Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 98-40213.,Civ. 98-40213.
• Citation: 44 F.Supp.2d 882
• Parties: Susan L. HOSKINS, Plaintiff, v. OAKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and The County of Oakland, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Page 882

44 F.Supp.2d 882

Susan L. HOSKINS, Plaintiff, v. OAKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and The County of Oakland, Defendants.

No. Civ. 98-40213.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 26, 1999.

Joseph C. Bird, Jeffrey J. Fleury, Stark, Reagan, Troy, MI, for Susan L. Hoskins, plaintiff.

Steven M. Potter, Rick J. Patterson, Potter, Carniak, Auburn Hills, MI, for, defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GADOLA, District Judge.

The above-entitled case commenced June 16, 1998 with the filing of plaintiff Susan L. Hoskins's two-count complaint. Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq., as well as gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The instant suit was filed after defendants Oakland County Sheriffs Department and Oakland County terminated plaintiff's employment following a non-work related injury. On January 15, 1999, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed her response on February 5, 1999. A reply brief was submitted by defendants on February 17, 1999. Oral argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment was heard on March 10, 1999.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background

In 1979, plaintiff Hoskins began working at the Oakland County Sheriff's Department as a dispatcher. In 1982, she was promoted to Deputy I after successfully passing the test required for that position. Plaintiff was originally placed in the Women's Division of the Oakland County jail where she received on the job training with respect to security and controlling of inmates. Plaintiff never attended a police academy nor was she ever given a strength test or graded on her ability to grapple with inmates.

In 1987, plaintiff was assigned to Oakland County Circuit Court detention. Her duties included transporting prisoners from the jail through a tunnel to various courtrooms at Oakland County Circuit Court. In 1993, plaintiff was assigned to Novi District Court. Plaintiff's duties there included transporting inmates and pretrial detainees. It is undisputed that in this capacity plaintiff had contact with inmates on a daily basis. Moreover, at plaintiff's deposition, she admitted that the potential existed for physical confrontation on a daily basis. Plaintiff further testified that "in my 18 years [of employment] I have only had one altercation [with a detainee], and that was with three other officers at the same time." Depo. of Susan L. Hoskins, p. 24, attached as Exh. A to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

On August 25, 1996, plaintiff suffered non-work related injuries when a horse fell on her. Dr., E. Patrick Mitchell, D.O. treated plaintiff and described her injuries as "a superior and inferior pudic rami fracture which were non-displaced and stable ... [with] bilateral clavicle fractures ... [and] sternal clavicular disarticulation." Depo. of E. Patrick Mitchell, p. 23, attached as Exh. A to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. In layman's terms, the clavicle where it connects to the breast bone was separated and "pushed back and in." Id. at pp. 23-24. Despite the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries, she was never treated with surgery. According to Dr. Mitchell, the injuries resulted in a limitation on plaintiff's range of motion and upper body strength, as well as "discomfort mostly associated with arthritis ... developing in [the] affected joints." Id.

Following plaintiff's injuries, she obtained two letters authorizing restrictions on her activities, one from her treating physician Dr. Mitchell and the other from Dr. William Bria of the Briarwood Medical Group, University of Michigan Hospitals. Dr. Bria's July 11, 1997 letter states that plaintiff "is able to return to work, however, she should not be lifting or engaging in any activity that would jar her chest such as shooting a shotgun or getting into a situation in which she could get hit in the chest." Exh. C to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. The July 11, 1997 letter also contains a "disability certificate" dated July 18, 1997 appearing in the lower right corner. The certificate is signed by Dr. Mitchell and states that plaintiff has sufficiently recovered to return to work, but nevertheless is prohibited from engaging in "work that will impact her anterior chest or shoulders." Id.

