Hoschler v. Sacramento City School Dist.
Decision Date | 03 April 2007 |
Docket Number | No. C050940.,C050940. |
Citation | 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 115,149 Cal.App.4th 258 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Stephen HOSCHLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. |
Law Office of Michael N. McCallum and Michael N. McCallum for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ruiz & Sperow, Alison C. Neufeld and Eduard E. Erslovas, Emeryville, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Stephen Hoschler appeals from a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, which sought his reinstatement as a teacher for defendant Sacramento City Unified School District (the District).
The central issue in this case is whether the District gave Hoschler timely notice of his nonreelection as a teacher for the 2004-2005 term under Education Code section 44929.21.1 Section 44929.21 provides that an employee on probationary status is deemed to have been "reelected" for the next succeeding school year unless the District "notif[ies]" him by March 15 of its decision not to retain him. The statute does not prescribe how such notice shall be given. Here, the District sent a notice of nonretention to Hoschler by certified mail notice until weeks later.
The trial court ruled that sending the notice by certified mail complied with section 44929.21, even though the statute does not prescribe certified mail as an acceptable method of notice. Hoschler argues that the decision contravenes the settled principle that, where a statute is silent as to the method of notice, personal notice is required. We agree with Hoschler and shall reverse the judgment.
The facts are undisputed. In 2001, Hoschler worked during the 2001-2002 school year as a university intern for the District while obtaining an intern credential from the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing. After obtaining his teaching credential, he taught during the 2002-2003 school year under a written contract. He began his second credentialed year in 2003-2004 as a probationary teacher.
On March 11, 2004 (all further calendar references are to that year), the District's Board of Education decided that Hoschler would not be reelected for the 2004-2005 school year. On March 12, the District claims it mailed Hoschler a "Notice of Probationary Release," informing him of its decision not to reelect him for the following school year. The notice was sent by certified mail, with a return receipt fee of "[$]1.75" indicated by the District.2 Hoschler claims he did not receive the letter from the District and did not see the notice until May 8, when he received a copy of it from his attorney. It was undisputed that Hoschler did not willfully refuse to pick up his mail.
On August 26, Hoschler filed a petition for a writ of mandate, requesting that the trial court declare him reelected for the 2004-2005 school year because he did not receive timely notice of his nonreelection. Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The trial court reasoned that since the Education Code "consistently" provided for notice by certified mail in other statutes dealing with teacher nonretention and dismissal, section 44929.21 must also be so construed.3
Where, as here, there is no factual dispute and the trial court's decision turns solely upon a question of law, the standard of review on appeal is de novo. (Conway v. City of Imperial Beach (1997) 52 Cal. App.4th 78, 83, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 (Conway).)
Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Liemsakul (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 433, 438, 238 Cal.Rptr. 346.) The trial court's application of an interpreted statute to undisputed facts is also subject to our independent review. (Conway, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 83, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 402.)
Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944.) "We begin our inquiry by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] In doing so, however, we do not consider the statutory language `in isolation.' [Citation.] Rather, we look to ... That is, we construe the words in question "in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute...."'" (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907-908, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431,4 P.3d 265.)
Under the Education Code, for the first two years of his employment, a certificated teacher in a large school district (250 or more students) is a probationary employee and serves at the pleasure of the district. As long as it notifies the teacher by March 15 of the second year of his employment of its decision not to rehire him for the next year, the district may release him at its complete discretion, "`without any showing of cause, without any statement of reasons, and without any right of appeal or administrative redress.'" (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 917, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54 (Kavanaugh), quoting Bellflower Education Assn. v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 805, 808, 279 Cal.Rptr. 179; accord, Summerfield v. Windsor Unified School Dist. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1029, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 233.) However, if a second-year teacher is not so notified, he is deemed reelected for the third year and achieves permanent status (tenure). (§§ 44929.21, subd. (b); see Grimsley v. Board of Trustees (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1440, 1447, 235 Cal.Rptr. 85.)
The controlling statute, section 44929.21, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: (Stats.1987, ch. 1452, § 380, pp. 5449-5450, italics added.)
Section 44929.21 is silent as to a method of giving the required notice. Under settled principles of statutory construction, "[a] statute requiring that a notice shall be given, but which is silent as to the manner of giving such notice, contemplates personal service thereof." (Long v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1924) 68 Cal.App. 171, 179, 228 P. 873 (Long); accord, see Johnson v. Barreiro (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 213, 218-219, 138 P.2d 746 (Johnson), cited with approval in Simpson v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 40 Cal.2d 271, 280, 253 P.2d 464; Smith v. Smith (1940) 42 Cal.App.2d 19, 22, 108 P.2d 47.) As the court noted in Long: " " (Long, supra, at p. 179, 228 P. 873, quoting Stockton Automobile Co. v. Confer (1908) 154 Cal. 402, 408-409, 97 P. 881, italics omitted.)
Since the District claims it sent notice of Hoschler's nonretention by certified mail, and the evidence is undisputed that he did not receive the notice until well after March 15, the notice of nonrenewal was untimely. (Johnson, supra, 59 Cal. App.2d at pp. 218-219, 138 P.2d 746 [ ].) Although there is no California teacher case directly on point, out-of-state decisions applying analogous education statutes on similar facts, have so held. (See, e.g., School Dist. No. 6 v. Barber (1958) 85 Ariz. 95, 96-97, 332 P.2d 496, 497-498; School Dist. Re-11J v. Norwood (Colo.1982) 644 P.2d 13, 15-16; Weckerly v. Mona Shores Bd. of Education (1972) 388 Mich. 731, 733-734, 202 N.W.2d 777, 779; Kiel v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. (1994) 69 Ohio St.3d 149, 152-153, 630 N.E.2d 716, 719.)
The District cites Gilliam v. Moreno Valley Unified School Dist. (1996) 48 Cal. App.4th 518, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 (Gilliam) to support its argument that, despite its silence on the method of notice, we should read into section 44929.21 a provision that certified mail service by the March 15 deadline is effective.
In Gilliam, the plaintiff was a probationary employee of a district that mailed him a notice on March 11, 1994, that he would not be reelected for the 1994-1995 school year. The plaintiff claimed that section 44929.21 did not apply because he was transferred to a lateral position. The Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs argument that his termination was controlled by a different statute under the "general versus specific" rule of statutory construction. Accepting at...
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