Hospital Services v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 02 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 9068,9068
• Citation: 229 N.W.2d 69
• Parties: HOSPITAL SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George BROOKS, Defendant and Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 69

229 N.W.2d 69

HOSPITAL SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George BROOKS, Defendant and Appellee.

Civ. No. 9068.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

April 2, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. No part of the North Dakota Century Code is retroactive unless it is expressly declared to be so.

2. Statutory construction of an Act of the Legislature is presumed to be prospective unless a contrary intention is clearly manifested.

3. Questions, the answers to which are not necessary to the determination of a case, need not be considered.

4. For reasons stated in the opinion, Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., as it relates to the responsibility of children to pay for their parents' care at the State Hospital, which care results from an involuntary commitment, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and is unconstitutional as a violation of Sections 11 and 20 of the North Dakota State Constitution.

Robert A. Alphson, Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellant.

DePuy, Fair & O'Connor, Ltd., Grafton, for defendant and appellee; argued by E. N. O'Connor, Grafton.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

This action was brought by the appellant, Hospital Services, Inc., an assignee of the State Hospital at Jamestown, North Dakota, to recover upon an account for supplies and services provided to the appellee's mother, Agnes Brooks. The district court, finding Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., unconstitutional, ruled in favor of the defendant, appellee, George Brooks.

The parties have stipulated to the following facts.

Agnes Brooks, born April 23, 1906, was committed to the State Hospital at Jamestown, North Dakota, through the Walsh County Court. She remained a patient at that institution from May 21, 1965, until September 2, 1969, during which time the Hospital performed services for and furnished supplies to her of the reasonable value of $8,708.46. Mrs. Brooks is a widow and now a resident of the Pembelier Nursing Center at Walhalla, North Dakota. While no legal action has been commenced against her for collection of the account, demand for payment has been made upon George Brooks, one of her five sons. He refused to make payment and on January 27, 1972, the State Hospital claim was assigned to Hospital Services, Inc., which commenced an action against Mr. Brooks.

As framed by the parties, the issue before this Court is whether Section 25--09--04 of the North Dakota Century Code violates the provisions of Section 11 and Section 20 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota and Article XIV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution.

Previous to its amendment in 1971, Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., read:

'25--09--04. Responsible relatives shall pay for care and treatment--Definition.--In the event of the patients' inability to pay for the costs of care and treatment, responsible relatives of such patients at the state hospital or state school shall pay to the supervising department quarterly, the actual cost of care and treatment incurred by the state at each institution, or such lesser amount as may be determined in accordance with sections 25--09--05, 25--09--06, or 25--09--11. For purposes of this chapter and title 25 of this code 'responsible relatives' shall mean the patient's spouse, father, mother or children.' N.D.C.C.

Pertinent sections of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota read:

'Section 11. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.'

Article I, Constitution of the State of North Dakota.

'Section 20. No special privileges or immunities shall ever by granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislartive assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens.'

Article I, Constitution of the State of North Dakota.

Pertinent also is Article XIV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution.

'Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

Article XIV, United States Constitution.

Preliminary to any consideration of constitutional questions, we will examine Brooks' contention that the judgment dismissing the complaint can be affirmed on nonconstitutional grounds.

He first contends that in amending Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., in 1971, the Legislature intended only a clarification of the prior statute and did not intend to alter its operation. Brooks asserts that because the amended statute now excludes children from the list of 'responsible relatives,' the judgment should be affirmed on the basis of Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., as amended. That section now reads:

'25--09--04. Responsible relatives shall pay for care and treatment--Definition.--In the event of a patient's inability to pay for the costs of care and treatment, responsible relatives of such patient at the state hospital or state school shall pay to the supervising department monthly, the actual cost of care and treatment incurred by the state at each institution, or such lesser amount as may be determined by law. For purposes of this chapter and title 25, 'responsible relatives' shall mean the patient's spouse, father, or mother. No responsible relative shall be required to pay such costs for children upon such children reaching their eighteenth birthday in regard to indebtedness incurred from and after July 1, 1971.' N.D.C.C.

To uphold Brooks' contention we would have to give retrospective effect to the amendment in 1971 of Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C. Giving retrospective effect to this section would contravene a statute and decisions of this State.

Section 1--02--10, N.D.C.C., provides that 'no part of this code is retroactive unless it is expressly declared to be so.'

In Monson v. Nelson, 145 N.W.2d 892, 897 (N.D.1966), we said:

'The general rule of statutory construction that an act of the legislature is presumed to be prospective unless the legislative clearly manifests a contrary intention is well established in this state by case law and statute. See Gimble v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 77 N.D. 581, 44 N.W.2d 198, and cases cited.'

For these reasons we conclude that the judgment cannot be affirmed on the basis that Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., as amended in 1971, is in effect for this case.

Brooks also contends that legal action by the State Hospital against the patient to recover the amount due is a condition precedent to bringing action against a responsible relative as described in Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C. because of our views concerning the constitutional issue, we shall not attempt to determine the validity of this contention.

Questions, the answers to which are not necessary to the determination of a case, need not be considered. See Stockmen's Ins. Agcy., Inc. v. Guarantee Res. L. Ins. Co., 217 N.W.2d 455 (N.D.1974); Inches v. Butcher, 104 N.W.2d 556 (N.D.1960); Heald v. Strong, 24 N.D. 120, 138 N.W. 1114 (1912).

The statute before us constitutes class legislation in that it imposes upon some persons a financial burden related to a state function which is not imposed upon other persons. The question is whether it constitutes impermissible classification or invidious discrimination. Classification is not in itself prohibited. However, in classifying to achieve social goals, the Legislature may not act arbitrarily.

We have said in considering the constitutionality of a statute which distinguished between State legislators who rendered services or did business with the State or its subdivisions, depending on whether they rendered services or did business in excess of or less than $10,000 in any calendar year, and in considering the constitutionality of a statute dealing with the right of an illegitimate child to receive an inheritance, that:

'5. Sections 11 and 20 of the North Dakota Constitution and § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution do not prohibit or prevent classification, provided such classification is reasonable for the purpose of legislation, is based on proper and justifiable distinctions considering the purpose of the law, is not clearly arbitrary, and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or to burden another or to oppress unlawfully in its administration.

'6. A proper classification for legislative purposes must embrace all who naturally belong to the class.' In Re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 877 (N.D.1968).

See also Melland v. Johanneson, 160 N.W.2d 107 (N.D.1968).

We believe that the classification inherent in Section 25--09--04, N.D.C.C., is arbitrary and oppressive, that there exists no reasonable relationship between the legislative purpose, that of reducing the financial burden upon the State of caring for those who have been involuntarily committed to the State Hospital for the mentally ill, and the selection of the class of 'responsible relatives' designated in that section to accomplish that purpose and that this section therefore denies that equal protection of the laws that is guaranteed under Sections 11 and 20 of our State Constitution. For reasons later explained, we decline to decide whether that section is violative of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In finding Section 25--09--04 unconstitutional, we reach the same result as the Supreme Court of California in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 (1964).

The facts before us closely parallel those in that case. In Kirchner, a Mrs. Schaeche was adjudged mentally ill and committed by the Court to a State...