Hosp. San Antonio, Inc. v. Oquendo-Lorenzo

• Decision Date: 25 August 2022
• Docket Number: 17-1810, 18-1936
• Citation: 47 F.4th 1
• Parties: HOSPITAL SAN ANTONIO, INC., or alternatively, John Doe Corporation, d/b/a Hospital San Antonio, Defendant, Appellant, Dr. Osvaldo Quiles-Giovannetti; National Fire & Marine Insurance Company; Sindicato De Aseguradores Para La Suscripcion Conjunta De Seguros De Responsabilidad Profesional Medico-Hospitalaria (SIMED); Marketform Managing Agency Limited on behalf of Syndicate 2468; Jane Doe; Conjugal Partnership Doe-Quiles; John Does 1, 2, and 3; Corporations A, B, and C; Unknown Insurance Companies A through H, Defendants, v. Jessica OQUENDO-LORENZO, personally and on behalf of her conjugal partnership with Rolando Lopez-Montanez; Rolando Lopez-Montanez, personally and on behalf of his conjugal partnership with Jessica Oquendo-Lorenzo; Conjugal Partnership Lopez-Oquendo, Plaintiffs, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

47 F.4th 1

HOSPITAL SAN ANTONIO, INC., or alternatively, John Doe Corporation, d/b/a Hospital San Antonio, Defendant, Appellant,Dr. Osvaldo Quiles-Giovannetti; National Fire & Marine Insurance Company; Sindicato De Aseguradores Para La Suscripcion Conjunta De Seguros De Responsabilidad Profesional Medico-Hospitalaria (SIMED); Marketform Managing Agency Limited on behalf of Syndicate 2468; Jane Doe; Conjugal Partnership Doe-Quiles; John Does 1, 2, and 3; Corporations A, B, and C; Unknown Insurance Companies A through H, Defendants,

v.Jessica OQUENDO-LORENZO, personally and on behalf of her conjugal partnership with Rolando Lopez-Montanez; Rolando Lopez-Montanez, personally and on behalf of his conjugal partnership with Jessica Oquendo-Lorenzo; Conjugal Partnership Lopez-Oquendo, Plaintiffs, Appellees.

No. 17-1810, 18-1936

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

August 25, 2022

Carlos G. Martínez-Vivas, with whom Martinez-Texidor & Martínez-Vivas was on brief, for appellant.

David Efron, with whom Alberto J. Pérez Hernández, Etienne Totti Del Toro, and Law Offices David Efron, PC were on brief, for appellees.

Before Kayatta and Howard, Circuit Judges.^*

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

Before us are consolidated appeals of a final judgment entered by the district court and the court's subsequent denial of a Rule 60(b) motion. This case involves two Puerto Rico statutes -- Article 41.050 of the Puerto Rico Insurance Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 4105, which immunizes a set of healthcare workers from suit, and Section 3077, which waives Puerto Rico's sovereign immunity and establishes liability caps in certain circumstances. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3077. The question before us is whether appellant, Hospital San Antonio, Inc., benefits from the liability limits in Section 3077. We affirm the district court's final judgment below. We also affirm the district court's denial of appellant's Rule 60(b) motion.

I.

A. Factual Background

In July 2013, Jessica Oquendo-Lorenzo -- then pregnant -- visited Dr. Osvaldo Quiles-Giovannetti for a prenatal exam. After examining Oquendo-Lorenzo, Dr. Quiles ordered her admission to San Antonio Hospital. San Antonio Hospital is a public hospital owned by the Municipality of Mayagüez. San Antonio Hospital is operated by Hospital San Antonio, Inc. ("HSA"), a private corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

The next day, Dr. Quiles ordered a cesarean section

on Oquendo-Lorenzo, resulting in the birth of Oquendo-Lorenzo's daughter, J.L.O. J.L.O. was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit at San Antonio Hospital and ultimately transferred to the University Pediatric Hospital at Centro Medico in San Juan, Puerto Rico, until she was discharged in January 2014. That August, J.L.O. died.

Oquendo-Lorenzo and Rolando López-Montañez, J.L.O.'s father, (collectively, "Oquendo") brought a medical malpractice suit against HSA, Dr. Quiles, and their insurance carriers, alleging that J.L.O.'s birth injuries and death resulted from negligence on the part of Dr. Quiles and hospital staff.

B. Procedural History

HSA moved below for partial summary judgment on the basis that it benefited from liability limits and immunity conferred by two Puerto Rico statutes: Section 3077, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3077, a statute that authorizes suits against Puerto Rico in certain circumstances but places caps on liability, and Article 41.050 of the Puerto Rico Insurance Code, which immunizes certain healthcare workers from suit. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 4105. The district court denied HSA's motion and held that HSA was not a covered entity under either statute. HSA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Following that ruling -- and while a second motion for reconsideration by HSA was pending -- in June 2017, the district court approved and adopted a joint settlement agreement proposed by the parties.

