Horwath v. DiGrazio

• Decision Date: 24 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2069 EDA 2015,2069 EDA 2015
• Citation: 2016 PA Super 133,142 A.3d 877
• Parties: Susan HORWATH and Susan Horwath, Executrix of the Estate of Robert S. Horwath, Dec'd, Appellant v. Juanita DiGRAZIO and Pasquale DiGrazio, Jr., Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

142 A.3d 877

2016 PA Super 133

Susan HORWATH and Susan Horwath, Executrix of the Estate of Robert S. Horwath, Dec'd, Appellant

v.Juanita DiGRAZIO and Pasquale DiGrazio, Jr., Appellees.

No. 2069 EDA 2015

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 3, 2016.

Filed June 24, 2016.

Danielle L. Duffy, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Hugh J. Gillespie, Plymouth Meeting, for appellees.

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.^*

OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:

Appellant, Susan Horwath, appeals from the April 2, 2015 order, denying her petition to open the judgment of non pros (JNP), entered in favor of Appellees, Juanita DiGrazio and Pasquale DiGrazio, Jr.¹ After careful review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case as follows. On October 23, 2013, Appellant filed a praecipe for summons to commence a civil action against Appellees. The praecipe was signed by Thomas Novak, Esquire (Attorney Novak). However, no complaint was filed. On June 20, 2014, Appellees filed a praecipe for JNP pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.1 for failure to file a complaint. That same day, the trial court's prothonotary entered a JNP in favor of Appellees. On July 14, 2014, Appellants filed a petition to open the JNP. The petition to open was filed by Danielle L. Duffy, Esquire (Attorney Duffy), who represents Appellant on appeal. In said petition, Appellant argued that Attorney Novak effectively abandoned her and at the time the JNP was entered, she was “in the process of transferring representation.”² Appellant's Petition to Open JNP, 7/14/14, at ¶ 8. Appellees filed their response on August 13, 2014. The trial court heard argument on Appellant's petition on March 25, 2015.³ On April 2, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant's petition to open.

Appellant filed a petition for reconsideration on April 14, 2015. On April 23, 2015, the trial court entered an order, expressly granting reconsideration. On April 30, 2015, Appellees filed a response to Appellant's motion, to which Appellant filed a reply on May 7, 2015. On May 28, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant's motion on the merits. On June 26, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.⁴

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

1. Did [t]he [h]onorable [t]rial [c]ourt make an error of law and abuse its discretion in denying [Appellant's] [p]etition to [o]pen [JNP] initially, and upon reconsideration, where:

a) [Appellant's] [p]etition to [o]pen was promptly filed under the circumstances;

b) [Appellant] presented a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for the failure to file a timely complaint due to former counsel's gross neglect and abandonment; and

c) [Appellant] presented a meritorious cause of action and balancing equities weighed in favor of opening the judgment?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

We begin with our well-settled standard of review.

A request to open a [JNP], like the opening of a default judgment, is in the nature of an appeal to the equitable powers of the court and, in order for the [JNP] to be opened, three elements must coalesce: 1) the petition to open must be promptly filed; 2) the default or delay must be reasonably explained or excused; and 3) facts must be shown to exist which support a cause of action. A petition under Rule 3051 is the only means by which relief from a [JNP] may be sought. Any appeal related to a [JNP] lies not from the judgment itself, but from the denial of a petition to open or strike. Finally, failure to file a timely or rule-compliant petition to open operates as a waiver of any right to address issues concerning the underlying [JNP].

A trial court's decision to deny a petition to open or strike a [JNP] is scrutinized on the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review.

Madrid v. Alpine Mountain Corp., 24 A.3d 380, 381–382 (Pa.Super.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 615 Pa. 768, 40 A.3d 1237 (2012). As the trial court stated, it denied Appellant's petition to open solely based on the timeliness and reasonable excuse prongs; therefore, it is not contested that Appellant has satisfied the meritorious cause of action prong. Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/15, at 8.

Turning to the timeliness prong, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that because Appellant failed to file her petition to open within ten days under Rule 237.3(b), the petition was untimely filed. Appellant's Brief at 12–15. In Appellant's view, the standards of promptness under Rule 3051(b)(1) governed the petition to open, and her petition was timely under our Rule 3051 cases. Id. at 12, 15–19. Appellees counter that Rule 237.3(b) displaces Rule 3051(b)(1) and imposes a special ten-day per se rule. Appellees' Brief at 10.

