Hoskins v. State
| Decision Date | 01 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1612-CR-2860. |
| Citation | 83 N.E.3d 124 |
| Parties | Joseph K. HOSKINS and Daniel McLayea, Appellants-Defendants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellants : Stephen Gerald Gray, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Joseph Hoskins and Daniel McLayea appeal the trial courts' denials of their respective motions for discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4.1 Finding that a trial date was set for both appellants outside the one-year limit set by Rule 4(C), we reverse and remand.
[2] On June 17, 2015, the State charged Hoskins with Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. An initial hearing was held and Hoskins posted bond the same day. The first trial setting for Hoskins was scheduled for February 8, 2016. Between June 17, 2015, and February 8, 2016, the parties were engaged in discovery. Hoskins delayed one pretrial conference from August 18 to September 3, 2015. On February 3, 2016, Hoskins moved to continue his trial. The trial court granted the motion and reset the trial for April 4, 2016.
[3] On March 30, 2016, the State moved to continue the trial; the trial court granted the motion and set a trial date of July 11, 2016. On July 6, 2016, the State again moved to continue the trial. Hoskins objected and the trial court overruled the objection, resetting Hoskins's trial to September 26, 2016.
[4] On September 14, 2016, Hoskins moved for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). He noted that the time interval from June 17, 2015, to September 26, 2016, is a total period of 467 days; he admits that 72 days of delay are chargeable to him but argues that the remaining balance of 395 days is charged to the State. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for discharge. Hoskins now brings this interlocutory appeal.
[5] On June 30, 2015, the State charged McLayea with Level 5 felony dealing in marijuana with a prior conviction and Level 6 felony possession of marijuana with a prior conviction. On July 1, 2015, an initial hearing was held and McLayea posted bond; the trial court set a trial date of October 21, 2015. Counsel entered an appearance for McLayea on July 6, 2015.
[6] On October 15, 2015, the State moved to continue the trial, and the trial court rescheduled the trial to February 10, 2016. On February 1, 2016, McLayea moved to continue the trial; the trial court granted the motion and reset the trial for June 20, 2016. On June 15, 2016, the State moved to continue the trial; the trial court granted the request and rescheduled the trial for October 3, 2016.
[7] On September 28, 2016, the State moved to continue the trial. The deputy prosecutor explained that while preparing for trial, he had reviewed telephone calls from the jail indicating that "evidence of highly probative value" was on cell phones discovered by law enforcement. McLayea Tr. p. 2-4. The deputy prosecutor explained that the forensic services unit could accommodate the October 3, 2016, trial date by providing their analysis of the phones on October 2. But the State noted that it would provide no time for McLayea to evaluate the new evidence and, if McLayea moved to exclude it at trial, his remedy would be a continuance. McLayea objected to a continuance of the trial but then stated that, if the evidence were admitted at trial, he "would need some time to examine the warrant that they're going to get to search these phones, and there maybe [sic] some suppression issues ... so I would just hope that the court would give me enough time to look at the warrant [and] have meaningful consultation with my client." Id. at 5. The trial court granted the State's motion to continue, asking McLayea if he wished to have a trial on October 31 or November 14, 2016; McLayea replied that he was not available on October 31, so the trial was reset for November 14, 2016.
[8] On November 9, 2016, McLayea moved for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). Following a hearing, the trial court denied McLayea's motion. McLayea now brings this interlocutory appeal.
[9] Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act....
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for discharge, we apply a de novo standard of review to issues of law and to the application of law to undisputed facts. Austin v. State , 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013). We review resolution of disputed factual issues for clear error, which is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 1039-40.
[10] Turning first to Hoskins, the timeline is as follows:
In sum, a total of 467 days elapsed between the filing of charges and the September 26, 2016, trial date. It is undisputed that 72 of those days are charged to Hoskins; that leaves a remaining balance of 395 days, which exceeds the 365-day limit put in place by Rule 4(C). We must determine, therefore, whether any of the remaining 395 days are chargeable to Hoskins.
[11] The State argues that the clock does not begin running until July 23, 2015, when Hoskins retained counsel. We disagree. The cases to which the State cites in support of this assertion involve situations in which defendants caused delays by making late requests for changes of counsel or waiting for unreasonable amounts of time to retain counsel. See Andrews v. State , 441 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 1982) (); Little v. State , 275 Ind. 78, 415 N.E.2d 44 (1981) (); State ex rel. Shepp h ard v. Circuit Court of Clark County , 274 Ind. 602, 413 N.E.2d 258 (1980) (same); Eguia v. State , 468 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (). In this case, Hoskins did not change trial counsel, wait an unreasonable amount of time to retain counsel, or in any way delay the setting of the trial with respect to the retention of counsel. Under these circumstances, we decline to toll the running of the 365-day clock until Hoskins retained counsel; as a result, the clock began ticking on June 17, 2015—the day on which the State filed the charges.
[12] The State next argues that the entire delay between August 18, 2015, and the first trial date setting of February 8, 2016, should be charged to Hoskins. Again, we disagree. While the State frames Hoskins's August 2015 motion as one to continue the trial, in fact, no trial date had even been set at that point. Instead, he merely moved to continue a pretrial status conference, and as noted above, is charged with the sixteen-day delay as a result of that motion. There is simply no reason to charge Hoskins with more of a delay than that for this period of time.
[13] Next, we must consider the 98-day delay from April 4 to July 11, 2016, and the 77-day delay from July 11 to September 26, 2016—a total delay of 175 days. Both of these continuances were requested by the State, and Hoskins objected to the second continuance, which resulted in a trial date set outside the 365-day limit. On appeal, the State argues that Hoskins should be charged with the delay.2 Its argument amounts to the following:
In other words, the State argues that the delay resulted because Hoskins requested the return of his property, which caused the State to finally search the cell phones. The State directs our attention to well-settled authority that "delays caused by action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendant," Cook , 810 N.E.2d at 1067, contending that this delay was caused by Hoskins's request for the return of his property.
[14] Initially, we note that the State has waived this argument as it raises it for the first time on appeal. E.g. , Harbert v. State , 51 N.E.3d 267, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied ....
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