Hosp. Of St. Vincent Of v. Thompson

Decision Date12 March 1914
Citation116 Va. 101,81 S.E. 13
PartiesHOSPITAL OF ST. VINCENT OF PAUL IN CITY OF NORFOLK. v. THOMPSON.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

1. Charities (§ 45*)—Condition and Use or Buildings—Care as to Licensees.

A person who accompanied a sick friend to a hospital was not a mere licensee upon the premises, and the hospital was bound to use ordinary care to have its premises in a reasonably safe condition.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. §§ 80, 81, 102-104; Dec. Dig. § '45.*]

2. Charities (§ 1*)—Character of Beneficiaries.

That a hospital received compensation from patients who were able to pay for the accommodations did not render it any the less a charitable institution.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 1.*]

3. Charities (§ 45*)—Liability for Torts.

A beneficiary of a charity cannot hold the association liable for negligent injuries, not on the ground of public policy or diversion of trust funds, but because one accepting the benefit of a charity enters into a relationship which exempts his benefactor from such liability.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. §§ 80, 81, 102-104; Dec. Dig. § 45.*]

4. Charities (§ 45*)—Liability fob Torts.

Where plaintiff accompanied a sick friend to a hospital, a charitable institution, and was injured by falling into an elevator shaft negligently left unprotected by defendant, she could recover, since she was not a beneficiary of the charity, but a stranger; a charitable institution not being exempt from torts against strangers because it holds its property in trust to be applied to the purposes of charity.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. §§ 80, 81, 102-104; Dec.-Dig. § 45.*]

5. Charities (§ 45*)—Actions for Injury-Question for Jury.

In an action for an injury to plaintiff, who had accompanied a sick friend to a hospital, caused by her falling into an elevator shaft, evidence held to make a proper case for the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. §§ 80, 81, 102-104; Dec. Dig. tj 45.*]

Appeal from Law and Chancery Court of City of Norfolk.

Action for personal injuries by Mrs. Thompson against the Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul in the City of Norfolk. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Burrow & Spindle and Jas. E. Heath, Jr., all of Norfolk, for plaintiff in error.

E. R. F. Wells, of Norfolk, for defendant in error.

KEITH, P. This was a suit brought by Mrs. Thompson against the Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, in the city of Norfolk, to recover damages for an injury alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the defendant. There was a verdict and judgment infavor of the plaintiff for $2,500, to which a writ of error was awarded.

Three errors are assigned to the rulings of the trial court: First, the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the declaration; second, its refusal to give certain instructions asked for by plaintiff in error, and the giving of certain instructions asked for by defendant in error; and, third, its refusal to set aside the verdict and entering judgment thereon.

There are several grounds of demurrer assigned, which present no question of novelty or importance, and the underlying principles of which will be sufficiently discussed in the succeeding part of this opinion. Suffice it now to say that the declaration, in our judgment, states a cause of action, and the demurrer was therefore properly overruled.

It is assigned as error that the court refused instructions 1 and 3, asked for by the plaintiff' in error, and gave instruction 4, asked for by the defendant in error.

Instruction No. 1, asked for by plaintiff in error and refused by the court, declares that a hospital which is incorporated for taking care of sick and disabled persons who may be received by it, which has no capital stock, and is not conducted for dividends or profits, is a charitable institution; and, if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant is a charitable institution according to this definition, it cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's injury merely because its employes' negligence may have caused said injury, but that, before they can bring in a verdict for the plaintiff, they must further find that the defendant was guilty of negligence in selecting said employes.

The third instruction asked for by the plaintiff in error and refused tells the jury that "if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in this case came upon the premises of the defendant on the 31st day of July, 1912, at the time of the injury complained of, without an invitation, either express or implied, from the said defendant, then the said plaintiff was a mere licensee, and the said defendant was liable to her, if injured upon said premises, for wanton injury only, and they must find for the defendant, unless they further believe that the said plaintiff was wantonly injured while on the premises of the said defendant"

Taking up these instructions in their inverse order, and dealing first with the principle announced in the third instruction, we are of opinion that it was rightly rejected. It appears from the declaration and from the proof—indeed, all of the evidence tends to establish—that the defendant in error was an invitee, and not a mere licensee, to whom the plaintiff in error owed the duty of reasonable care. The law is correctly and, we think, sufficiently stated upon this branch of the case in instruction No. 2, given at the Instance of defendant in error, as follows:

"The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff on July 31, 1912, accompanied at her request a sick friend to the defendant's hospital for treatment, that the condition of her friend was such as to render it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff, or some one else, to accompany her, then the defendant owed to the plaintiff the duty to exercise ordinary care to have its premises in reasonably safe condition for the visit; and, if the defendant negligently failed to perform that duty, and, as the proximate consequence thereof, the plaintiff, while exercising due care, was injured, then the defendant is liable for the injuries sustained."

There is no dispute as to the facts on which this instruction is predicated, and, the facts being ascertained, it was the duty of the court to tell the jury the law which applied to them; and this, as we have said, is correctly done in defendant in error's instruction No. 2.

Instruction No. 1, asked for by plaintiff in error, presents a question of great interest It must be conceded that the plaintiff in error is a charitable institution. That it receives compensation from patients who are able to pay for the accommodations received does not render it any the less a charitable institution in the eye of the law. This seems to be well established by the authorities. McDonald v. Mass. Gen'l Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529; Gla'vin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675.

It may also be conceded that, by the weight of authority, a beneficiary of the charity cannot hold the association responsible for negligent injuries, but the basis upon which the immunity is made to rest differs widely in the adjudicated cases. This court has never heretofore been called upon to consider this subject.

In Trevett v. Prison Association, 98 Va. 332, 36 S. E. 373, 50 L R. A. 564, 81 Am. St. Rep. 727, Trevett, who was a stranger to the association, obtained an injunction against it for polluting a stream which passed through his premises, upon the ground that it had created a nuisance. The association undertook to maintain that it was a public corporation, and relied upon the authority of Maia's Adm'r v. Eastern State Hospital, 97 Va. 507, 34 S. E. 617, 47 L. R. A. 577, a corporation which was held to be purely of a governmental character and under the exclusive ownership and control of the state, and was therefore not liable in damages for the negligent acts of its servants. It was held that the Prison Association could not plead immunity upon this ground; that it was not a public corporation, and, though of a benevolent character, was responsible for Its torts.

The subject has, however, been considered and treated with great learning and ability by numerous courts.

In Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium, 92

Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1127, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a charitable institution conducting a hospital solely for philanthropic and benevolent purposes is not liable to inmates for the negligence of nurses; that a charitable hospital does not, by accepting compensation from a patient who is able to pay for room, board, and care, incur liability to such patient for the negligence of nurses. It will be observed that in this case the hospital accepted compensation from a patient who was able to pay, and, notwithstanding this fact, the court charged the jury, that "the undisputed evidence further shows that the defendant is a charitable institution maintained for philanthropic and charitable and benevolent purposes, and in no manner, directly or indirectly, for private profit or dividend-paying to any one"; and the appellate court held that this instruction was fully justified by the evidence and was properly given. In the course of its opinion, the court said: "It is a well-established doctrine that a charitable institution conducting a hospital solely for philanthropic and benevolent purposes is not liable to inmates for the negligence of nurses. Some courts say that one accepting the benefits of such a charity exempts his benefactor from liability for the negligent acts of servants. Others assert that nonliability is based on the ground that trust funds created for benevolent purposes should not be. diverted therefrom to pay damages arising from the torts of servants. Exemption from liability is frequently sanctioned on...

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