Hosford v. Chateau Foghorn LP
| Decision Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 852,Sept. Term, 2015,852 |
| Citation | 145 A.3d 616,229 Md.App. 499 |
| Parties | Wesley Hosford v. Chateau Foghorn LP |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Matthew Zernhelt (Maryland Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. on the brief) for Appellant.
Argued by: Avery B. Strachan (Kerri L. Smith, Silverman, Thompson, Slutkin, White LLC on the brief) all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Kehoe, Friedman, Alan M. Wilner, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
, J.
Wesley Hosford appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in favor of Chateau Foghorn LP (“Foghorn”). Hosford presents three issues, which we have re-worded:
1. In an eviction action involving federally-subsidized housing, does federal law preempt the requirement in Maryland Annotated Code Real Property Article (“RP”) § 8–402.1
that a court must conclude that a breach of a lease be “substantial” and “warrant eviction” before granting judgment for possession of the leased premises?
2. Was there sufficient evidence in the record to support the circuit court's conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Hosford possessed marijuana in his apartment?
3. Does the possession of a small amount of marijuana for medical purposes constitute “drug-related criminal activity” in violation of the terms of Hosford's lease?
The circuit court answered the first question in the affirmative, but we reach the opposite conclusion. We will therefore reverse the judgment.
Foghorn owns and manages Ruscombe Gardens, a federally-subsidized apartment building in Baltimore. Hosford has resided there since 1989. Ruscombe Gardens' units are leased exclusively to elderly and disabled individuals. Hosford has been disabled by incomplete quadriparesis
as the result of an accident in 1987.
In 2014, Foghorn hired an extermination company to treat Ruscombe Gardens for a bedbug infestation. Two exterminators entered Hosford's apartment and saw what looked to them like a marijuana plant growing in his bathtub. They reported this to the apartment's management office. Someone in the office contacted the police and Baltimore City Police Officer Phillip G. Tabron responded. Officer Tabron concluded that the plant in the bathtub was marijuana, confiscated it, and issued Hosford a criminal citation for possession of marijuana. The plant was tested by a police chemist, who concluded that the plant was marijuana. Hosford was subsequently charged in the District Court for Baltimore City with possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana, but the charge was later nol prossed.
In July, 2014, Foghorn initiated an eviction action pursuant to RP § 8–402.11
against Hosford in the district court, claiming that Hosford had breached the following term of his lease:
Hosford moved for a jury trial, claiming that the value of his right to continued occupation of his apartment exceeded $15,000.2 After the case was transferred to the circuit court, Foghorn filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that:
's requirement that a court can order eviction only if the breach is substantial and warrants eviction.
From these premises, Foghorn argued that the only issue before the court was whether Hosford breached the lease. As to that issue, Foghorn asserted that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether Hosford possessed marijuana in his apartment and that his possession of it constituted a “drug-related criminal activity,” in violation of the lease.
In response, Hosford claimed that there was a dispute of material fact as to whether the plant in his apartment was marijuana. Second, he contended that Foghorn was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because: (a) if he did possess marijuana, it was not a criminal activity, and thus not a breach of the lease; and (b) even if the action did breach the lease, the court must still determine whether the breach was “substantial” and “warrants eviction” pursuant to RP § 8–402.1
. Hosford also presented medical records indicating that he suffers from painful muscle spasms as a result of his physical condition, as well as an affidavit from an associate professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, stating that use of marijuana “is likely to provide ... therapeutic or palliative relief” for persons suffering from chronic pain and muscle spasticity associated with quadriparesis.
On March 23, 2015, the circuit court granted Foghorn's motion for summary judgment. In its accompanying written opinion, the court first concluded that the exterminators' affidavits and, most significantly, the police chemist's report, established there was no dispute of material fact that there was a marijuana plant in Hosford's apartment when the exterminators entered the apartment.
Second, the court was not persuaded by Hosford's arguments that the possession of the marijuana was not criminal. The court noted that, even though Maryland “no longer punishes the possession of less than ten grams of marijuana as a crime,” the pertinent amendment to Maryland Code Criminal Law (“CL”) Article § 5-601(c)(2)(ii)3 became effective on October 1, 2014, that is, after the marijuana plant was discovered in Hosford's apartment.
