Horvatt v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 26 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14-cv-869-J-34JBT |
| Parties | CLINT HORVATT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Clint Horvatt, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (Petition, Doc. 1). He later amended his Petition (Am. Petition, Doc. 8) and filed exhibits identified by letters (Pet. Ex.). Horvatt challenges his 2010 state court (Putnam County) conviction for principal to first degree murder with a firearm. Respondents filed a Response to Petition (Response, Doc. 12) and filed exhibits identified by letters (Resp. Ex.). Horvatt replied (Reply, Doc. 13) and filed exhibits identified by letters (Reply Ex.). This case is ripe for review.
The State of Florida charged Horvatt by indictment with one offense: principal to first degree murder with a firearm. See Resp. Ex. A. Following a trial that began on November 1, 2010, and ended on November 4, 2010 , a jury found Horvatt guilty as charged, see Resp. Ex. B at 956-57. The Court sentenced him to life in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. See Resp. Ex. C. Horvatt filed a timely notice of appeal. See Resp. Ex. D.
On Horvatt's behalf, the Office of the Public Defender filed an initial brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and an accompanying motion to withdraw. See Resp. Ex. F. Consistent with the Anders protocol, Horvatt filed a pro se initial brief. See Resp. Ex. I. On August 9, 2011, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) affirmed his conviction and sentence per curiam. See Resp. Ex. K; see also Horvatt v. State, 5D10-4206, 2011 WL 3557176 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 9, 2011). The Fifth DCA issued the mandate on August 31, 2011. See Resp. Ex. L.
Horvatt filed a motion for postconviction relief and a memorandum of law on February 20, 2012.1 In the motion, he asserted five claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The State responded. See Resp. Ex. O. On January 29, 2013, the state circuit court summarily denied grounds one, two, four, and five, and set an evidentiary hearing to consider ground three. Resp. Ex. P. The court held the evidentiary hearing on July 12, 2013, at which counsel represented Horvatt. See Resp. Ex. Q. On August 26, 2013, the court entered an order denying relief on ground three. See Resp. Ex. R. Horvatt filed a timely notice of appeal, see Resp. Ex. S, and a pro se initial brief with the Fifth DCA challenging the denial of each claim, see Resp. Ex. T. The State filed an answer brief. See Resp. Ex. U. On May 20, 2014, the Fifth DCA affirmed per curiam the circuit court'sdenial of Horvatt's motion for postconviction relief. See Resp. Ex. V; Horvatt v. State, 141 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (table). Horvatt filed a motion for rehearing, which the Fifth DCA denied. See Resp. Ex. W, X. The court issued the mandate on July, 8, 2014. See Resp. Ex. Y.
Horvatt filed a second pro se motion for postconviction relief on January 24, 2014. See Resp. Ex. Z. In the second motion, he asserted two claims of newly discovered evidence. The circuit court dismissed the second motion on October 3, 2014, for failure to comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.030, but gave Horvatt leave to amend within thirty days. See Resp. Ex. AA. Horvatt filed an amended second motion on October 17, 2014. See Resp. Ex. BB. The State filed a response. See Resp. Ex. CC. Horvatt replied. See Resp. Ex. DD. On March 2, 2015, the circuit court entered an order summarily denying the motion. See Resp. Ex. EE. Horvatt filed a timely notice of appeal, see Resp. Ex. FF, a pro se initial appellate brief, see Resp. Ex. GG, and an unauthorized supplemental brief with the Fifth DCA, see Resp. Ex. II. On July 7, 2015, the Fifth DCA affirmed the denial of the second postconviction motion per curiam. See Resp. Ex. JJ; see also Horvatt v. State, 171 So. 3d 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (table). Horvatt filed a motion for rehearing/clarification, see Resp. Ex. KK, which the court denied, see Resp. Ex. LL. The Fifth DCA issued the mandate on August 25, 2005. See Resp. Ex. MM.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeasrelief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Horvatt's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[ ]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'"opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) ().
To fairly present a claim, the petitioner must present it to the state courts as a federal, constitutional claim rather than as a matter of state law. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Preston v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 456-59 (11th Cir. 2015). To do so, a petitioner can include "the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'" Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32. But raising a state law claim that "is merely similar to the federal habeas claim is insufficient to satisfy the fairly presented requirement." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. Likewise, merely citing to the federal constitution is insufficient to exhaust a claim in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982); see also McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) () (quoting Kelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)). As explained by the Eleventh Circuit:
To "fairly present" a claim, the petitioner is not required to cite "book and verse on the federal constitution." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, a petitioner does not "fairly present" a claim to the state court "if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32, 124 S. Ct. 1347. In other words, "to exhaust state remedies fully the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted presentfederal constitutional issues." Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.1998)) (concluding that the petitioner's claims were raised where the petitioner had provided enough information about the claims (and citations to Supreme Court cases) to notify the state court that the challenges were being made on both state and federal grounds).
Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012). "The crux of the exhaustion requirement is simply that the petitioner must have put the state court on notice that he intended to raise a federal claim." Preston, 785 F.3d at 457 (11th Cir. 2015); see also French v. Warden, Wilcox State Prison, 790 F.3d 1259, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 815 (2016).
"[W]hen 'the petitioner fails to raise the [federal] claim in state court and it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile," a procedural default occurs. Owen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 568...
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