Hoskins v. State, 872S111
| Decision Date | 31 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 872S111,872S111 |
| Citation | 302 N.E.2d 499,39 Ind.Dec. 388,261 Ind. 291 |
| Parties | James Goman HOSKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Carr L. Darden, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., of Ind., Robert E. Dwyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the denial of a Motion to Correct Errors following the denial of a Post-Conviction Remedy Rule 1 motion to vacate the prior judgment of guilty, withdraw the plea of guilty to first degree murder and grant a jury trial. It presents the single issue of whether or not the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing required a grant of the motion.
In support of the motion, Defendant (Appellant) asserts that at the time of his guilty plea he was illiterate, had been harassed by police interrogation without benefit of counsel, had ineffective counsel, and had been coerced by means of threatening letters sent to his sister by one of his two co-defendants. It is his contention that as a result of the foregoing, his guilty plea was not entered freely and understandingly.
At the hearing upon the motion, the defendant testified to the foregoing. His sister verified the receipt of threatening notes from the co-defendant, and the co-defendant admitted having sent them. The co-defendant further testified that he sent notes knowing that the defendant was illiterate and easily influenced and in the belief that if one of the accused would plead guilty, the others could get off with a lesser offense conviction. The co-defendant also testified that following the defendant's guilty plea, he stood trial before the court on a charge of first degree murder but was found guilty and sentenced for involuntary manslaughter.
In opposition to the post-conviction motion, the State introduced into evidence the transcript of the guilty plea proceedings. From the transcript, it appears that the defendant had first entered a plea of not guilty but later sought to withdraw and enter a plea of guilty. Thereupon, he was interrogated by his counsel, the prosecuting attorney, and the trial judge. The record reveals that at the time of the change in plea, he knew and understood the following:
1. What a jury trial was and that he was entitled to a jury trial;
2. That he could plead not guilty to either the Court without jury or to a jury;
3. That either the Court or jury could find him guilty of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, or manslaughter;
4. What the penalties were for each of the above findings;
5. When he would be eligible for parole upon a guilty finding of first or second degree murder;
6. That if he had a trial, he would be entitled to have subpoenas issued and witnesses compelled to testify in his behalf;
7. That if the trial ended in a conviction, he would have the right to have counsel appointed, and a transcript furnished, to appeal the conviction to the Indiana Supreme Court;
8. That he had a right to take a change of venue 9. That the prosecutor would recommend life imprisonment for the first degree murder plea and that the Court was not bound by that recommendation and could still sentence him to the electric chair;
10. That he was waiving all of the above rights with his plea of guilty;
11. That nothing had been promised him to induce this guilty plea;
12. That his attorneys represented him in a competent manner; and
13. That the Court was required to hear a portion of the evidence regardless of his plea to bear out the truth of the guilty plea.
Additionally, the record discloses the defendant's admission that nothing had been promised him to induce his guilty plea; and his counsel, at the post-conviction hearing, denied the defendant's charges that he had failed to counsel the defendant properly. The defendant testified that the attorney had spent only five minutes with him. The attorney, although acknowledging that he had no independent recollection of the case which had been disposed of some fourteen years earlier, testified that he had never in his career pleaded a client guilty to first...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Davis v. State
...by the trier of fact will the decision be reversed as contrary to law. Henson v. State, (1979) Ind., 392 N.E.2d 478; Hoskins v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 291, 302 N.E.2d 499. I. Petitioner's post-conviction relief petition was filed on April 5, 1978. On April 10, 1978, petitioner filed a motio......
-
Fleenor v. State
...the trial court has reached the opposite conclusion, that the decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law. Hoskins v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 291, 302 N.E.2d 499. ISSUE While Fleenor's direct appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment precludes a senten......
-
Harrison v. State
...appealing a negative judgment vulnerable on appeal only if contrary to the one reasonable conclusion compelled by the evidence. Hoskins v. State, supra; Berry v. State, Hence our inquiry is restricted to determining whether the record contains evidence from which the court below was require......
-
Davis v. State
...evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Lamb v. State (supra); Maxwell v. State (supra); Colvin v. State (supra); Hoskins v. State (1973), Ind., 302 N.E.2d 499. There is a strong presumption that an attorney has discharged his duty faithfully, and it requires strong and convincing pr......