional circumstances supporting abstention may exist in certain cases.” Beeman v. Stafford, 62 F.3d 1417 (Table), 1995 WL 456367, at *3 (6th Cir. 1995) (identifying “a series of Supreme Court cases that supply the “doctrinal foundation for abstention”) (citations omitted). One of these cases is Younger, supra.

“The Supreme Court's decision in Younger [] ‘counsels federal-court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding' and ‘reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.' Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 23 Fed.Appx. 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979)). As pointed out by the court in Meyers, although Younger...

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