Plaintiff also obtained a letter from Dr. Mitchell dated September 29, 1997. Exh. D to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. That letter more specifically describes her injuries and states that plaintiff has been evaluated by both the pulmonary and thoracic surgery, departments of the University of Michigan hospitals. Dr. Mitchell writes that Ms. Hoskins is not on medication, has restrictions on lifting, pushing or pulling over 20 pounds, as well as being restricted from using a shotgun and restraining of inmates. Id. Although Dr. Mitchell makes clear that plaintiff "still experiences pain and decreased range of motion ... her motivation and rehabilitation potential is excellent." Id. Dr. Mitchell concludes:

I do not believe that Susan will ever be able to resume full duty as a Deputy with Oakland County Sheriff's Department. She will probably need permanent restrictions of certain activities which would be considered duties of a Deputy Sheriff.

Id.

Plaintiff submitted both letters to Carol VanLeuvan, an employee records specialist of defendant Oakland County. Plaintiff was informed that she would not be able to return to work in a restricted, light-duty capacity because no light-duty positions were available. Depo. of Susan L. Hoskins, p. 70, attached as Exh. A to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. At her deposition, plaintiff testified that she knew of other female and male Deputy I employees who also were not allowed to return to work with restrictions due to the unavailability of light-duty positions. See Depo. of Susan L. Hoskins, p. 72, attached as Exh. A to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion. The next communication from Oakland County Sheriff's Department received by plaintiff was a letter indicating that a pre-termination hearing was to be held regarding her separation from the department.

On November 7, 1997 a pre-termination hearing was conducted. See Transcript of Hearing, attached as Exh. E to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Major Thomas Quisenberry, Chief of Staff, represented the sheriff's department. Quisenberry stated that the termination was based on the restrictions set forth in Dr. Mitchell's September 29, 1997 letter and also upon the language in that letter indicating that the restrictions were permanent in nature. Exh. E to Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Quisenberry next explained that the restrictions impacted plaintiff's primary duties because "the Deputy I's primary job description is working with inmates...." Id. Quisenberry pointed out that the only place a Deputy I could avoid all contact with inmates would be if she were locked in a control booth in the master control area. Id.

During the hearing, plaintiff was explicitly asked whether there were "any jobs within the Sheriff's Department that [she was] able to perform other than Deputy Sheriff." Id. Plaintiff responded, "No. Well probably with training...." A discussion ensued, in which plaintiff was asked about the possibility of taking a job as a dispatcher, a position she had held previously. Plaintiff rejected placement as a dispatcher and also as a booking clerk. Thereafter, she was asked again, "Are there any other jobs within the Sheriff's Department that you would be interested in, that you are able to perform?" Plaintiff responded, "No." Next, a discussion was entered into regarding locating plaintiff a desirable job with Oakland County. Plaintiff was uncertain as to which jobs were available, and therefore could not identify a specific job. Id.

Plaintiff at her deposition was asked to describe her condition as a result of the accident. She testified that "[m]y chest is permanently pulled apart." See Depo. of Susan L. Hoskins, p. 62, attached as Exh. A to Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Plaintiff's Motion. Plaintiff stated that she has trouble lifting heavy things, but also remarked, "I attempt everything." Id. Plaintiff's husband, Ronald Hoskins, testified that when his wife tries to lift heavy items, she stops and "she just says I can't do it." See Depo. of Ronald Hoskins, p. 18, attached as Exh. C to Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Plaintiff's Motion. When queried as to whether plaintiff stops because of pain or because of lack of physical strength, he responded that he did not know. Plaintiff also testified that

I have problems still with my chest ... it will never heal from what I've been told.

* * * * * *

I have to be careful the way I move at times. It hurts to cough, sneeze, if I breathe the wrong way. But I learned to just kind of ignore it ... I just be careful with the way I do things.

* * * * * *

... at times a couple of weeks ago I grabbed laundry and for some reason something that I did pulled and that hurt.

Depo. of Susan L. Hoskins, pp. 138-39, attached as Exh. A to Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Plaintiff's Motion.

Following the termination hearing, defendants refused to allow plaintiff to come back to work as a Deputy I. In an effort to pursue a different career, she attended classes and has recently. graduated from Oakland Community College, earning a degree in accounting.

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to...