In construing the Rules of [Civil] Procedure, as the ultimate promulgator of said Rules, it is the intent of our Supreme Court that controls. Commonwealth v. Baker, 547 Pa. 214, 690 A.2d 164, 167 (1997). In performing our task, we also look to the tools of statutory construction. Id. In analyzing the intent of our Supreme Court, “the best indication of [said] intent is the plain language of a [rule].” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 111 A.3d 747, 751 (Pa.Super.2015) (citations omitted). “In pursuing that end, we are mindful that ‘[w]hen the words of a [rule] are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’ ” Id., quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). In addition, “ ‘[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage’ while any words or phrases that have acquired a ‘peculiar and appropriate meaning’ must be construed according to that meaning.” Id., quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). Also, we presume that our Supreme Court “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1).

Commonwealth v. Williams, 125 A.3d 425, 428 (Pa.Super.2015).

Rules 237.3 and 3051 provide in relevant part as follows.

Rule 237.3 Relief From Judgment of Non Pros or by Default

(a) A petition for relief from a [JNP] or of default entered pursuant to Rule 237.1 shall have attached thereto a verified copy of the complaint or answer which the petitioner seeks leave to file.

(b) If the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of the judgment on the docket, the court shall open the judgment if the proposed complaint or answer states a meritorious cause of action or defense.

Note: Rule 236 requires the prothonotary to give notice of the entry of any judgment and to note in the docket the giving of the notice.

...

See Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 505 Pa. 90, 477 A.2d 471 (1984) for the requirements for opening a judgment by default and Pa.R.C.P. 3051 as to a [JNP]. Rule 237.3 does not change the law of opening judgments. Rather, the rule supplies two of the three requisites for opening such judgments by presupposing that a petition filed as provided by the rule is timely and with reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for the inactivity or delay resulting in the entry of the judgment. The requirement of this rule for proceeding within ten days is not intended to set a standard for timeliness in circumstances outside this rule.

A defendant who seeks to file a pleading other than an answer is not entitled to the benefit of this rule but must comply with the requirements of Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, supra.

Rule 3051. Relief from Judgment of Non Pros

(a) Relief from a [JNP] shall be sought by petition. All grounds for relief, whether to strike off the judgment or to open it, must be asserted in a single petition.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), if the relief sought includes the opening of the judgment, the petition shall allege facts showing that

(1) the petition is timely filed,

(2) there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for the conduct that gave rise to the entry of [the JNP], and

(3) there is a meritorious cause of action.

Note: See Rule 237.3 for special provisions relating to relief from a [JNP] entered pursuant to Rule 1037(a).

...

Pa.R.C.P. 237.3, 3051.

Appellees rely in part on our Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. Luallen, 563 Pa. 589, 763 A.2d 810, 812 (2000), in support of their argument that Rule 237.3(b) imposes a per se ten-day rule. Appellees' Brief at 11, 14. In Simmons, a JNP was entered against Simmons for her failure to file a complaint under Rule 237.1, and Simmons filed her petition to open the same seven days later. Simmons, supra at 810. The trial court denied the petition to open, and this Court affirmed, concluding that under Rule 3051(b)(2), Simmons had not shown a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing her complaint. Id. at 812.

Our Supreme Court granted allocatur and reversed. Specifically, it held that in a case where a JNP is entered for failure to file a complaint, and a petition to open is filed within ten days, Rule 3051(b)(1) “does not apply when a [JNP] is entered because of a party's failure to file a complaint.” Id. Rather, Rule 237.3 applies, noting that Rule 3051 is a general rule, Rule 237.3 is a specific rule, and “the particular controls over the general [.]” Id., citing Pa.R.C.P. 132. Our Supreme Court further stated, “[a]lthough Rule 237.3 does not alter the law of opening judgments as reflected in Rule 3051(b), it presupposes that a petition to open filed within the ten-day period is timely or prompt and that a reasonable explanation or excuse for the delay exists.” Id.; see also Kruis v. McKenna, 790 A.2d 322, 326 (Pa.Super.2001) (stating, “where a [JNP] has been entered by the prothonotary for a plaintiff's failure to file a timely complaint, Rule 237.3(b) excuses a petitioner from establishing the first two prongs of that standard, where the petitioner filed a petition to open the [JNP] within ten days from the date the [JNP] was entered[ ]”).

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