Under the settlement, Oquendo agreed to release the claims against Dr. Quiles and Quiles' insurance carrier in exchange for $75,000. Oquendo also released the claims against HSA's insurance companies in exchange for $270,000, with $50,000 allocated to Oquendo's attorney.

The settlement noted HSA's position throughout the litigation that it was covered under liability limits established by Article 41.050 and Section 3077. The parties stipulated that, if HSA did not benefit from limited liability, Oquendo's damages would include an additional $105,000 in excess of the $75,000 and $270,000 payments specified in the settlement. Noting the district court's ruling that HSA did not benefit from limited liability, the agreement provided that -- should the court deny HSA's second motion for reconsideration -- "the [d]istrict [c]ourt would enter judgment against [HSA] in the amount of $105,000."

HSA "reserve[d], preserve[d], and maintain[ed] its defense, as to the extent of the applicability of the immunity and/or the statutory liability limit and/or cap" and preserved its right to appeal. HSA also "preserve[d] and maintain[ed] the right to request to the United States First Circuit the certification of the issues and matters to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico." Finally, HSA committed to "appeal to the United States First Circuit the judgment adverse to it, as to the denial of the cap on liability and/or immunity."

The district court denied HSA's second motion for reconsideration and, on June 27, 2017, entered a partial judgment against HSA in favor of appellees for $105,000. On June 28, 2017, the district court entered a final judgment dismissing all claims against Dr. Quiles and the insurance companies. HSA timely appealed after entry of the final judgment. HSA alternatively requests that we certify the statutory interpretation issues before us to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.

On November 14, 2017, and while this appeal was pending, HSA filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment on the basis that Law No. 99-2017 ("Law 99"), enacted on August 13, 2017, substantially amended Article 41.050 to expressly cover HSA. The district court interpreted the settlement agreement as precluding HSA from seeking further relief from the district court and denied the motion in September 2018. HSA timely appealed that ruling.

II. Jurisdiction

In consolidated appeals, we must have independent jurisdiction to hear both appeals. See Galvin v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 852 F.3d 146, 154 (1st Cir. 2017). We conclude that we have jurisdiction over both appeals in this case.

There is no question that we have jurisdiction to hear HSA's appeal of the final judgment below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties dispute whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of HSA's Rule 60(b) motion. We do.

First, the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the Rule 60(b) motion despite HSA's pending appeal because the district court has "continuing jurisdiction during an appeal to act in aid of the appeal." Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1979). Thus, when "an appeal is pending from a final judgment, parties may file Rule 60(b) motions directly in the district court." Id. at 42. The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion "is appealable as a separate final order." Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 401, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). If a Rule 60(b) motion is denied, "and the denial appealed, we will entertain a request to consolidate that appeal with the pending appeal from final judgment." Colocotroni, 601 F.2d at 42 ; see also Stone, 514 U.S. at 401, 115 S.Ct. 1537. Because the district court had jurisdiction to deny HSA's post-judgment motion -- and we have jurisdiction to hear appeal of that denial -- there are no jurisdictional defects and we may proceed to the merits of both appeals.

III. Standard of Review

Our review of a denial of summary judgment is de novo, Miller v. Sunapee Difference, LLC, 918 F.3d 172, 176 (1st Cir. 2019), as is our review of a district court's statutory interpretation. Hannon v. City of Newton, 744 F.3d 759, 765 (1st Cir. 2014).

With respect to HSA's request to certify the statutory interpretation questions to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, we may certify questions when we decide that available precedent is not clear, and the questions may be determinative in the appeal at issue. Quilez-Velar v. Ox Bodies, Inc., 823 F.3d 712, 723 (1st Cir. 2016). However, "even in the absence of controlling precedent, certification would be inappropriate where state law is sufficiently clear to allow us to predict its course." Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting In Re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) ).

Finally, we review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, though "embedded findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, questions of law are reviewed de novo, and judgment calls are subjected to classic abuse-of-discretion review." Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2010) ; see also Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129, 132 (1st Cir. 2005). Relevant here, interpretation of a settlement agreement is also reviewed de novo. Home Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. Inc., 397 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2005).

IV. Discussion

As a federal court sitting in diversity, "we look to the pronouncements of a state's highest court in order to discern the contours of that state's law." González Figueroa v. J.C. Penney Puerto Rico, Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 2009). For purposes of determining applicable Puerto Rico law, we look to Puerto Rico Supreme Court precedent. Id. Where, as here, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue before us, we must anticipate how the court would rule if it were deciding the questions presented. Id. In doing so, we look to the "pertinent statutory language and analogous decisions of the [Puerto Rico] Supreme Court." Id.

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