The court then turned to Hosford's assertion that possession of marijuana in small amounts for medical purposes was not a criminal offense. The court stated that the statute in question, CL § 5–601(c)(3)(iii)(1),4 makes “medicinal use for a debilitating medical condition an affirmative defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted).
Acknowledging that no appellate court had yet addressed the operation and effect of the statute, the court reasoned that, based upon “the ordinary operation of affirmative defenses in criminal cases ... a defendant successfully asserting the affirmative defense would escape conviction altogether.” The court observed, however, that there is no corresponding affirmative medical marijuana defense in the federal Controlled Substances Act.5 The court reasoned that, because “marijuana remains a federally prohibited Schedule I substance”:
[Foghorn] may proceed on the basis that the possession of any quantity of marijuana is a crime under federal law. Defendant Hosford's assertion of the medical use affirmative defense therefore would be irrelevant, unless the jury is allowed to review the landlord's exercise of discretion in treating this particular possession of marijuana as warranting termination of the lease and eviction.
(Emphasis added.)
The court then turned to whether “the jury is allowed to review the landlord's exercise of discretion in treating this particular possession of marijuana as warranting termination of the lease and eviction.” The court decided that the answer to the question was “no.” It stated:
Federal law compels [Foghorn] to include in its leases for subsidized housing provisions that forbid tenants from engaging in or permitting any criminal drug activity on the premises and that give it the authority to evict a tenant for breaching that promise. See Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker , 535 U.S. 125, 130–31, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002)
. Although these terms are strict, the severity is tempered by federal regulations giving landlords some measure of discretion in deciding whether to seek eviction. Id . at 128–29, 122 S.Ct. 1230. [Foghorn] argues that this federal law preempts RP § 8–402.1(b)(1) to the extent it vests in Maryland courts discretion to determine either that an alleged breach is substantial or that it warrants eviction.[6
]The court concluded “although federal law vests a landlord renting subsidized housing with discretion not to pursue eviction in all instances of criminal activity, state courts cannot be given discretion to overrule the landlord's exercise of discretion.” (Emphasis in original). The circuit court relied upon three decisions, Milwaukee City Housing Authority v. Cobb , 361 Wis.2d 359, 860 N.W.2d 267 (2015)
; Boston Housing Auth. v. Garcia , 449 Mass. 727, 871 N.E.2d 1073 (2007) ; and Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apts ., 890 A.2d 249 (D.C.2006). (We will discuss these cases, together with additional authorities, later in the opinion.)
Hosford filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed.
We will reverse the judgment of the circuit court. As we will explain, RP § 8–402.1
grants to courts the authority to consider equitable and similar factors before granting a landlord's request for an eviction. In order for this portion of RP § 8–402.1 to be preempted by federal law, the exercise of such authority must cause “major damage” to “clear and substantial federal interests.” Foghorn asserts that the federal interest at issue in this case is the right of a landlord, at its unfettered discretion, to evict a tenant if that tenant has been engaged in “drug-related criminal activity.” Foghorn also argues that the circuit court's conclusion is fully supported by the authority cited in its opinion.
Foghorn's arguments are not persuasive. As we will explain, the relevant federal statute, its implementing regulations, and the pertinent Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford
...Appeals. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court. Hosford v. Chateau Foghorn LP , 229 Md.App. 499, 145 A.3d 616 (2016). The Court of Special Appeals considered three issues, only one of which is before us:1. In an eviction action involv......
- Huntley v. Huntley
-
Netro v. Greater Balt. Med. Ctr., Inc.
...... statute ‘sharply’ interferes with, or is directly contrary to a federal law ....")(citations omitted); Hosford v. Chateau Foghorn LP , 229 Md. App. 499, 510, 145 A.3d 616, cert. granted sub nom . Chateau Foghorn v. Hosford , 455 Md. 462, 168 A.3d 824 (2017) ("conflict preemption applies......