Hoskin-Morainville Paper Co. v. Bates Valve Bag Corp.

• Citation: 268 Mich. 443,256 N.W. 477
• Decision Date: 18 September 1934
• Docket Number: Motion No. 364.
• Parties: HOSKIN-MORAINVILLE PAPER CO. v. BATES VALVE BAG CORPORATION.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

268 Mich. 443

256 N.W. 477

HOSKIN-MORAINVILLE PAPER CO.

v.BATES VALVE BAG CORPORATION.

Motion No. 364.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 18, 1934.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Menominee County; Frank A. Bell, Judge.

Action by the Hoskin-Morainville Paper Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Michigan, against the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, a foreign corporation under the laws of New Jersey. From an order granting a new trial after return of a verdict by a jury, defendant appeals in nature of mandamus.

Order reversed, and judgment entered on verdict and writ of mandamus to be issued, if necessary.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

John J. O'Hara, of Menominee (Miller & Kuchenberg, of Marinette, Wis., of counsel), for appellant.

George Barstow, of Menominee (A. H. Ryall, of Escanaba, of counsel), for appellee.

BUSHNELL, Justice.

Defendant's appeal in the nature of mandamus deals with events which followed the verdict of the jury in the principal case. Plaintiff is a Michigan corporation, domiciled at Menominee, and defendant is a New Jersey corporation, whose principal offices are in New York City.

Three questions were submitted to the jury: (1) Nonpayment of the purchase of 70 tons of paper; (2) loss of profit on an alleged contract for the purchase of 20,000 tons of paper for the year 1929; and (3) loss of profit on a similar contract for 10,000 tons of paper for the year 1930. The trial began December 4, 1933, and ended December 12, when, after four hours of deliberation, the jury at 8:30 p. m. returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $7,354 on item (1), and no cause of action as to items (2) and (3); the jurymen were then discharged, and resumed their status as private citizens. The case was of considerable interest, and a number of defendant's employees and officers came to Menominee to attend the hearing. Immediately after the verdict, counsel and one of defendant's officers met in the chambers of the circuit judge to discuss the question of custodian's fees arising out of the attachment issued in the cause. Plaintiff's counsel, defendant's officer, and the trial judge then walked to the hotel, where they met defendant's counsel about 9:30 p. m., he having preceded them by automobile, and who immediately informed them that a number of the jurors were in the hotel room of one Douglas, the western sales manager of the defendant, and that liquor was being served. Several more jurors arrived later and visited the same room.

The next morning the trial judge conferred with counsel in his chambers, and the inquiry disclosed that seven or eight of the jurors were entertained; the chief executive officer of defendant company stating that he had visited the room and expressed his disapproval of the entire affair. The party, evidently a misconceived celebration of defendant's victory, lasted about one hour, after which time defendant's officers and employees left the hotel to board a train for their respective homes.

Plaintiff moved the court to set aside the verdict and judgment entered, and grant a new trial, assigning various errors in the court's charge to the jury and alleging misconduct of the jury, after its verdict, stating that the contact with the jury was made so quickly and accepted so promptly that the relationship between defendant and members of the jury could only be accounted for on the ground of direct and intimate contact during the trial of the cause. Plaintiff's counsel also executed an affidavit containing all the available facts, which was neither contradicted nor disputed by defendant. We infer that the principal offenders' immediate departure from the jurisdiction of the court explains the absence of any action for contempt of court, and we presume that the thoughtless jurymen will not be considered qualified for jury service for some considerable time, if at all.

The learned judge, in a well-considered and informative opinion, in referring to plaintiff's allegations of error, stated: ‘So far as that part of the action for a new trial is concerned there is nothing in the motion or in the argument of counsel that tends to change my mind as to the correctness of the charge, and I shall hold that the jury was properly charged until the Supreme Court holds otherwise.’

And he added: ‘I think I am well within the facts when I say that the verdict was supported by the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and I am not at all sure now, although I offer no opinion on it, but that it would have been the duty of the court,-but that it was the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant on both the questions upon which the jury found for the defendant.’

The remainder of the opinion is also important, and is therefore quoted:

‘I am satisfied that this entertainment was innocent. I am satisfied that it did not affect the result, and I am satisfied from what I have been advised, or what I was advised on the following morning that the man who furnished the entertainment was advised by counsel that he was doing no wrong in so doing, but, he was ill-advised. It was misconduct. It was, I think, without any doubt a reproach to and a reflection on our jury system and upon our administration of justice which tended to bring the courts and juries into contempt and disgrace.

‘I agree with counsel that under the holdings of the court, the supreme court of this state, and of the general holdings laid down by our textwriters that, much as I regret it, it is the duty of this court to grant a new trial, and I am going to do it on this ground alone and no other. I do not know that I need to say any more. I am putting counsel in a position to mandamus this court from the supreme court if they do not agree with me.

‘I think under the rulings of our court that it would be error for me to refuse to grant a new trial on this ground. As I say, I regret it.

‘The trial cost the litigants of Menominee a lot of money and it cost the litigants a lot of money. Another trial will cost as much, but, I cannot help that. It is my duty, it seems to me to point it out. I appreciate this is all done after the verdict, and that possibly the court should have directed a verdict as the jury found, nevertheless, I think it is my duty to grant a new trial on this ground, and, making these findings, I do grant a new trial on the ground that this entertainment tended to bring the courts into contempt and reproach, and was a reflection on the administration of justice and upon our jury system. I think that is all I can say. Nobody regrets this more than I do but I must say it.’

Had the misconduct occurred during the progress of the trial, there would be no question about the correctness of the order. Harrington v. Calhoun Probate Judge, 153 Mich. 660, 117 N. W. 62;Solomon v. Loud, 173 Mich. 233, 140 N. W. 651,48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540;In re Quinn's Estate, 180 Mich. 502, 147 N. W. 566, and People v. Levey, 206 Mich. 129, 172 N. W. 427. See, also, People v. Montague, 71 Mich. 447, 39 N. W. 585;Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 140 Mich. 384, 103 N. W. 856;Township of Alpena v. Mainville, 153 Mich. 732, 117 N. W. 338;Cooper v. Carr, 161 Mich. 405, 126 N. W. 468;Vincent v. Heenan, 194 Mich. 316, 160 N. W. 563; and Evans v. City of Detroit, 255 Mich. 381, 238 N. W. 279; but we have not had occasion to pass upon the question of misconduct occurring after the rendering of the verdict.

It is suggested that there should be but one rule. Where a juror rode during the trial of a cause with defendant to a county home of which the defendant had charge, the Supreme Court of Iowa said:

‘The question involved herein is of a more serious character than would appear at first blush. There is probably no more interesting or fascinating question involved in the history of cou...